Feminism and multiculturalism: foes or companions?

Okin, S. M., Cohen, J., Howard, M., & Nussbaum, M. C. (1999). Is multiculturalism bad for women? Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ.

Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Susan M. Okin. 7-24
Liberalism's Sacred Cow. Homi K. Bhabha. 79-84.
A Plea for Difficulty. Martha C. Nussbaum. 105-114.

By questioning, “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” in Boston Review in 1997, Okin (1999) contests that multiculturalism in the name of group rights tends to provide rationales for perpetuating gender inequality in minority cultures. Examining the French accommodation of polygamy in minority groups while prohibiting Magrbin girls from wearing headscarves at school in the 1980s, Okin suggests intrinsic tensions between feminism and multiculturalism that commits to group rights for minority cultures.

She claims that most cultures are patriarchal and many of the cultural minorities calling for group rights are more patriarchal than the ‘surrounding culture’. This assumption of the nature of minority cultures stems partially from a view that regards a culture as a self-defined and well-bounded static entity. As Song rightly points out, Okin overlooks that cultures are interconnected and shaped by interactions between majority and minority cultures. What’s more, her approach to the issue of gender inequality in minority cultures is based on a biased view that Western societies are more liberal with respect to gender equality. This premise is observed in her clause us versus them:

Surely it is not enough, for one to be able to "question one's inherited social roles" and to have the capacity to make choices about the life one wants to lead, that one's culture be protected. At least as important to the development of self-respect and self-esteem is our place within our culture [sic]. And at least as important to our capacity to question our social roles is whether our culture instills in and enforces particular social roles on us [sic]. To the extent that their culture is patriarchal, in both these respects the healthy development of girls is endangered. (p. 22)

Okin supports her idea of the likely contention between multiculturalism and feminism on the two basis: (1) almost legal cases related to women’s rights are grounded in their individual rights were violated by the practices of their cultural groups and (2) As Amy Gutmann pointed out, the majority of challenges of multiculturalism has to do with gender inequality. Okin maintains that this multicultural commitment to cultural diversity/defense can violate individual rights to the equal protection of the laws. On the grounds that gender discrimination in minority cultures tends to remain private, she calls for special care in looking at the inequality issue within the cultures.

Okin’s forceful argument aroused debate among scholars. Bhabha responds to Okin’s argument by stating that Okin falls into monolithic, though gender-differentiated, characterization of minority cultures by focusing on patriarchal cultural defense for certain crimes, thus missing the liberal grounds where multiculturalism and feminism might negotiate. Bhabha insinuates that Okin’s pitfall stems partially from her view to evaluate minority cultures from a perspective of liberal Western culture. Instead, he insists on placing cultural defense or group rights in the context of the current lives of minorities in the Western cultures. In this regards, he states, “[w]hat is considerably more problematic than the inappropriate application of "external" norms is the way in which the norms of Western liberalism become at once the measure and mentor of minority cultures” (p. 83).

In contrast to Okin’s perspective, Bhabha maintains that a Western liberalism interacts with and is inscribed in the exclusionary division of post-colonial practices. Thus he writes, “[a]n awareness of the ambivalent and "unsatisfied" histories of the liberal persuasion allows "us"--postcolonial critics, multiculturalists, or feminists--to join in the unfinished work of creating a more viable, intra-cultural community of rights” (p. 84).

In responding to Okin's argument of sex discrimination in religion, Nussbaum states that it is a difficult task to define the complexity of the relationship between religion and feminism but Okin makes it sound too easy. In this regard, Nussbaum is attentive to civil movements, in particular feminist movement, grounded in religion. She writes:

By treating the original core of the religion as equivalent to certain patriarchal stories, Okin simply bypasses centuries of debate within each of the religions, debate highly pertinent to religion's role in the search for women's equality.(p. 107)

Nussbaum argues further that by ignoring religious struggle for justice, Okin alienates potential allies and makes her own feminist struggle difficult. With regard to state's political intervention to religious practices, Nussbaum hesitates to present a clear view, writing:

It is indeed difficult to say how far the state should accommodate comprehensive religious views that seem at odd with secular liberal political values. But this is my point: it is [sic] difficult, rather than easy. (p. 108)

She agrees with a special protection for minority religions because of their vulnerability in all societies. Questionable to her is how state should intervene. She proposes that we should ask whether a proposed law, banning child marriage or polygamy, for example, really does impose a 'substantial burden' on people's free exercise of their religion. If the answer is no, the law may go forward, she argues. On the basis of her argument, she calls for respect for different lives one choose to lead before delving into the complexity of this issue.