Livingston, Paiseley. (2009). In Cinema, philosophy, and Bergman: On film as philosophy (pp. 63-83). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Livingston three key issues of mainstream large-scale film-making. (1) individual and joint/collective authorship: he emphasizes these two forms of authorship in lieu of the predominant notion of individual authorship. (2)authorship and value: one of the reasons for discussing authorship is the link between certain kinds of values and intentional activity. (3) authorship and unity: Livingston argues, "only the maker of a large, strongly unified life work or oeuvre complet truly qualifies as an author" (p. 68). [This view makes him distinct from Gaut, who argued for multiple authors within a single work of art.]
Livingston argues for two conditions of cinematic authorship: sufficient control over the production of a work plus an intentional act to express the author's own attitude. In this regard, he presented various types of cinematic authorship: individual authorship, individual authorship in the context of a collective film-making process, and joint authorship amongst equals. In particular with joint authorship, Livingston borrowed the term "mashing sub-plans" used by Michael E. Bratman (Faces of intention: Selected essays on intention and agency, 98-103, Cambridge University Press, 1999):
"In many cases where two or more persons jointly author an utterance or work, they intentionally generate or select the text, artefact [sic], performance, or structure that is the work's publicly observable component; in so doing, they act on meshing sub-plans and exercise shared control and decision-making authority over the results; furthermore, in making the work or utterance, they together take credit for it as a whole." (p. 74)
Livingston contended that individual authorship is indeed rare in large-scale commercial film-making, for film-making is a collective process in which people depend on each other's skills. And yet, he stressed that there should be one who control over the overall process. In this respect, Livingston distinguishes himself from Gaut (1997, 2010), who argued for multiple authorship in mainstream authorship, in part, because actors also contribute to creating artistic properties that deserves recognition as one of the work's multiple authors.
Despite his agreement with Gaut that most films are not individually authored and various artistic contributions merit appreciation, Livingston limited the word author to " a person who has played the role of the dominant coordinating collaborator in the creation of the work, provided, that is, that the work has been made by this person with the aim of expressing his or her attitude (or, in the absence of any expressive content, with the aim of endowing the work with artistic quality)" (p. 77). One of the reasons why Livingston disqualify actors' performances as authorship is that they do not play controlling and expressive roles in the making of the work, although their performances are successfully "mashed" with the director's intention and expression.
In short, Livingston emphasized, in the notion of cinematic authorship, overall control and expressive or artistic intentional design in the making of a work. Nonetheless, he does not exclude other types of cinematic authorship, namely, in non-hierarchical forms of artistic collaboration. He leaves the door open to this field. [I think that PV can fall into this category.]