Song, Sarah. (2005).American Political Science Review, 99 (4), 473-489.
Attentive to debate on multiculturalism and gender inequality, emphasized by Okin in particular, Song agrees with a general assumption—either defenders or critiques of multiculturalism—that problems of gender inequality in minority groups originate partially from internal struggles within the groups, but contests that this internal view overlooks how intercultural interactions shape gender status. In this regard, she rightly points out that the debate over gender and culture within the practice and theory of multiculturalism focuses on ways in which minority norms and practices threaten gender equality within majority culture. Instead she calls attention to the reverse influence. She states:
Majority norms and practices also pose obstacles to the pursuit of gender equality within minority cultures. What is of particular concern for the debate on multiculturalism is that the mainstream legal and normative frameworks within which minority claims for accommodation are evaluated have themselves been informed by patriarchal norms, which in turn have offered support for gender hierarchies within minority cultures. (p. 474)
Thus she calls for a critical examination of both minority and majority norms and practices in claiming minority cultures.
Song insinuates that the current debate is grounded in the view that culture is well-bounded and self-integrated, as Kymlicka suggests. She argues,
Cultures and cultural identities emerge, change, and are maintained through social interactions and political struggle…To get at cultural differences, we need to examine the processes by which cultural identities get constructed. This requires attention to historical context and to collective discussions and struggles within a community, as well as to interactions between members and outsiders—–in particular, to the role of states in shaping cultural identities. (p. 474)
In responding to Kymlicka’s influential view of multiculturalism and preservation of minority cultures, Song continues to stress looking at cultural interchange between majority and minority groups and how minority cultures are shaped and continuously developed through the interchange. In this way, she calls attention to the politics of cultural construction, conflicts and identities. (She notes that cultural interactions are further fueled by global economy, transnational communication network and migrations of people across borders.) She states:
“Cultures vary in the degree of fluidity, contestation, and permeability, but even in relatively closed groups the content of cultures is not determined purely “from the inside.” Rather, cultures have developed through interactions and struggles with other cultures. This suggests the need to examine more closely the role of interactive dynamics in shaping the identities and practices of majority and minority cultural communities.” (p. 476)
Song categorizes the interconnections between majority and minority cultures: congruence effect, boomerang effect and diversionary effect.
1) Congruence effect refers to the reinforcement of (gender) inequality in minority cultures through majority norms. In reviewing the case of Santa Clara Pueblo in 1975, Song argues that gender inequality inscribed in the case—a refusal to matrilineal heritage in the Indian community—reflected the norms of gender inequality of the majority culture: the State endorsed the Pueblo’s amendment of their membership in 1939 that restricts to a patrilineal kinship system and this endorsement, in fact, reflected the current mainstream gender bias. It is only in the 1930s that women attained a right to citizenship independent to her husband. Song writes:
“[T]he gender-biased membership rule of the Santa Clara Pueblo was not “frowned upon by federal policy” in part because the Pueblo rule was congruent with the dominant culture’s own gendered understandings of membership.” (p. 479)
Song examines the congruence effect in the cases of ‘cultural defense’, where cultural evidence is taken into consideration in court decisions in the expense of equal protection to all. After examining cases of rape and wife-murder by immigrants in the 1980s in comparison with the provocation defense in the majority culture—where emotionally provoked criminal charge in intimate relationships is reduced—Song stresses:
“[T]he problem raised by the “cultural defense” cases above has not only to do with minority practices but also with mainstream norms that offer support for those practices…So long as gender-biased norms pervade legal doctrine and practice, minority defendants can continue to find support for patriarchal practices within mainstream law.” (p. 482)
2) Song defines boomerang effect as a reverse influence from minority to majority culture to reinforce patriarchal orders within the wider/mainstream society. Song calls attention to wider practices of patriarchal behaviors among immigrants and mainstream defendants influenced by a growing number of cultural defense cases. She writes:
“In some locales, juries have allowed such defenses to serve as partial excuses for patriarchal behavior among immigrants, and mainstream defendants can and may well point to these “cultural” cases in raising their own criminal defense claims. Given the increasingly diverse immigrant presence in the United States and the increasing use of cultural defenses, it is important to be attentive to boomerang effects.” (p. 483)
3) Song refers to diversionary effect as deflecting attention from unequal gender practices in the mainstream culture by emphasizing special cases of gender inequality in minority cultures. She states:
“[C]ondemnation of various practices among immigrants may help divert attention from majority practices. Focusing on cases of domestic violence or rape in immigrant communities can serve to reinforce the false dichotomy of oppressive minority cultures and egalitarian majority cultures, deflecting attention from the reality of domestic violence and other patriarchal practices within majority cultures” (p. 485)
Thus Song insist on analyzing majority norms and practices alongside those of minority because overlooking the diversionary effect can reinforce gender hierarchies across cultures and fuel the maintenance of the superiority of the mainstream culture.
In conclusion, Song contests that an internal view that regards gender inequality as an intrinsic quality of a culture as a whole fails to capture a range of interactive dynamics that shape cultural conflicts with the sustenance of the state’s role in endorsing the accommodation of minority practices that are congruent with the dominant culture’s own norms and practices. In this way, she disrupts the dilemma of multiculturalism and gender inequality, writing:
If we take a social constructivist view of cultures as not only internally contested but also interactive and mutually constitutive, then the problem for feminists is not so much “multiculturalism versus gender equality” as “patriarchy versus gender equality.” (p. 486)
In so doing, Song insinuates the necessity of looking into non-cultural factors, such as race and class, which impede struggles toward gender equality.
Showing posts with label gender. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gender. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Monday, January 11, 2010
Feminism and multiculturalism: foes or companions?
Okin, S. M., Cohen, J., Howard, M., & Nussbaum, M. C. (1999). Is multiculturalism bad for women? Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ.
Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Susan M. Okin. 7-24
Liberalism's Sacred Cow. Homi K. Bhabha. 79-84.
A Plea for Difficulty. Martha C. Nussbaum. 105-114.
By questioning, “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” in Boston Review in 1997, Okin (1999) contests that multiculturalism in the name of group rights tends to provide rationales for perpetuating gender inequality in minority cultures. Examining the French accommodation of polygamy in minority groups while prohibiting Magrbin girls from wearing headscarves at school in the 1980s, Okin suggests intrinsic tensions between feminism and multiculturalism that commits to group rights for minority cultures.
She claims that most cultures are patriarchal and many of the cultural minorities calling for group rights are more patriarchal than the ‘surrounding culture’. This assumption of the nature of minority cultures stems partially from a view that regards a culture as a self-defined and well-bounded static entity. As Song rightly points out, Okin overlooks that cultures are interconnected and shaped by interactions between majority and minority cultures. What’s more, her approach to the issue of gender inequality in minority cultures is based on a biased view that Western societies are more liberal with respect to gender equality. This premise is observed in her clause us versus them:
Surely it is not enough, for one to be able to "question one's inherited social roles" and to have the capacity to make choices about the life one wants to lead, that one's culture be protected. At least as important to the development of self-respect and self-esteem is our place within our culture [sic]. And at least as important to our capacity to question our social roles is whether our culture instills in and enforces particular social roles on us [sic]. To the extent that their culture is patriarchal, in both these respects the healthy development of girls is endangered. (p. 22)
Okin supports her idea of the likely contention between multiculturalism and feminism on the two basis: (1) almost legal cases related to women’s rights are grounded in their individual rights were violated by the practices of their cultural groups and (2) As Amy Gutmann pointed out, the majority of challenges of multiculturalism has to do with gender inequality. Okin maintains that this multicultural commitment to cultural diversity/defense can violate individual rights to the equal protection of the laws. On the grounds that gender discrimination in minority cultures tends to remain private, she calls for special care in looking at the inequality issue within the cultures.
Okin’s forceful argument aroused debate among scholars. Bhabha responds to Okin’s argument by stating that Okin falls into monolithic, though gender-differentiated, characterization of minority cultures by focusing on patriarchal cultural defense for certain crimes, thus missing the liberal grounds where multiculturalism and feminism might negotiate. Bhabha insinuates that Okin’s pitfall stems partially from her view to evaluate minority cultures from a perspective of liberal Western culture. Instead, he insists on placing cultural defense or group rights in the context of the current lives of minorities in the Western cultures. In this regards, he states, “[w]hat is considerably more problematic than the inappropriate application of "external" norms is the way in which the norms of Western liberalism become at once the measure and mentor of minority cultures” (p. 83).
In contrast to Okin’s perspective, Bhabha maintains that a Western liberalism interacts with and is inscribed in the exclusionary division of post-colonial practices. Thus he writes, “[a]n awareness of the ambivalent and "unsatisfied" histories of the liberal persuasion allows "us"--postcolonial critics, multiculturalists, or feminists--to join in the unfinished work of creating a more viable, intra-cultural community of rights” (p. 84).
In responding to Okin's argument of sex discrimination in religion, Nussbaum states that it is a difficult task to define the complexity of the relationship between religion and feminism but Okin makes it sound too easy. In this regard, Nussbaum is attentive to civil movements, in particular feminist movement, grounded in religion. She writes:
By treating the original core of the religion as equivalent to certain patriarchal stories, Okin simply bypasses centuries of debate within each of the religions, debate highly pertinent to religion's role in the search for women's equality.(p. 107)
Nussbaum argues further that by ignoring religious struggle for justice, Okin alienates potential allies and makes her own feminist struggle difficult. With regard to state's political intervention to religious practices, Nussbaum hesitates to present a clear view, writing:
It is indeed difficult to say how far the state should accommodate comprehensive religious views that seem at odd with secular liberal political values. But this is my point: it is [sic] difficult, rather than easy. (p. 108)
She agrees with a special protection for minority religions because of their vulnerability in all societies. Questionable to her is how state should intervene. She proposes that we should ask whether a proposed law, banning child marriage or polygamy, for example, really does impose a 'substantial burden' on people's free exercise of their religion. If the answer is no, the law may go forward, she argues. On the basis of her argument, she calls for respect for different lives one choose to lead before delving into the complexity of this issue.
Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Susan M. Okin. 7-24
Liberalism's Sacred Cow. Homi K. Bhabha. 79-84.
A Plea for Difficulty. Martha C. Nussbaum. 105-114.
By questioning, “Is multiculturalism bad for women?” in Boston Review in 1997, Okin (1999) contests that multiculturalism in the name of group rights tends to provide rationales for perpetuating gender inequality in minority cultures. Examining the French accommodation of polygamy in minority groups while prohibiting Magrbin girls from wearing headscarves at school in the 1980s, Okin suggests intrinsic tensions between feminism and multiculturalism that commits to group rights for minority cultures.
She claims that most cultures are patriarchal and many of the cultural minorities calling for group rights are more patriarchal than the ‘surrounding culture’. This assumption of the nature of minority cultures stems partially from a view that regards a culture as a self-defined and well-bounded static entity. As Song rightly points out, Okin overlooks that cultures are interconnected and shaped by interactions between majority and minority cultures. What’s more, her approach to the issue of gender inequality in minority cultures is based on a biased view that Western societies are more liberal with respect to gender equality. This premise is observed in her clause us versus them:
Surely it is not enough, for one to be able to "question one's inherited social roles" and to have the capacity to make choices about the life one wants to lead, that one's culture be protected. At least as important to the development of self-respect and self-esteem is our place within our culture [sic]. And at least as important to our capacity to question our social roles is whether our culture instills in and enforces particular social roles on us [sic]. To the extent that their culture is patriarchal, in both these respects the healthy development of girls is endangered. (p. 22)
Okin supports her idea of the likely contention between multiculturalism and feminism on the two basis: (1) almost legal cases related to women’s rights are grounded in their individual rights were violated by the practices of their cultural groups and (2) As Amy Gutmann pointed out, the majority of challenges of multiculturalism has to do with gender inequality. Okin maintains that this multicultural commitment to cultural diversity/defense can violate individual rights to the equal protection of the laws. On the grounds that gender discrimination in minority cultures tends to remain private, she calls for special care in looking at the inequality issue within the cultures.
Okin’s forceful argument aroused debate among scholars. Bhabha responds to Okin’s argument by stating that Okin falls into monolithic, though gender-differentiated, characterization of minority cultures by focusing on patriarchal cultural defense for certain crimes, thus missing the liberal grounds where multiculturalism and feminism might negotiate. Bhabha insinuates that Okin’s pitfall stems partially from her view to evaluate minority cultures from a perspective of liberal Western culture. Instead, he insists on placing cultural defense or group rights in the context of the current lives of minorities in the Western cultures. In this regards, he states, “[w]hat is considerably more problematic than the inappropriate application of "external" norms is the way in which the norms of Western liberalism become at once the measure and mentor of minority cultures” (p. 83).
In contrast to Okin’s perspective, Bhabha maintains that a Western liberalism interacts with and is inscribed in the exclusionary division of post-colonial practices. Thus he writes, “[a]n awareness of the ambivalent and "unsatisfied" histories of the liberal persuasion allows "us"--postcolonial critics, multiculturalists, or feminists--to join in the unfinished work of creating a more viable, intra-cultural community of rights” (p. 84).
In responding to Okin's argument of sex discrimination in religion, Nussbaum states that it is a difficult task to define the complexity of the relationship between religion and feminism but Okin makes it sound too easy. In this regard, Nussbaum is attentive to civil movements, in particular feminist movement, grounded in religion. She writes:
By treating the original core of the religion as equivalent to certain patriarchal stories, Okin simply bypasses centuries of debate within each of the religions, debate highly pertinent to religion's role in the search for women's equality.(p. 107)
Nussbaum argues further that by ignoring religious struggle for justice, Okin alienates potential allies and makes her own feminist struggle difficult. With regard to state's political intervention to religious practices, Nussbaum hesitates to present a clear view, writing:
It is indeed difficult to say how far the state should accommodate comprehensive religious views that seem at odd with secular liberal political values. But this is my point: it is [sic] difficult, rather than easy. (p. 108)
She agrees with a special protection for minority religions because of their vulnerability in all societies. Questionable to her is how state should intervene. She proposes that we should ask whether a proposed law, banning child marriage or polygamy, for example, really does impose a 'substantial burden' on people's free exercise of their religion. If the answer is no, the law may go forward, she argues. On the basis of her argument, she calls for respect for different lives one choose to lead before delving into the complexity of this issue.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)