Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts

Sunday, January 4, 2009

Democracy and Education

John Dewey. (1916; 1966). Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada.

The Democratic Conception in Education (81-99)

In his view of intelligence, Dewey expresses that intelligence lack of social/human factors is narrowed down only to factors concerning technical production and marketing goods to the extent that emotional life is distorted. He emphasizes enlarged physical environment and social contacts for tolerant mental life, and asserts that frequent travels and commercial tendencies contributed to the broaden contacts, thus alleviating tensions among people. [But this last view is very naive because those travels and economic flows do not necessarily bring people closer in reality. Most of all, he does not identify what he means by the closeness. He is lack of economic and political connotations in the smaller world.]

By democracy he means a "mode of associative living and of conjoint communicated experience," and writes as its characteristics increasing shared concerns and the liberation of personal capacities. As the purpose of education he writes,"a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims." [As he indicates, a common pitfall throughout the history is that social aims and its direction are hardly defined and so does his case.]

He reviews educational philosophy in three different epochs: (1) Plato believed the great truth and the society reflecting it should be stable, which is achieved by arranging individuals' roles based on what they are good for. Thus, discovering the personal aptitude and training it is the purpose of education. Dewey's criticism of Plato includes that Plato categorized individuals into three classes and did not recognize individual uniqueness. [Dewey's perspective of education is very individualistic without paying much attention to what each bring into educational environment, thus, very idealistic.] (2) With the significant studies in Nature, the eighteenth century Enlightment influenced education philosophy, namely by Rousseau. Its emphasis was given to development of individualism. Dewey, however, sees that its chief interest was in social progress toward a freer society with two distinctive aspects--cosmopolitanism and humanity. Thus in this view, individual emancipation was the agent of a progressive society, Dewey denotes. Dewey's criticism comes from the way of conducting education, which followed the natural environment--in other words, education means filling individual mind with something good and true just like seen in Nature.[This perspective is clearly shown in Emile by Rousseau.] (3) Under the German influence in the 19th century state-run public school system and nationalism spread out and the purpose of education in this paradigm was to form the citizen who can serve for the state interests and social efficiency, thus the idea of individual development receded and disciplinary training became far the most important aim of education. Even it was said that the attainment of true personality is obtained through institutions organized by the state.

Dewey poses the question of how to conduct education that preserves humanity and he answers that it should be done by the efforts of enlightened men in their private capacity. [While he criticizes Plato for his aristocratic perspective that a smart ruler will know the orderly rules and law, his idealistic individualism does not go beyond. He thinks we should rely on those few. Isn't there any systematic way of approaching the problem?]


Experience and Thinking (139-151)
Emphasizing experience, Dewey argues that even a humble experience has possibility to generate any amount of theory, but theory without an experience cannot be established. Thinking and reflection are the agent that connects experience to theory as we do not really know unless bringing certain things in relation to something else.

Thinking in Education (152-163)
For Dewey, "thinking is the method of intelligent learning" and it requires an experience. The problem in school setting is that this out-of-school ordinary experience is not reflected in pupils' learning, thus mind and activities are divorced and learning is isolated from the rest of social engagement. This separation hinders the process of thinking and creativity, which lies in putting familiar materials in an unusual context. "Only silly folk identify creative originality with the extraordinary and fanciful, " said Dewey. Therefore, his emphasis on interconnection between real life experience and school lessons becomes an core idea of curriculum development to the extent that real life materials such as 'shops' and 'gardens' integrated into class will provide opportunities for acquiring information and knowledge while carrying on progressive experience. [Although his emphasis on real life experience is agreeable in general, bringing in a model of society poses a problem because of his neglect of diversity of individual pupils' lived experience based on their cultural/social/economic/political background. Remodeling a society is not transparent as he insinuates because individuals live in different contexts. In addition, it is my ever-lasting rejection to Dewey is why we don't allow pupils to bring their own experience to class and/or dream a new society, which is totally different from the current one, for a moment.]

Intellectual and Practical Studies (262-276)

The Individual and the World (291-305)
Individualism is a modern concept. While in both Greek and medieval periods, individuals were regarded only as a channel through which a universal or divine intelligence or "reason" operated, a latent individualism smeared as a religious individualism--the salvation of individual soul-- in the medieval period, thus knowledge itself is something built up within the individual through his acts and mental states. This aspect gave birth to the 'practical individualism' that knowledge is obtained through personal experience. It, however, originates from the notion that mind is isolated from the world, which is left to be discovered, and spurred philosophic subjectivism. Dewey argues that men strive for freedom in nature and society and initiate changes in the world instead of isolating themselves from the nature. Thus self, mind and knowledge constitute a unity achieved through interactions: "The self achieves mind in the degree in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life about him; the self is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account."

Dewey maintains that every new idea different from the custom must originate from an individual, however, sprouting it is suppressed in society because of its tendency of continuity and stability. In this light, the notion of intellectual individualism guides us further as a moral and social individualism. While intellectual activities of the individual are agencies of social progress, conformity is that of social conservation. Then, the question arises: how egoistic consciousness is related to the public world? Dewey introduces three philosophic branches with regard to this question: (1) French rationalism, which emphasizes general and impersonal forms, argues that activities will be externally consistent and thus always reach a uniformity through argument and persuasion. (2) English thought is centered on individual own pleasure and pains. The main idea of this thought is that in order to maximize the pleasure, each should be considerate of others' circumstances as well and thus a harmony is achieved. (3) German philosophy lies in between in that individuals become rational only if they absorbs the rationality of the universe and social institution. Often called absolute or objective idealism, it is termed as institutional idealism by Dewey. He evaluates that while this idealism overcame isolated individualism fallen in France and England and served to arouse state-wide public education, it tended to reinstate the principle of authority and thus left political democracy foreign.

In stating educational implication of these philosophies, Dewey emphasizes learner's perspective: originality springs from unforced response of student's own individuality, which leads to their own discovery and allows them to obtain new points of view and intellectual companionship. Intellectual servility and subjection will only serve the purpose of authority, Dewey argues. His perspective of education and democracy is unfolded as following: "A progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth. Hence a democratic society must, in consistency with its ideal, allow for intellectual freedom and the play of diverse gifts and interests in its educational measures."

Vocational Aspect of Education (pp. 306-320)
By vocation Dewey means a direction of life activities in relation to others and social accomplishment that individuals play in various roles. Criticizing Plato's idea of the purpose of education, which is to discover what each person is good for and train them to master that area for social harmony, Dewey argues that he not only limits the scope of vocation but also ignores infinite capabilities that individual may possess. As seen in his note that "the vocation acts as both magnet to attract and as glue to hold," he regards vocation from a very macroscopic view to the extent to realize well-rounded personality in society. From this stand, he also writes, "the dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is living--intellectual and moral growth," thus denotes that restricting education for future occupation not only injures present development but also hinders exploring proper future right employment. In relation to the current industrial society, he asserts that increasing 'conspicuous' industrial process has brought social importance and brought to light questions of school learning to industrial life and demanded trade education. This tendency is twofold: it maintains higher education as a threshold for social status and prestige to a certain class while for the rest it turns occupation to only means for surviving, thus making education become an instrument to perpetuate the existing industrial social order--in his word, "to accomplish the feudal dogma of social predestination." Nevertheless, his pragmatic/progressive perspective is preserved in his purpose of vocational education and the way to achieve the goals: as education lies in the process of constructing a gradual transition from school materials to real life, vocational education, under the conspicuous industrial society, should integrate scientific factors that the society offers into curriculum to develop intelligence and make it more practical. [He admits that this process is not easy and emphasize the preparation to vocation should be indirect, but does not explicitly explain how to use the industrial context in such a peculiar way. Materials borrowed in class brings not only itself but also the context it is created. Without carefully conceived criticality in the adaptation, it is not an easy task.]

Saturday, November 15, 2008

Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews & Other Writings (1972-77)

Michel Foucault. (1980). Colin Gordon (Ed). New York: Pantheon Books.

Prison Talk (pp. 37-54)
"With the prisons there would be no sense in limiting oneself to discourses about prisons; just as important are the discourses which arise within the prison, the decisions and regulations which are among its constitutive elements, its means of functioning, along with its strategies, its convert discourses and ruses, ruses which are not ultimately played by any particular person, but which are none the less lived, and assure the permanence and functioning of the institution. All of this has to be brought together and made visible by the historian." Foucault asserts that power exists in a capillary form as it operates on body, actions, attitude, and discourses in granularity of every day life. Foucault's suggested study of history is to use a magnifying instrument to make unseen visible. By looking into one particular incident, one may not only reveal the same domain but also add another layer to history. His particular contribution to the study of history is that he started to investigate the relation between power and knowledge. He argues, "the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power." His comments on university is of interest: "The university hierarchy is only the most visible, the most sclerotic and least dangerous form of this--relation of power and knowledge-- phenomenon...Diffused, entrenched and dangerous, they operate in other places than in the person of the old professor."

Truth and Power (pp.109-133)
This conversation records Foucault's perspective on truth and power and methodological approach to knowledge. By the productive aspect of power, he means power that 'traverses and produces things, induces pleasure, forms knowledge and produces discourse' through the whole social body. According to him, this is a new 'economy' of power--biopower in Hardt and Negri's term. He emphasizes study of power goes beyond the State and sovereignty because the State can only operate on already existing power relations, not regulating all the powers. Detaching power from sovereignty and law, he suggests redefining power as a form of warlike domination, peace as a form of war and the State a means of waging it. As reflected in Hardt and Negri's work, Foucault stresses permanent war in civil society, and questions the role of army and military in this society. [It is interesting to find overlaps with regard to constant war and characteristics of power between Hardt & Negri and Foucault.] Unlike in feudal societies, power is exercied through 'social production' that intends to obtain productive services from individuals in their concrete life, Foucault argues, and thus power has to permeate the bodies of individuals, acts, attitudes and behaviors, as seen in school discipline.

His perspective on intellectuals also meets Hardt and Negri's. Foucault emphasizes 'specific' intellectuals rather than 'universal' intellectuals. He asserts that 'specific' intellectuals, experts or savant, specialized in certain domain of knowledge, maintains concrete awareness of struggles, thus drawn even closer to the proletariat since they confront the same adversary as the proletariat in their own struggles. Their growing importance is exemplified by Foucault with physicists debating in political realm at the turn of the century. He finds the real importance of specific intellectuals in the extention of 'technico-scientific structures' in the economic and strateific domain. Foucault stresses that unlike universal intellectuals, who were the writers of genius and opposed the unjust sovereignity, specific intellectuals are a group of handful people who possess at their disposal power, which can either produce or destroy life. [Here again resonates the concept of biopower by Hardt and Negri.] Foucault continues, the pitfall of experts' struggles lies in lack of a 'global strategy' or 'outside support.' In other words, isolation or singularity lacking network is a problem. [Grounding in this idea, Hardt and Negri argues that a distributed communication network can be an instrument for orchestrating these struggles.]

Foucault says, "truth isn't outside of power." According to him, truth is produced by constraints and induces power through the regime of truth, or the general politics of truth, of each society. The regime of truth is explained by him as follows, "the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded values in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true."

He suggests that political problems for intellectuals should be placed in terms of power and truth rather than science and ideology. In this way, he argues that professionalization of intellectuals, which distinguishes intellectual labors from manual labors, can be 'envisaged' in a new way. Thus, according to him, emancipating truth from power does not hold the same importance as "detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony at social/economical/cultural levels."

The History of Sexuality (pp.183-193)
Foucault argues that one should go beyond focusing on a negative grid of power in terms of justice, technology and strategy and need to see a productive side of it--'bio-power' or 'somato-power'--which operates on the body itself bypassing the subject's consciousness. He also emphasizes on certain power, which is not a projection of sovereign's power. He calls this power the concrete and 'changing' soil that sovereign power is grounded. He criticizes the existentialism with the notion that it lays everything at individual responsibility, while those with a political/economic perspective limit their views to the market economy or capital exploitation. Thus, he brings about new schemas of politicisation for political anaylsis.