Rawls, John. (1999). Harvard University Press.
Justice as Fairness (3-46)
By justice as fairness Rawls means that the principles of justice are drawn from an initial situation that is fair. In this situation, he explains, no one knows his position in society, his class or social status, his intelligence, and the like; and likewise no parties knows their conceptions of the good. Thus, "the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance" (p. 11).
Rawls emphasizes the importance of deriving the principles of justice from the ideal situation as justice as fairness, stating:
"[E]ach person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society , and the nature of this position materilaly affects his life prospect. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to bring a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed." (p. 12)
In the foundation of his conception of justice as fairness, there is a view that each person possesses an inviolability based on justice, which "does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many" (p. 3). In this view, individual rights and liberties take a precedence over a greater good shared by others, and a society is more or less self-sufficient association of people who recognize certain rules and act accordingly. However, Rawls notes that, because of inevitable conflicts and identity of interests among its members, a set of rules is required to prioritize and arrange certain distributive principles for the basic structure of society. This is the concept of social justice that Rawls delves into.
A conflict that arise in this situation, according to him, is that without strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure for a greater good because each person desires to protect his interests and advance his conception of the good. Here he argues that people would choose two principles in the initial situation that is fair: (1) the first principle requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, and (2) social and economic inequalities must result in compensating benefits for everyone. Thus he maintains the justice for a greater good, writing, "[T]here is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved." (p. 13).