Song, Sarah. (2005).American Political Science Review, 99 (4), 473-489.
Attentive to debate on multiculturalism and gender inequality, emphasized by Okin in particular, Song agrees with a general assumption—either defenders or critiques of multiculturalism—that problems of gender inequality in minority groups originate partially from internal struggles within the groups, but contests that this internal view overlooks how intercultural interactions shape gender status. In this regard, she rightly points out that the debate over gender and culture within the practice and theory of multiculturalism focuses on ways in which minority norms and practices threaten gender equality within majority culture. Instead she calls attention to the reverse influence. She states:
Majority norms and practices also pose obstacles to the pursuit of gender equality within minority cultures. What is of particular concern for the debate on multiculturalism is that the mainstream legal and normative frameworks within which minority claims for accommodation are evaluated have themselves been informed by patriarchal norms, which in turn have offered support for gender hierarchies within minority cultures. (p. 474)
Thus she calls for a critical examination of both minority and majority norms and practices in claiming minority cultures.
Song insinuates that the current debate is grounded in the view that culture is well-bounded and self-integrated, as Kymlicka suggests. She argues,
Cultures and cultural identities emerge, change, and are maintained through social interactions and political struggle…To get at cultural differences, we need to examine the processes by which cultural identities get constructed. This requires attention to historical context and to collective discussions and struggles within a community, as well as to interactions between members and outsiders—–in particular, to the role of states in shaping cultural identities. (p. 474)
In responding to Kymlicka’s influential view of multiculturalism and preservation of minority cultures, Song continues to stress looking at cultural interchange between majority and minority groups and how minority cultures are shaped and continuously developed through the interchange. In this way, she calls attention to the politics of cultural construction, conflicts and identities. (She notes that cultural interactions are further fueled by global economy, transnational communication network and migrations of people across borders.) She states:
“Cultures vary in the degree of fluidity, contestation, and permeability, but even in relatively closed groups the content of cultures is not determined purely “from the inside.” Rather, cultures have developed through interactions and struggles with other cultures. This suggests the need to examine more closely the role of interactive dynamics in shaping the identities and practices of majority and minority cultural communities.” (p. 476)
Song categorizes the interconnections between majority and minority cultures: congruence effect, boomerang effect and diversionary effect.
1) Congruence effect refers to the reinforcement of (gender) inequality in minority cultures through majority norms. In reviewing the case of Santa Clara Pueblo in 1975, Song argues that gender inequality inscribed in the case—a refusal to matrilineal heritage in the Indian community—reflected the norms of gender inequality of the majority culture: the State endorsed the Pueblo’s amendment of their membership in 1939 that restricts to a patrilineal kinship system and this endorsement, in fact, reflected the current mainstream gender bias. It is only in the 1930s that women attained a right to citizenship independent to her husband. Song writes:
“[T]he gender-biased membership rule of the Santa Clara Pueblo was not “frowned upon by federal policy” in part because the Pueblo rule was congruent with the dominant culture’s own gendered understandings of membership.” (p. 479)
Song examines the congruence effect in the cases of ‘cultural defense’, where cultural evidence is taken into consideration in court decisions in the expense of equal protection to all. After examining cases of rape and wife-murder by immigrants in the 1980s in comparison with the provocation defense in the majority culture—where emotionally provoked criminal charge in intimate relationships is reduced—Song stresses:
“[T]he problem raised by the “cultural defense” cases above has not only to do with minority practices but also with mainstream norms that offer support for those practices…So long as gender-biased norms pervade legal doctrine and practice, minority defendants can continue to find support for patriarchal practices within mainstream law.” (p. 482)
2) Song defines boomerang effect as a reverse influence from minority to majority culture to reinforce patriarchal orders within the wider/mainstream society. Song calls attention to wider practices of patriarchal behaviors among immigrants and mainstream defendants influenced by a growing number of cultural defense cases. She writes:
“In some locales, juries have allowed such defenses to serve as partial excuses for patriarchal behavior among immigrants, and mainstream defendants can and may well point to these “cultural” cases in raising their own criminal defense claims. Given the increasingly diverse immigrant presence in the United States and the increasing use of cultural defenses, it is important to be attentive to boomerang effects.” (p. 483)
3) Song refers to diversionary effect as deflecting attention from unequal gender practices in the mainstream culture by emphasizing special cases of gender inequality in minority cultures. She states:
“[C]ondemnation of various practices among immigrants may help divert attention from majority practices. Focusing on cases of domestic violence or rape in immigrant communities can serve to reinforce the false dichotomy of oppressive minority cultures and egalitarian majority cultures, deflecting attention from the reality of domestic violence and other patriarchal practices within majority cultures” (p. 485)
Thus Song insist on analyzing majority norms and practices alongside those of minority because overlooking the diversionary effect can reinforce gender hierarchies across cultures and fuel the maintenance of the superiority of the mainstream culture.
In conclusion, Song contests that an internal view that regards gender inequality as an intrinsic quality of a culture as a whole fails to capture a range of interactive dynamics that shape cultural conflicts with the sustenance of the state’s role in endorsing the accommodation of minority practices that are congruent with the dominant culture’s own norms and practices. In this way, she disrupts the dilemma of multiculturalism and gender inequality, writing:
If we take a social constructivist view of cultures as not only internally contested but also interactive and mutually constitutive, then the problem for feminists is not so much “multiculturalism versus gender equality” as “patriarchy versus gender equality.” (p. 486)
In so doing, Song insinuates the necessity of looking into non-cultural factors, such as race and class, which impede struggles toward gender equality.
Showing posts with label multicultural. Show all posts
Showing posts with label multicultural. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Monday, February 8, 2010
The End of Tolerance: Racism in 21st Century Britian
Kundnani, Arun. (2007). London & Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
Kundnani's case study of multiculturalism in Britain provides keen insight into evaluating multiculturalism policies within the North American context. Kundnani argues that the discourses of globalization and the war on terror have brought British multiculturalism under attack as fostering separatism. Central to this attack, however, is not multiculturalism itself, but integration policies inscribed in it. Kundnani notes that this attach singled out young Muslims after 9/11 and demanded them to subsume their cultural differences within Britishness in the process of their integration. According to Kundnani, this demand for 'integration' is in fact 'assimilation' because it is grounded in the idea that Muslims are inherently at odd with modern values and thus needed to be forcibly integrated.
Kundnani contests that this 'bogus integrationism' along with the state's drive for 'community cohesion' signaled the death of multiculturalism and the rise of managed migration as immigration policy: regulating the supply of disposable migrant workers into the country while recruiting skilled workers abroad to supplement national shortage.
Through managed migration together with community cohesion, Kundnani maintains, a state is emerging that "fuses absolute powers and absolute fear, in order to create absolute conformity" (p. 8). Arguing that universal human rights are undermined as a consequence of this conformity, Kundnani calls for fresh debate on multiculturalism.
Kundnani's case study of multiculturalism in Britain provides keen insight into evaluating multiculturalism policies within the North American context. Kundnani argues that the discourses of globalization and the war on terror have brought British multiculturalism under attack as fostering separatism. Central to this attack, however, is not multiculturalism itself, but integration policies inscribed in it. Kundnani notes that this attach singled out young Muslims after 9/11 and demanded them to subsume their cultural differences within Britishness in the process of their integration. According to Kundnani, this demand for 'integration' is in fact 'assimilation' because it is grounded in the idea that Muslims are inherently at odd with modern values and thus needed to be forcibly integrated.
Kundnani contests that this 'bogus integrationism' along with the state's drive for 'community cohesion' signaled the death of multiculturalism and the rise of managed migration as immigration policy: regulating the supply of disposable migrant workers into the country while recruiting skilled workers abroad to supplement national shortage.
Through managed migration together with community cohesion, Kundnani maintains, a state is emerging that "fuses absolute powers and absolute fear, in order to create absolute conformity" (p. 8). Arguing that universal human rights are undermined as a consequence of this conformity, Kundnani calls for fresh debate on multiculturalism.
Friday, February 5, 2010
Multicultural Citizenship
: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Kymlicka, Will. (1995). New York: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 1. Introduction (1-9)
In his view, cultural diversity world-wide gives significant rise to clashes between majorities and minorities over languages, regional autonomy, political representation, curriculum, etc. and imposes the greatest challenge to democracies today. Taking a liberal stance of minority rights, he distances himself from the post-war liberals. He criticizes that post-war liberals framed minority rights within an extension of universal human rights as demonstrated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and at the same time defined the rights only in private spheres; post-war liberals thus neglected public recognition of minority groups and some of them focused on anti-discriminatory action as a temporary remedy.
Refuting this traditional liberal approach, Kymlicka states that minority rights are required to obtain basic human rights because minorities are more vulnerable to social injustice. He argues in addition that traditional human rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to vote, do not solve problems such as language policies, power distribution among governments, etc. which arise in diverse societies. Thus for Kymlicka, critical is to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights by giving minority groups a permanent political identity and group specific rights or 'special status' to ensure culture difference. Minority rights, however, are not unlimited to Kymlicka. He argues that minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice. (Thereby he proposes two concepts, internal restriction and external protection.)
Chapter 2. The politics of multiculturalism (10-33)
For Kymlicka, it is important to distinguish two patterns of cultural diversity: multinational and polyethnic. By nation he means "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture" (p. 11) closely related to a people or a culture. In this view, a country that consists of more than one nation is not a nation-state but a multination state. Polyethnicity, on the other hand, is an outcome of immigration. According to Kymlicka, immigrant groups neither occupy homelands nor ask to set up a parallel society; instead, they usually integrate into the dominant culture(s) and increasingly assert the rights to preserve their ethnicity. Thus he defines Canada and the United State as both multinational and polyethnic.
Kymlicka asserts that multiculturalism arise from national and ethnic differences. According to him, the confusion between the two concepts led to criticism of the Canadian government's multiculturalism policy; while French Canadians think that the policy reduces the status of Quebecers to the level of immigrants, other people fear that the policy treats immigrant groups as nations. According to Kymlicka, neither is justifiable because the multiculturalism policy supports polyethnicity within the English and French cultures. [The criticism is not all, there is an inherent problem in the official policy of multiculturalism. So isn't there any mentioning of Aboriginal rights in multicultural policy?] In this category, African-Americans, who neither form a nation nor are fully integrated into the society as immigrants, and refugees, who disassociate themselves from their own homeland and culture, are exceptional.
Kymlicka proposes three fundamental forms of group-specific rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights. In the case of Quebec, Kymlicka states:
One difficulty in a federal system is maintaining the balance between centralization and decentralization. While most Quebecers want an even more decentralized division of powers, most English Canadians favour a stronger central government. One of the challenges facing Canada, therefore, is finding an acceptable form of 'asymmetrical federalism' which grants Quebec powers not given to other provinces. Other federal states face a similar problem. (p. 28)
Chapter 3. Individual Rights and Collective Rights. (34-48)
Kymlicka forcefully argues that group-differentiated rights are consistent with liberal principles of individual freedom and equality.
Kymlicka distinguishes two forms of claims that an ethnic or national group make to protect the stability of their own communities. They are internal restriction and external protection. According to Kymlicka, while minority groups tend to suppress internal dissent ('internal restriction'), they also demand protection from external forces. For Kymlicka, not all the claims are acceptable. Within a group, individual rights take a precedence to group rights. He states:
[L]iberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices. (p. 37)
Kymlicka casts a new perspective on the debate on the primacy of individual or collective rights by proposing the concept of group-differentiated rights/citizenship. According to him, group-differentiated rights can be accorded to members of a group, to the group as a whole, or even to a province/state where the group forms the majority. For instance, the rights of French Canadians to use French in federal courts is a right accorded to individuals because language rights are one component of the national rights, which immigrant groups are not granted. The Indian rights to hunt and fish are accorded to the group, not individuals. The rights of Quebecers to promote their culture is accorded to the province of Quebec, whose citizens are predominantly Quebecers.
According to Kymlicka, the conflation of group-differentiated rights with collective rights has brought a fatal impact on the current debate over individual and group rights. In this regard, he contests that the members of different groups are to be accorded different rights which depend on their group-differentiated citizenship. For Kymlicka, justice between the members of different groups is relative to the groups to which the individuals belong.
Chapter 6. Justice and Minority Rights (107-130)
Kymlicka contests that the ideal of 'benign neglect' that states should not interfere with maintenance of of particular cultures is a myth because majority cultures and minority cultures do not have a level playing field in cultural market-place: states support the majority culture inevitably and systematically through languages, public holidays, state symbols, etc. whereas minority groups face disadvantages that the majorities do not. Thus, he calls for a political recognition of these minority groups and a provision of differential treatment to differential needs in order to sustain fairness among members of minority groups.
Kymlicka differentiates minority national rights from polyethnic rights. For Kymlicka, minority national rights are primarily to eliminate inequalities inherited to members of the minority groups and to maintain the particularities of their cultures under the theme of 'external protection', whereas polyethnic rights are rather limited to promoting equal access to the mainstream culture(s), thus enforcing common rights of citizenship among immigrants, by providing language training, for instance. [For Kymlicka, immigrants rights are very limited, just comprising a cultural mosaic and conformity to mainstream. HERE COMES THE CRITICISM.]
Kymlicka, however, does not reject entirely the idea of cultural market-place. He argues that, once national minority cultures are externally protected through language rights and territory autonomy, members of the groups should determine internally the character of the culture based on the rule of cultural market-place. [CRITICISM: what about in case there exists inherent patriarchal orders and internal unjust social issues? Are these seen problems they have internally within their own culture? Culturalization...]
With respect to minority national rights, in particular, Kymlicka stresses that the view on justice, that is, achieving fairness through differential external protections, is in fact attuned to a liberal egalitarian theory that emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities as Rawls argued. [TALK ABOUT RAWLS]
As to current argument over cultural diversity and its diffuse benefit to all, Kymlicka states that the argument itself is not sufficient to justify minority rights, arguing, "the diversity argument supplements, but cannot replace, justice arguments based on equality or historical agreement" (p. 123). The reasons include that diffuse benefit is rather by-product of national rights and promoting bilingual education for diversity does not explain special language training offered to immigrants.
Chapter 9. The Ties that Bind. (p. 173-192)
Kymlicka argues that citizenship is important to a liberal democracy because it provides a level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness to create a sense of solidarity across cultures and nations. He questions whether citizenship can be still achieved in the situation where rights are distributed on the basis of group membership.
Kymlicka argues that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by the majority, can be extended to culturally excluded minority groups such as immigrants, black, women, religious minorities, gay and lesbian, only if group-differentiated rights are granted so that they can feel accepted to the community.
Kymlick contests that polyethnic rights do not tribalize society, but instead integrate members of ethnic groups into a political community as a citizen. He explains the reasons for the public backlash against multiculturalism: first, it is because a racist fear of non-White immigrant groups. Secondly, it is because entrenched conflicts between national or racial groups are displaced onto relatively modest demands of ethnic groups.
Kymlicka notes that self-government rights among nations challenge the integrative function of citizenship more seriously than polyethnic rights. In this regard, he suggests that it is necessary to take national identities as givens to some extent. In particular observing ethnonationalist conflict around the world, he argues that imposing common citizenship on national minorities is likely to promote alienation and increase conflict in a multination state like Canada.
Kymlicka asks about the basis of social unity in a multination state. He argues that sharing principles of justice is not enough and there should be the idea of a shared identity; however, shared identity comes mostly from commonality of history, language and perhaps religion, which are not shared in a multination state. The only viable solution for him is to accommodate and nurture national identities within the larger polity.
Book Reviews: Multicultural Citizenship. By Charles Taylor. (The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), p. 408)
Taylor values highly some philosophical and political distinctions made by Kymlicka. First, the demarcation of multinational from polyethnic situations.
According to Kymlicka, a multinational state is the home of multiple nations, which claim self-determination and the ownership of a defined territory and share a distinct language or culture. A polyethnic state is, on the other hand, characterized with various immigrants who entered a society with their own distinct language and culture but without the intention of forming nations; however, they usually integrate into the dominant society while simultaneously demanding protection for their cultural preservation. (Chapter 2)
For Taylor, this distinction is important in Canada, where Quebec and aboriginal nations as national groups and voluntary immigrants as ethnic groups coexist. Taylor notes that the confusion between the two contexts has led fatal discussions by "attempting to treat Quebecois as immigrants or fearing that immigrants might demand the same things as Quebecois" (p. 408).
Taylor also points out that Kymlicka, taking a liberal stance, emphasizes that liberals neither are blind to group rights--in fact, he writes that group rights are important to supplement individual rights (chapter 1. politics of vernacular)--nor deny justice. Responding to Kymlicka concerning justice from a liberal perspective--in which the autonomy of all individuals is central, Taylor states that autonomy can be achieved in a condition where we are able to conceive what the good life is for us and this thinking can only be possible when we have a 'home' culture. Thus, he stresses that liberalism should protect and promote minority cultures that are under great pressure in the larger society if it attempts to ensure equality in autonomy.
Taylor points out internal restriction and external protection as the third crucial distinction that Kymlicka made. By internal restriction, Kymlicka means that group rights can be protected as long as they do not enforce conformity among their group members; by external protection, he means that minority culture should be protected against majority pressure.
Chapter 1. Introduction (1-9)
In his view, cultural diversity world-wide gives significant rise to clashes between majorities and minorities over languages, regional autonomy, political representation, curriculum, etc. and imposes the greatest challenge to democracies today. Taking a liberal stance of minority rights, he distances himself from the post-war liberals. He criticizes that post-war liberals framed minority rights within an extension of universal human rights as demonstrated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and at the same time defined the rights only in private spheres; post-war liberals thus neglected public recognition of minority groups and some of them focused on anti-discriminatory action as a temporary remedy.
Refuting this traditional liberal approach, Kymlicka states that minority rights are required to obtain basic human rights because minorities are more vulnerable to social injustice. He argues in addition that traditional human rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to vote, do not solve problems such as language policies, power distribution among governments, etc. which arise in diverse societies. Thus for Kymlicka, critical is to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights by giving minority groups a permanent political identity and group specific rights or 'special status' to ensure culture difference. Minority rights, however, are not unlimited to Kymlicka. He argues that minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice. (Thereby he proposes two concepts, internal restriction and external protection.)
Chapter 2. The politics of multiculturalism (10-33)
For Kymlicka, it is important to distinguish two patterns of cultural diversity: multinational and polyethnic. By nation he means "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture" (p. 11) closely related to a people or a culture. In this view, a country that consists of more than one nation is not a nation-state but a multination state. Polyethnicity, on the other hand, is an outcome of immigration. According to Kymlicka, immigrant groups neither occupy homelands nor ask to set up a parallel society; instead, they usually integrate into the dominant culture(s) and increasingly assert the rights to preserve their ethnicity. Thus he defines Canada and the United State as both multinational and polyethnic.
Kymlicka asserts that multiculturalism arise from national and ethnic differences. According to him, the confusion between the two concepts led to criticism of the Canadian government's multiculturalism policy; while French Canadians think that the policy reduces the status of Quebecers to the level of immigrants, other people fear that the policy treats immigrant groups as nations. According to Kymlicka, neither is justifiable because the multiculturalism policy supports polyethnicity within the English and French cultures. [The criticism is not all, there is an inherent problem in the official policy of multiculturalism. So isn't there any mentioning of Aboriginal rights in multicultural policy?] In this category, African-Americans, who neither form a nation nor are fully integrated into the society as immigrants, and refugees, who disassociate themselves from their own homeland and culture, are exceptional.
Kymlicka proposes three fundamental forms of group-specific rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights. In the case of Quebec, Kymlicka states:
One difficulty in a federal system is maintaining the balance between centralization and decentralization. While most Quebecers want an even more decentralized division of powers, most English Canadians favour a stronger central government. One of the challenges facing Canada, therefore, is finding an acceptable form of 'asymmetrical federalism' which grants Quebec powers not given to other provinces. Other federal states face a similar problem. (p. 28)
Chapter 3. Individual Rights and Collective Rights. (34-48)
Kymlicka forcefully argues that group-differentiated rights are consistent with liberal principles of individual freedom and equality.
Kymlicka distinguishes two forms of claims that an ethnic or national group make to protect the stability of their own communities. They are internal restriction and external protection. According to Kymlicka, while minority groups tend to suppress internal dissent ('internal restriction'), they also demand protection from external forces. For Kymlicka, not all the claims are acceptable. Within a group, individual rights take a precedence to group rights. He states:
[L]iberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices. (p. 37)
Kymlicka casts a new perspective on the debate on the primacy of individual or collective rights by proposing the concept of group-differentiated rights/citizenship. According to him, group-differentiated rights can be accorded to members of a group, to the group as a whole, or even to a province/state where the group forms the majority. For instance, the rights of French Canadians to use French in federal courts is a right accorded to individuals because language rights are one component of the national rights, which immigrant groups are not granted. The Indian rights to hunt and fish are accorded to the group, not individuals. The rights of Quebecers to promote their culture is accorded to the province of Quebec, whose citizens are predominantly Quebecers.
According to Kymlicka, the conflation of group-differentiated rights with collective rights has brought a fatal impact on the current debate over individual and group rights. In this regard, he contests that the members of different groups are to be accorded different rights which depend on their group-differentiated citizenship. For Kymlicka, justice between the members of different groups is relative to the groups to which the individuals belong.
Chapter 6. Justice and Minority Rights (107-130)
Kymlicka contests that the ideal of 'benign neglect' that states should not interfere with maintenance of of particular cultures is a myth because majority cultures and minority cultures do not have a level playing field in cultural market-place: states support the majority culture inevitably and systematically through languages, public holidays, state symbols, etc. whereas minority groups face disadvantages that the majorities do not. Thus, he calls for a political recognition of these minority groups and a provision of differential treatment to differential needs in order to sustain fairness among members of minority groups.
Kymlicka differentiates minority national rights from polyethnic rights. For Kymlicka, minority national rights are primarily to eliminate inequalities inherited to members of the minority groups and to maintain the particularities of their cultures under the theme of 'external protection', whereas polyethnic rights are rather limited to promoting equal access to the mainstream culture(s), thus enforcing common rights of citizenship among immigrants, by providing language training, for instance. [For Kymlicka, immigrants rights are very limited, just comprising a cultural mosaic and conformity to mainstream. HERE COMES THE CRITICISM.]
Kymlicka, however, does not reject entirely the idea of cultural market-place. He argues that, once national minority cultures are externally protected through language rights and territory autonomy, members of the groups should determine internally the character of the culture based on the rule of cultural market-place. [CRITICISM: what about in case there exists inherent patriarchal orders and internal unjust social issues? Are these seen problems they have internally within their own culture? Culturalization...]
With respect to minority national rights, in particular, Kymlicka stresses that the view on justice, that is, achieving fairness through differential external protections, is in fact attuned to a liberal egalitarian theory that emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities as Rawls argued. [TALK ABOUT RAWLS]
As to current argument over cultural diversity and its diffuse benefit to all, Kymlicka states that the argument itself is not sufficient to justify minority rights, arguing, "the diversity argument supplements, but cannot replace, justice arguments based on equality or historical agreement" (p. 123). The reasons include that diffuse benefit is rather by-product of national rights and promoting bilingual education for diversity does not explain special language training offered to immigrants.
Chapter 9. The Ties that Bind. (p. 173-192)
Kymlicka argues that citizenship is important to a liberal democracy because it provides a level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness to create a sense of solidarity across cultures and nations. He questions whether citizenship can be still achieved in the situation where rights are distributed on the basis of group membership.
Kymlicka argues that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by the majority, can be extended to culturally excluded minority groups such as immigrants, black, women, religious minorities, gay and lesbian, only if group-differentiated rights are granted so that they can feel accepted to the community.
Kymlick contests that polyethnic rights do not tribalize society, but instead integrate members of ethnic groups into a political community as a citizen. He explains the reasons for the public backlash against multiculturalism: first, it is because a racist fear of non-White immigrant groups. Secondly, it is because entrenched conflicts between national or racial groups are displaced onto relatively modest demands of ethnic groups.
Kymlicka notes that self-government rights among nations challenge the integrative function of citizenship more seriously than polyethnic rights. In this regard, he suggests that it is necessary to take national identities as givens to some extent. In particular observing ethnonationalist conflict around the world, he argues that imposing common citizenship on national minorities is likely to promote alienation and increase conflict in a multination state like Canada.
Kymlicka asks about the basis of social unity in a multination state. He argues that sharing principles of justice is not enough and there should be the idea of a shared identity; however, shared identity comes mostly from commonality of history, language and perhaps religion, which are not shared in a multination state. The only viable solution for him is to accommodate and nurture national identities within the larger polity.
Book Reviews: Multicultural Citizenship. By Charles Taylor. (The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), p. 408)
Taylor values highly some philosophical and political distinctions made by Kymlicka. First, the demarcation of multinational from polyethnic situations.
According to Kymlicka, a multinational state is the home of multiple nations, which claim self-determination and the ownership of a defined territory and share a distinct language or culture. A polyethnic state is, on the other hand, characterized with various immigrants who entered a society with their own distinct language and culture but without the intention of forming nations; however, they usually integrate into the dominant society while simultaneously demanding protection for their cultural preservation. (Chapter 2)
For Taylor, this distinction is important in Canada, where Quebec and aboriginal nations as national groups and voluntary immigrants as ethnic groups coexist. Taylor notes that the confusion between the two contexts has led fatal discussions by "attempting to treat Quebecois as immigrants or fearing that immigrants might demand the same things as Quebecois" (p. 408).
Taylor also points out that Kymlicka, taking a liberal stance, emphasizes that liberals neither are blind to group rights--in fact, he writes that group rights are important to supplement individual rights (chapter 1. politics of vernacular)--nor deny justice. Responding to Kymlicka concerning justice from a liberal perspective--in which the autonomy of all individuals is central, Taylor states that autonomy can be achieved in a condition where we are able to conceive what the good life is for us and this thinking can only be possible when we have a 'home' culture. Thus, he stresses that liberalism should protect and promote minority cultures that are under great pressure in the larger society if it attempts to ensure equality in autonomy.
Taylor points out internal restriction and external protection as the third crucial distinction that Kymlicka made. By internal restriction, Kymlicka means that group rights can be protected as long as they do not enforce conformity among their group members; by external protection, he means that minority culture should be protected against majority pressure.
Thursday, February 4, 2010
Culture and Imperialism
Said, Edward W. (1993). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Introduction (xi-xxviii)
Said contests that culture and imperialism are interconnected by controlling power to either narrate or block other narratives from emerging. Said points out that culture is often associated with the nation or the state and becomes a source of identity, and a rather combative one within the context of religious and nationalist fundamentalism in the formerly colonized world. In this sense, "Western imperialism and Third World Nationalism feed off each other" (p. xxiv) writes Said. In particular observing an emergence of vigorous non-Western feminist scholarship, Said refutes the binary oppositions between imperialism and nationalism; instead, he focuses on new alignments across borders, nations, types and essences that challenge the static notions of identity and culture bounded by a supposedly unbroken tradition. He argues:
Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogenous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic. (p. xxv)
For Said, multiculturalism in the United State is a process of integration, not separation, of women, minorities and recent immigrants who had been excluded from the main group and now claim for a place in it, thus by no means to be feared.
Body
Said defines as 'imperialism' "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory" whereas colonialism a consequence of imperialism that implant settlements on distant territory (p. 9). He argues that, while direct colonialism has largely ended, imperialism lingers in a general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic and social practices.
Said describes the paradox of culture in the late twentieth century: whereas all nationally defined cultures aspire after sovereignty and dominance, these cultures come across national boundaries and assume many foreign elements, alterities and differences within themselves. Thus, people's cultural experiences are oddly hybrid and even contradictory.
There was scholastic intervention in developing the concepts of nation and its culture. Said notes that the parallel alignment between the rise of nationalism between 1745 and 1945 and the emergence of the Eurocentric Enlightenment under the alleged universalism. He writes, "when most European thinkers celebrated humanity or culture they were principally celebrating ideas and values they ascribed to their own national culture, or to Europe as distinct from the Orient, Africa, and even the Americas," (p. 44)
Lyotard and other post-modernists, however, criticize the impact of the Enlightenment, arguing that the modernity that the Western Enlightenment had aimed to achieve in fact failed. Said defines as post-modernism "the loss of legitimizing power of the narratives of Western emancipation and the enlightenment" (p. 57). Said states that it is an irony that Western societies enter post-modernism whereas simultaneously modernism is rediscovered in the formerly colonized world. For Said, modernism and post-modernism coexist today. Within this context, Said stresses that cultural experience or every cultural form is essentially hybrid and culture and experience should not be separated. This theoretical framework is important to Said because cultural dimensions of an imperial ideology precede its actual territorial accumulation world-wide. Thus, his focus is on formulating the relationship between empire and culture.
Introduction (xi-xxviii)
Said contests that culture and imperialism are interconnected by controlling power to either narrate or block other narratives from emerging. Said points out that culture is often associated with the nation or the state and becomes a source of identity, and a rather combative one within the context of religious and nationalist fundamentalism in the formerly colonized world. In this sense, "Western imperialism and Third World Nationalism feed off each other" (p. xxiv) writes Said. In particular observing an emergence of vigorous non-Western feminist scholarship, Said refutes the binary oppositions between imperialism and nationalism; instead, he focuses on new alignments across borders, nations, types and essences that challenge the static notions of identity and culture bounded by a supposedly unbroken tradition. He argues:
Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogenous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic. (p. xxv)
For Said, multiculturalism in the United State is a process of integration, not separation, of women, minorities and recent immigrants who had been excluded from the main group and now claim for a place in it, thus by no means to be feared.
Body
Said defines as 'imperialism' "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory" whereas colonialism a consequence of imperialism that implant settlements on distant territory (p. 9). He argues that, while direct colonialism has largely ended, imperialism lingers in a general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic and social practices.
Said describes the paradox of culture in the late twentieth century: whereas all nationally defined cultures aspire after sovereignty and dominance, these cultures come across national boundaries and assume many foreign elements, alterities and differences within themselves. Thus, people's cultural experiences are oddly hybrid and even contradictory.
There was scholastic intervention in developing the concepts of nation and its culture. Said notes that the parallel alignment between the rise of nationalism between 1745 and 1945 and the emergence of the Eurocentric Enlightenment under the alleged universalism. He writes, "when most European thinkers celebrated humanity or culture they were principally celebrating ideas and values they ascribed to their own national culture, or to Europe as distinct from the Orient, Africa, and even the Americas," (p. 44)
Lyotard and other post-modernists, however, criticize the impact of the Enlightenment, arguing that the modernity that the Western Enlightenment had aimed to achieve in fact failed. Said defines as post-modernism "the loss of legitimizing power of the narratives of Western emancipation and the enlightenment" (p. 57). Said states that it is an irony that Western societies enter post-modernism whereas simultaneously modernism is rediscovered in the formerly colonized world. For Said, modernism and post-modernism coexist today. Within this context, Said stresses that cultural experience or every cultural form is essentially hybrid and culture and experience should not be separated. This theoretical framework is important to Said because cultural dimensions of an imperial ideology precede its actual territorial accumulation world-wide. Thus, his focus is on formulating the relationship between empire and culture.
Monday, February 1, 2010
Looking White People in the Eye
Razack, Shrene. (1998). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Razack criticizes that postcolonial discourse of cultural difference makes power relations invisible and keeps dominant cultural norms, white supremacy, in place by culturalizing social domination, in other words, replacing the domination of race, gender, and class with the language of culture. Thus, in the case of sexual violence involving Aboriginal women and immigrant women, both victims and attackers are often “culturalized, that is, understood as cultural and frozen in time, rather than as dynamic, historical, and social” (p. 19). Looking at sexual violence and the process of refugee determination, Razack asserts that women’s realities should be understood within the structures of patriarchy, capitalism, and white supremacy.
Chapter 3. What is to Be Gained by Looking White People in the Eye? Race in Sexual Violence Cases
Razack states that culture talk is a double-edged sword, as “it packages difference as inferiority and obscures both gender-based and racial domination, yet cultural considerations are important for contexualizing oppressed groups’ claims for justice, for improving their access to services, and for requiring dominant groups to examine the invisible cultural advantages they enjoy” (p. 58).
Problems, however, arise from the fact is culture is often uttered as an unchangeable set of values and customs autonomous from historical and social contexts. Razack writes, “culture is taken to mean values, beliefs, knowledge, and customs that exist in a timeless and unchangeable vacuum outside of patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and colonialism” (p. 58). Thus she calls attention to sexism interlocked with racism.
Razack contests that white society preempts racism and sexism by replacing the discoursesof racism and sexism with culture. Calling this process culturalization, Razack states:
In its modern form, overt racism, which rests on the notion of biologically based inferiority, coexists with a more covert practice of domination encoded in the assumption of cultural or acquired inferiority. This ‘culturalization of racism,’ whereby Black inferiority is attributed to ‘cultural deficiency, social inadequacy, and technological underdevelopment,’ thrives in a social climate that is officially pluralist. (p. 60)
Razack also points out the culturalization of sexism, writing that cultural consideration are used to defend male sexual violence offenders while also being used to intensify prejudices against minority, in particular Aboriginal, women. In this regard, Razack pays attention to the tendency that women of color distance themselves from the culturalization of violence, as seen in the statement, ‘No culture condones violence’ included in the report of the Coalition of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of British Colombia.
Observing cross-cultural sensitivity training, Razack contests that such training is of little use unless it is pursued in the context of the greater empowerment of the subordinate group.
Chapter 4. Policing the Borders of Nation: The Imperial Gaze in Gender Persecution Cases (88-129)
Razack states that the guideline released by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board in 1993 that recognized domestic violence as a form of persecution and legalized petitions of asylum based on gender-related persecution is one of the most remarkable achievement in Canadian legal history and the first guideline in the world to address gender-related persecution.
As Razack argues, a problem with this asylum structure, , is sexism interlocked with colonialsim, that is, the West "knows what is best for the Other" (p. 92). Thus Razack argues that refugees are viewed to the West as a mess that the Third World created and that the West must clean up. Women seeking asylum are seen also within this context. Razack states:
The successful asylum seeker must cast herself as c cultural Other, that is, as someone fleeing from a more primitive culture. That is to say, it is through various orientalist and imperialist lenses that women's gender-based persecution becomes visible in the West. Without the imperial or colonial component, claims of gender persecution are less likely to succeed and asylum is denied. (pp. 92-93)
Razack criticizes that postcolonial discourse of cultural difference makes power relations invisible and keeps dominant cultural norms, white supremacy, in place by culturalizing social domination, in other words, replacing the domination of race, gender, and class with the language of culture. Thus, in the case of sexual violence involving Aboriginal women and immigrant women, both victims and attackers are often “culturalized, that is, understood as cultural and frozen in time, rather than as dynamic, historical, and social” (p. 19). Looking at sexual violence and the process of refugee determination, Razack asserts that women’s realities should be understood within the structures of patriarchy, capitalism, and white supremacy.
Chapter 3. What is to Be Gained by Looking White People in the Eye? Race in Sexual Violence Cases
Razack states that culture talk is a double-edged sword, as “it packages difference as inferiority and obscures both gender-based and racial domination, yet cultural considerations are important for contexualizing oppressed groups’ claims for justice, for improving their access to services, and for requiring dominant groups to examine the invisible cultural advantages they enjoy” (p. 58).
Problems, however, arise from the fact is culture is often uttered as an unchangeable set of values and customs autonomous from historical and social contexts. Razack writes, “culture is taken to mean values, beliefs, knowledge, and customs that exist in a timeless and unchangeable vacuum outside of patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and colonialism” (p. 58). Thus she calls attention to sexism interlocked with racism.
Razack contests that white society preempts racism and sexism by replacing the discoursesof racism and sexism with culture. Calling this process culturalization, Razack states:
In its modern form, overt racism, which rests on the notion of biologically based inferiority, coexists with a more covert practice of domination encoded in the assumption of cultural or acquired inferiority. This ‘culturalization of racism,’ whereby Black inferiority is attributed to ‘cultural deficiency, social inadequacy, and technological underdevelopment,’ thrives in a social climate that is officially pluralist. (p. 60)
Razack also points out the culturalization of sexism, writing that cultural consideration are used to defend male sexual violence offenders while also being used to intensify prejudices against minority, in particular Aboriginal, women. In this regard, Razack pays attention to the tendency that women of color distance themselves from the culturalization of violence, as seen in the statement, ‘No culture condones violence’ included in the report of the Coalition of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of British Colombia.
Observing cross-cultural sensitivity training, Razack contests that such training is of little use unless it is pursued in the context of the greater empowerment of the subordinate group.
Chapter 4. Policing the Borders of Nation: The Imperial Gaze in Gender Persecution Cases (88-129)
Razack states that the guideline released by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board in 1993 that recognized domestic violence as a form of persecution and legalized petitions of asylum based on gender-related persecution is one of the most remarkable achievement in Canadian legal history and the first guideline in the world to address gender-related persecution.
As Razack argues, a problem with this asylum structure, , is sexism interlocked with colonialsim, that is, the West "knows what is best for the Other" (p. 92). Thus Razack argues that refugees are viewed to the West as a mess that the Third World created and that the West must clean up. Women seeking asylum are seen also within this context. Razack states:
The successful asylum seeker must cast herself as c cultural Other, that is, as someone fleeing from a more primitive culture. That is to say, it is through various orientalist and imperialist lenses that women's gender-based persecution becomes visible in the West. Without the imperial or colonial component, claims of gender persecution are less likely to succeed and asylum is denied. (pp. 92-93)
Saturday, January 30, 2010
Exalted Subjects
:Studies in the making of race and nation in Canada. Thobani, Sunera. (2007). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Chapter 4. Multiculturalism and the Liberalizing Nation (143-175)
It is notable the mandate of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963: it is "to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of equal participation between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups" (p. 144). This mandate called for official recognition of various ethnic communities, leading to the adoption of multiculturalism as official state policy in 1971, Thonabi writes.
Thobani contests that official multiculturalism contributed to stabilizing white supremacy under the guise of tolerance to difference. In particular, it is pointed out that the elimination of overt Canadian immigration policy and citizenship in the 1970s was a pragmatic response to changing global economic condition and lack of labour and had less to do with idealistic commitments to c cultural utopia.
Thobani argues that Canadian multiculturalism contribute to recasting national identity by distinguishing Canada from other nation-states such as the United State and Europe in that Canada departed from colonial and imperialist histories and it had more embracing and pluralist, more tolerant, racially innocent, thus more adaptable to changing global conditions, which led to selling diversity in the field of international business interests. Thus, Thobani writes, "[Multiculturalism's] appeal for tolerance enabled a national amnesia regarding inconvenient histories" (p. 154).
Thobani argues that multiculturalism suppressed race and racism discursively, thus disrupting the potential of greater multiracial solidarity. Looking at multiculturalism policy proclaimed by the Trudeau Liberals, Thobani states that the policy, framed within bilingualism and biculturalism, is to allocate resources to cultural groups who committed to a national unity. Thus she writes, "How the desire to contribute to national unity demanded by the policy was to be measured was left unspecified. It was clear, however, that multiculturalism was intended to further the nation's unity, not its transformation" (p. 156).
As Sheren Razack astutely describes culturalization of racism as modern racism, according to Thobani, multiculturalism deflected attention from race and racism to cultural difference. Thobani writes:
The multiculturalism policy identified the national's lack of familiarity with the cultures of racial minorities, and these minorities' lack of English- and French-language skills, as the most salient factors excluding them from 'full participation' in society. It thus placed the onus for racial inequalities experienced by people of colour onto their own (collective) cultural inadequacies (that is, their differences) and (individual) lack of linguistic skills.(p. 156)
(Federal Multicultural Policy
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Robert L. Stanfield, David Lewis, Réal Caouette
Thus polemics around racism disappeared in the discourse of culturalization of multiculturalism and reframed the power relations of racial hierarchies as cultural ignorance and intolerance. Thobani states, "whereas in the pre-war period, racial character and culture were treated as synonymous in state practices, these new policies emphasized distinctions of culture while suppressing those of race" (p. 158)
Thobani argues that the discursive regulation of multiculturalism encouraged immigrants to see themselves and their communities through the eyes of the state. Among the techniques used by state multiculturalism, selective state funding was crucial to conditioning community organizations, activities, etc., thus shaping particular multiculturalism. Central to this drive, according to Thobani, is the state's emphasis on traditional values in ethnic cultures. Within this aspects, cultures, static and bound to pre-modern, are to be tolerated. Thobani writes:
Ethnic groups were presented as connected to tradition, not modernity, and they embodies 'human experience in various parts of the world' associated with a different temporal plane (different periods of time) than the one inhabited by the nation...The policy advocated that their strangeness was not only to be tolerated but also was to be preserved and made cannibalistically available for the nation's sustenance and enrichment. (p. 163-164)
Opposing to the view of the multiculturalist policy that "fossilize immigrants as living remnants of the past"(p. 164), Thobani shares a perspective with post-colonialists and emphasizes new hybrid forms of subjectivities of immigrants.
The forms of identity, consciousness, and social practices developed by immigrants within Canada were likewise shaped as much by the exigencies of their insertion into the new society, by their experiences of migratory dislocation and by their interactions with nationals as they were by the 'cultural baggage' they were assumed to bring with them from their traditional homelands. (p. 164)
Here is part of the speech of Prime Minister Trudeau to the House of Commons:
The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for us all. (as cited on the page 164)
[This state's emphasis on the traditional aspects of immigrant communities or minority culture seems to ground a root cause of controversies over commensurability of feminism and multiculturalism.] Observe that minority group feminists' struggle over gender oppression that is confronted not only within the same community but also the pervasive discourse of (traditional) culture, Thobani argues that the hegemony of multiculturalism, which interlocks culture with tradition, support the maintenance of internal patriarchal order within cultural practices. [This also help the academic dispute that confronts feminism and multiculturalism, as seen Okin's argument. Culture, seen as tranditional aspects and pre-modern practices, could not be commensurable with a multiculturalism discourse.]
Thobani describes how the master narrative created by multicultural discourse control individual men and women's behaviors and identities:
Multicultural discourse marks non-western cultures as more patriarchal and backward than the west, while it simultaneously pressures immigrant men to conform to significantly strenghened masculist codes of behaviour in the name of cultural authenticity. As a consequence, immigrant women, whose consciousness is also shaped in interaction with the master narrative, approach the men of their communities with complex expectations and anxieties...Both women and men come to 'see' and experience their own culture through this frame, with its particular versions of femininities and masculinities. They learn to see themselves through the nation's eyes, even when they see to contest such damaging images of themselves. (p. 166)
Thus, Thobani states, "the gendered effects of multiculturalism undermine the possibilities for solidarity between 'cultured' women and men" (p. 167). Within this frame, Thobani asserts that immigrant women's modernization is signally by the level of their assimilation into Canadian society and its values, which exalts nationhood.
Thobani argues that, as Fanon saw racialization of colored people as critical to shaping their subjectiviy, "(multi)culturalizing process in Canada profoundly influence the subjectivity of immigrants, especially their racial and cultured sensibilities" (p. 171).
While immigrants have been 'overdetermined' culturally through multicultural state policy, Thobani argues, Aboriginal peoples were contemporaneously refused by the state. She asserts that responding to Aboriginal peoples' claim for self-determination, the state discredited their claims to special status as the original inhabitants of the land, thus devaluing Aboriginality as only one of several cultures to be harnessed for the cultural enrichment and to exalt the benevolent and inclusive qualities of nationals.
Chapter 5. Consultations and Nationalizations (179-213)
In examining Canada and Immigration: Facts and Issues (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994), Thobani calls attention to the phrase, "In 1991, the Economic Council of Canada found that immigration had a small but positive impact on our economy" (p. 3), as the beginning point for a discussion on the immigration program. Thobani criticizes the assumptions that base this statement: (1) it erases the history of European colonial migrations, thus neutralizing the nation's existence, (2) Referring to "our" economy, it identifies immigrants as strangers who contribute to our economy not their economy, and (3) it excludes Aboriginal Peoples from the discussion of immigration program by treating them as having no stake in the subject.
Thobani also sharply points out that the Canadian state, by defining immigrants as stranger, "legitimize and normalize unequal rights and entitlements for all immigrant, so that it appeared completely normal and natural that 'they' should not have the same rights as 'us'" (p. 212). What's more, this process of legitimization is performed through numerous public consultations, which not only condition a reality to perceive but also provide an illusion of public consensus collected and approved through participatory democracy.
Such discussion of immigration is often tied with economy. Family sponsored immigration, thus, became a target to criticism because of its lack of economic contribution to the state and its facilitation of virtually limitless immigration. In this circumstance, immigrant women and their families are more vulnerable to public angst.
Chapter 4. Multiculturalism and the Liberalizing Nation (143-175)
It is notable the mandate of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963: it is "to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of equal participation between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups" (p. 144). This mandate called for official recognition of various ethnic communities, leading to the adoption of multiculturalism as official state policy in 1971, Thonabi writes.
Thobani contests that official multiculturalism contributed to stabilizing white supremacy under the guise of tolerance to difference. In particular, it is pointed out that the elimination of overt Canadian immigration policy and citizenship in the 1970s was a pragmatic response to changing global economic condition and lack of labour and had less to do with idealistic commitments to c cultural utopia.
Thobani argues that Canadian multiculturalism contribute to recasting national identity by distinguishing Canada from other nation-states such as the United State and Europe in that Canada departed from colonial and imperialist histories and it had more embracing and pluralist, more tolerant, racially innocent, thus more adaptable to changing global conditions, which led to selling diversity in the field of international business interests. Thus, Thobani writes, "[Multiculturalism's] appeal for tolerance enabled a national amnesia regarding inconvenient histories" (p. 154).
Thobani argues that multiculturalism suppressed race and racism discursively, thus disrupting the potential of greater multiracial solidarity. Looking at multiculturalism policy proclaimed by the Trudeau Liberals, Thobani states that the policy, framed within bilingualism and biculturalism, is to allocate resources to cultural groups who committed to a national unity. Thus she writes, "How the desire to contribute to national unity demanded by the policy was to be measured was left unspecified. It was clear, however, that multiculturalism was intended to further the nation's unity, not its transformation" (p. 156).
As Sheren Razack astutely describes culturalization of racism as modern racism, according to Thobani, multiculturalism deflected attention from race and racism to cultural difference. Thobani writes:
The multiculturalism policy identified the national's lack of familiarity with the cultures of racial minorities, and these minorities' lack of English- and French-language skills, as the most salient factors excluding them from 'full participation' in society. It thus placed the onus for racial inequalities experienced by people of colour onto their own (collective) cultural inadequacies (that is, their differences) and (individual) lack of linguistic skills.(p. 156)
(Federal Multicultural Policy
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Robert L. Stanfield, David Lewis, Réal Caouette
House of Commons Debates, October 8, 1971, pp. 8545-8.
http://www.abheritage.ca/albertans/speeches/trudeau.html
)http://www.abheritage.ca/albertans/speeches/trudeau.html
Thus polemics around racism disappeared in the discourse of culturalization of multiculturalism and reframed the power relations of racial hierarchies as cultural ignorance and intolerance. Thobani states, "whereas in the pre-war period, racial character and culture were treated as synonymous in state practices, these new policies emphasized distinctions of culture while suppressing those of race" (p. 158)
Thobani argues that the discursive regulation of multiculturalism encouraged immigrants to see themselves and their communities through the eyes of the state. Among the techniques used by state multiculturalism, selective state funding was crucial to conditioning community organizations, activities, etc., thus shaping particular multiculturalism. Central to this drive, according to Thobani, is the state's emphasis on traditional values in ethnic cultures. Within this aspects, cultures, static and bound to pre-modern, are to be tolerated. Thobani writes:
Ethnic groups were presented as connected to tradition, not modernity, and they embodies 'human experience in various parts of the world' associated with a different temporal plane (different periods of time) than the one inhabited by the nation...The policy advocated that their strangeness was not only to be tolerated but also was to be preserved and made cannibalistically available for the nation's sustenance and enrichment. (p. 163-164)
Opposing to the view of the multiculturalist policy that "fossilize immigrants as living remnants of the past"(p. 164), Thobani shares a perspective with post-colonialists and emphasizes new hybrid forms of subjectivities of immigrants.
The forms of identity, consciousness, and social practices developed by immigrants within Canada were likewise shaped as much by the exigencies of their insertion into the new society, by their experiences of migratory dislocation and by their interactions with nationals as they were by the 'cultural baggage' they were assumed to bring with them from their traditional homelands. (p. 164)
Here is part of the speech of Prime Minister Trudeau to the House of Commons:
The government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer life for us all. (as cited on the page 164)
[This state's emphasis on the traditional aspects of immigrant communities or minority culture seems to ground a root cause of controversies over commensurability of feminism and multiculturalism.] Observe that minority group feminists' struggle over gender oppression that is confronted not only within the same community but also the pervasive discourse of (traditional) culture, Thobani argues that the hegemony of multiculturalism, which interlocks culture with tradition, support the maintenance of internal patriarchal order within cultural practices. [This also help the academic dispute that confronts feminism and multiculturalism, as seen Okin's argument. Culture, seen as tranditional aspects and pre-modern practices, could not be commensurable with a multiculturalism discourse.]
Thobani describes how the master narrative created by multicultural discourse control individual men and women's behaviors and identities:
Multicultural discourse marks non-western cultures as more patriarchal and backward than the west, while it simultaneously pressures immigrant men to conform to significantly strenghened masculist codes of behaviour in the name of cultural authenticity. As a consequence, immigrant women, whose consciousness is also shaped in interaction with the master narrative, approach the men of their communities with complex expectations and anxieties...Both women and men come to 'see' and experience their own culture through this frame, with its particular versions of femininities and masculinities. They learn to see themselves through the nation's eyes, even when they see to contest such damaging images of themselves. (p. 166)
Thus, Thobani states, "the gendered effects of multiculturalism undermine the possibilities for solidarity between 'cultured' women and men" (p. 167). Within this frame, Thobani asserts that immigrant women's modernization is signally by the level of their assimilation into Canadian society and its values, which exalts nationhood.
Thobani argues that, as Fanon saw racialization of colored people as critical to shaping their subjectiviy, "(multi)culturalizing process in Canada profoundly influence the subjectivity of immigrants, especially their racial and cultured sensibilities" (p. 171).
While immigrants have been 'overdetermined' culturally through multicultural state policy, Thobani argues, Aboriginal peoples were contemporaneously refused by the state. She asserts that responding to Aboriginal peoples' claim for self-determination, the state discredited their claims to special status as the original inhabitants of the land, thus devaluing Aboriginality as only one of several cultures to be harnessed for the cultural enrichment and to exalt the benevolent and inclusive qualities of nationals.
Chapter 5. Consultations and Nationalizations (179-213)
In examining Canada and Immigration: Facts and Issues (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994), Thobani calls attention to the phrase, "In 1991, the Economic Council of Canada found that immigration had a small but positive impact on our economy" (p. 3), as the beginning point for a discussion on the immigration program. Thobani criticizes the assumptions that base this statement: (1) it erases the history of European colonial migrations, thus neutralizing the nation's existence, (2) Referring to "our" economy, it identifies immigrants as strangers who contribute to our economy not their economy, and (3) it excludes Aboriginal Peoples from the discussion of immigration program by treating them as having no stake in the subject.
Thobani also sharply points out that the Canadian state, by defining immigrants as stranger, "legitimize and normalize unequal rights and entitlements for all immigrant, so that it appeared completely normal and natural that 'they' should not have the same rights as 'us'" (p. 212). What's more, this process of legitimization is performed through numerous public consultations, which not only condition a reality to perceive but also provide an illusion of public consensus collected and approved through participatory democracy.
Such discussion of immigration is often tied with economy. Family sponsored immigration, thus, became a target to criticism because of its lack of economic contribution to the state and its facilitation of virtually limitless immigration. In this circumstance, immigrant women and their families are more vulnerable to public angst.
Friday, January 29, 2010
Selling Diversity
Abu-Laban, Yasmeen., & Gabriel, Christina. (2002). Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.
Chapter 1. Diversity, Globalization and Public Policy in Canada. (11-35)
The authors finds the notion of selling diversity in three public policies--immigration, multiculturalism and employment. They note that multicultural policy, first articulated by the federal government of Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1971, has been a major means of official recognition of ethnic minorities in the Canadian nation. Recently, however, as they observe, policy-makers akin to neoliberal globalization, which emphasizes global markets and Canadian economic competitiveness, tend to turn certain notions of diversity pertaining to economic competitiveness into a selling point while muting diversity as a commitment to social justice and respect.
The authors affirm that the movement of peoples across national borders is one of the most evident forms of globalization today and a major source of greater diversity. Pointing out the lag of public policies that deal with the diversity, authors argue that some of the richest contributions to policy studies come from feminist scholarship in that while looking into thegendered/differential impact of policies on men and women, they open up space for a critical treatment of other forms of exclusion and marginalization. Yet, they rightly point out that gender analysis of Canadian public policy has not sufficiently interrogated the consequences of policy for ethnic minority and racialized women.
Chapter 4. Multiculturalism and Nation-Building (105-128)
In this chapter, the authors examine the Canadian state's multiculturalism historically. The Prime Minister Trudeau's announcement of a policy of multiculturalism is generally perceived as a state's response to the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, Aboriginal claim and third force from other ethnic groups. As the authors point out, it is interesting to note that Trudeau stood for a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. The authors argue that this framework early on bears witness to the continued domination of British and to a lesser extent French-origin groups in Canada.
Between 1971 and 1993, the authors state that multiculturalism focused on the cultural maintenance of diverse ethnic heritage such that "song and dance" were much highlighted. They observe a burgeoning linkage between multiculturalism and business interests in the 1980s, as seen in the slogan, "Multiculturalism Means Business", in a conference organized by the Progessive Conservatives in Toronto in 1986. From then on, the Canadian state has made a strong tie between multiculturalism and its international business. The authors argue that now the policy of multiculturalism, which began as a domestic policy, is becoming a selling product with a strong affinity to neo-liberal ideals.
The authors note another type of criticism along with this neo-liberal impetus. Reform Party, in particular, hinged on their advocacy of individual rights and the formal equality of people and provinces--this party also refused a special recognition of Quebec in Canada on the basis of the equality of each province. They argue, according to the authors, that the preservation of cultural background is a matter of personal choice and the state should promote minorities to integrate into the national culture, thus calling for an end to funding of multicultural support.
This conservative and neo-liberal criticism continued after 1993 and the authors note that business value was much stressed while funding for multiculturalism were severely being cut. In particular the authors note popular criticism, particularly in English-Speaking Canada in this period. They draw on the division of private and public spheres in the criticism. They state:
Along with the argument that Canadian multiculturalism weakens national unity, criticisms have centered around the idea that, while the expression of minority languages and culture are acceptable in the private sphere, the state should have no part in upholding them in the public sphere. (p. 106)
The authors argue that the notion of private means the household on the one hand and market and business on the other hand. Thus, multiculturalism as a policy means business to the Canadian state. They write:
While multiculturalism has faced significant cutbacks at the federal government level, at the same time policy-makers have marshalled a globalization discourse to defend multiculturalism policy. Here, policy-makers maintain that "diversity" benefits Canada's international trade and global competitiveness. (p. 106)
Interestingly the authors connect the division of private and public spheres in the dispute on multiculturalism with an implication of gender in multiculturalism. The authors observe the tendency that in the policy discussion, minority/immigrant women are often portrayed within their ethnocultural community, rather than within the structures of racism, sexism and exclusion in Canada. This tendency is tied to the argument for multiculturalism confined to the private sphere. The authors argue: specially for those in favor of multiculturalism only in the private sector, the realm of culture, such as food, language, and customs, is typically associated with women. Positioned in this way, women are more excluded from the realm of the public spheres of politics and work.
The authors observe a similar tension among feminist scholarship, as Okin view that minority women are harmed by multiculturalism, which sustains group rights. In a response to such argument, the authors call for careful dialogue and exchange between men and women within ethnocultural communities as well as the broader Canadian society. The authors quote Sherene Razack's argument on this subject. Razack criticizes that few of feminist scholars have engaged in respectful First/Third dialogue and instead seen Third Women only as subjects, "exotic other females in need of their benevolent protection".
Chapter 1. Diversity, Globalization and Public Policy in Canada. (11-35)
The authors finds the notion of selling diversity in three public policies--immigration, multiculturalism and employment. They note that multicultural policy, first articulated by the federal government of Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1971, has been a major means of official recognition of ethnic minorities in the Canadian nation. Recently, however, as they observe, policy-makers akin to neoliberal globalization, which emphasizes global markets and Canadian economic competitiveness, tend to turn certain notions of diversity pertaining to economic competitiveness into a selling point while muting diversity as a commitment to social justice and respect.
The authors affirm that the movement of peoples across national borders is one of the most evident forms of globalization today and a major source of greater diversity. Pointing out the lag of public policies that deal with the diversity, authors argue that some of the richest contributions to policy studies come from feminist scholarship in that while looking into thegendered/differential impact of policies on men and women, they open up space for a critical treatment of other forms of exclusion and marginalization. Yet, they rightly point out that gender analysis of Canadian public policy has not sufficiently interrogated the consequences of policy for ethnic minority and racialized women.
Chapter 4. Multiculturalism and Nation-Building (105-128)
In this chapter, the authors examine the Canadian state's multiculturalism historically. The Prime Minister Trudeau's announcement of a policy of multiculturalism is generally perceived as a state's response to the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, Aboriginal claim and third force from other ethnic groups. As the authors point out, it is interesting to note that Trudeau stood for a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. The authors argue that this framework early on bears witness to the continued domination of British and to a lesser extent French-origin groups in Canada.
Between 1971 and 1993, the authors state that multiculturalism focused on the cultural maintenance of diverse ethnic heritage such that "song and dance" were much highlighted. They observe a burgeoning linkage between multiculturalism and business interests in the 1980s, as seen in the slogan, "Multiculturalism Means Business", in a conference organized by the Progessive Conservatives in Toronto in 1986. From then on, the Canadian state has made a strong tie between multiculturalism and its international business. The authors argue that now the policy of multiculturalism, which began as a domestic policy, is becoming a selling product with a strong affinity to neo-liberal ideals.
The authors note another type of criticism along with this neo-liberal impetus. Reform Party, in particular, hinged on their advocacy of individual rights and the formal equality of people and provinces--this party also refused a special recognition of Quebec in Canada on the basis of the equality of each province. They argue, according to the authors, that the preservation of cultural background is a matter of personal choice and the state should promote minorities to integrate into the national culture, thus calling for an end to funding of multicultural support.
This conservative and neo-liberal criticism continued after 1993 and the authors note that business value was much stressed while funding for multiculturalism were severely being cut. In particular the authors note popular criticism, particularly in English-Speaking Canada in this period. They draw on the division of private and public spheres in the criticism. They state:
Along with the argument that Canadian multiculturalism weakens national unity, criticisms have centered around the idea that, while the expression of minority languages and culture are acceptable in the private sphere, the state should have no part in upholding them in the public sphere. (p. 106)
The authors argue that the notion of private means the household on the one hand and market and business on the other hand. Thus, multiculturalism as a policy means business to the Canadian state. They write:
While multiculturalism has faced significant cutbacks at the federal government level, at the same time policy-makers have marshalled a globalization discourse to defend multiculturalism policy. Here, policy-makers maintain that "diversity" benefits Canada's international trade and global competitiveness. (p. 106)
Interestingly the authors connect the division of private and public spheres in the dispute on multiculturalism with an implication of gender in multiculturalism. The authors observe the tendency that in the policy discussion, minority/immigrant women are often portrayed within their ethnocultural community, rather than within the structures of racism, sexism and exclusion in Canada. This tendency is tied to the argument for multiculturalism confined to the private sphere. The authors argue: specially for those in favor of multiculturalism only in the private sector, the realm of culture, such as food, language, and customs, is typically associated with women. Positioned in this way, women are more excluded from the realm of the public spheres of politics and work.
The authors observe a similar tension among feminist scholarship, as Okin view that minority women are harmed by multiculturalism, which sustains group rights. In a response to such argument, the authors call for careful dialogue and exchange between men and women within ethnocultural communities as well as the broader Canadian society. The authors quote Sherene Razack's argument on this subject. Razack criticizes that few of feminist scholars have engaged in respectful First/Third dialogue and instead seen Third Women only as subjects, "exotic other females in need of their benevolent protection".
Thursday, January 28, 2010
The Dark Side of Nation
Bannerji, Himai. (2000). Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press.
Introduction (1-13)
Describing globalization as an economic and cultural imperialism, Bannerji is keen to cultural politics and calls attention to culture of resistance, which she calls popular multiculturalism, in opposition to official or elite multiculturalism--each is represented by Kymlicka and Taylor. She asserts that it is antiracist and feminist class politics that would prevent the popular multiculturalism from falling prey to colonial, racist discourse and ethnic nationalism.
Bannerji examines Canadian state's adoption of multiculturalism historically: multiculturalism was a response of the Canadian federal government to rapid influx of third world immigrants to Canada as well as a growing intensity of the English-French rivalry and claims of Canada's aboriginal population. Within this situation, the proclamation of multiculturalism diffused the tensions and reduced the groups' demands to cultural ones, thereby helping the nationhood of Canada centered on the hegemonic Anglo-Canadian national culture, Bannerji notes.
Observing issues around multicultualism, Bannerji argues that no critique of hegemonic relations takes place and such debate ignores an understanding of socio-economic relations that constitutes a larger national and international political economy and their manifestations in our lives. Taking a critical stance, Bannerji calls attention to class, patriarchy and gender that construct relations and ideologies for exploitation under the name of community or nation. Bannerji states:
Thus a nexus is visible between the racialized class patriarchy of the Canadian state and its creations, the multicultural ethnic communities who come from equally sexist and class societies. There is a convergence of forms of ruling and exploitation when "the community" meets the multicultural state. (p. 11)
Bannerji maintains a stance of marxist feminism in looking at multiculturalism in Canada. Refusing official or elite multiculturalism, she calls for popular multiculturalism that is safeguarded by an antiracist and feminist marxist perspective.
Chap. 1. The Paradox of Diversity: The Construction of a Multicultural Canada and "Women of Colour" (15-61)
Bannerji notes that multiculturalism is a state sanctioned, state organized ideological affair in Canada. For Bannerji, a fundamental problem in the discourse of multiculturalism lies in the notion of difference is socially abstract and wipes away its historical implication. Bannerji argues that Deflecting from historical power relations, the deployment of diversity reduces to a managerial task outside of hegemony. Through depoliticizing culture and removing hegemony from it, Bannerji contests, the discourse of multiculturalism, after all, reduces political issues into a cultural artifice and converts culture into a private matter. Bannerji defines as a dispersion effect that the discourse of diversity occludes a process of homegenization that underpins the project of liberal pluralism. Thus, for Bannerji, the discourse of diversity is an ideology.
Claiming an antiracist and marxit feminist, Bannerji ultimately calls for collective political conscientization with others inhabiting similar social conditions produced through oppressive relations such as class, race, gender and sexuality.
Chap. 3. On the Dark Side of the Nation: Politics of Multiculturalism and the State of "Canada" (87-124)
Bannerji examines the discourse of multiculturalism in the nation-making process: Canada, a capital state with the legacy of a white settler colonial economy along with aspirations of liberal democracy, needs an ideology to mediate tensions and ruptures around the historical Anglo-French rivalry. Within this context, Bennerji argues, "undesirable others" consisting non-white peoples with other kinds of cultures, are to be discursively inserted in the binary hegemonic conflict. Bennerji argues, therefore, that the discourse of multiculturalism serves as a culmination for the ideological construction of Canada. In this ideological process, difference becomes neutralized and perceived as diversity rather than racism and colonial ethnocentrism. (p. 96)
Chap. 4. Charles Taylor's Politics of Recognition: A Critique (125-150)
From the perspective of antiracist and marxist feminism, Bannerji criticizes that Taylor, who differentiates his approach from the Canadian state's official multicultural policy, demonstrates an elite multiculturalism by calling for the recognition of the incoming "their" cultures within "our" culture, the existing Anglo-European hegemony in Canada. According to Bannerji, it is condescension toward "other" people who bear witness to their complex history, culture, and value.
Bannerji notes that despite his sensitivity to alienation and individualism produced by an industrial society, Taylor does not take in account the history, social relations and politics that drive to such technological deployment; instead he slips into a metaphysics of the human conditions, thus obscuring history. (Thus, he dissociates culture from power/knowledge and politics. )
Bannerji explains Taylor's perspective on the liberal state's multiculturalism: for Taylor, the liberalism, which is based on the abstract universalism and individual rights and equality, now enters the cultural realm in the state's multiculturalism. By seeking to incorporating cultural difference into the procedural democracy of the state, the official multiculturalism inevitably encounters a dilemma because of the simultaneous demand for equality and difference and because of its reliance on a universal argument to validate the particular.
As the fundamental problem in Taylor's argument, Bannerji writes that Taylor sees difference only in culture, uninscribed with relations of power, such that Taylor quotes the attempt to connect culture with politics a half-baked neo-Nietzscheanism (in his book:70). Without consideration of class struggle, and even resisting to affirmative action (his book: 64), Bannerji criticizes, "his idea of difference invloves a combination of aesthetic resting in a sort of cultural genetics--as a phenomenon of ontology and taste" (p. 132).
For Bannerji, Taylor's use of the terms "us" and "them" reveals his hidden assumptions about his perspectives. Bannerji states:
Speaking in terms of a social dialogue, this "we" extends a gesture of communitarian hospitality--creates a space where the readers can come in if they feel themselves to be a part of this "we." But this is where a trouble arises when some readers, unable to claim an insider's status of the culture that Taylor sees as "our" culture, fall into the category of "they" about whose multiculture Taylor talks about...After all, the very need for recognition of some by others signals to relations of power and ties cultural recognition to power/knowledge. (134-136).
Bannerji states that, although Talyor turns into a philosophical role to arbitrate cultural differences, at the bottom lies his sens of cultural crisis from the influx of multicultures, as quoted on the page 63.
Another problem Bannerji points out in Taylor's theoretical horizon is that he essentializes third world culture as "traditional" and religious, which is contrasted with European post-Enlightenment. Thus, they are at most to be tolerated. After all, Taylor calls for voluntary recognition in responding to the identity needs of others, thus depoliticizing the context where parties with power differentials struggle for their rights. Therefore, For Taylor, "'they' are merely unable to know what 'they' really want, thus the politics of social justice needs to be displaced by the politics of charitable recognition" (p. 143). Bennerji contests that Taylor's elitism thus offers condescension in the name of community, where a struggle to end exploitation and injustice, not a plea for recognition, takes place. Thus, for Bannerji, what is necessary to deal with cultural contestation is not an accolade of worth or equal value but a political organization that sustains structural and legal conditions to wage such struggles.
Finally Bannerji briefs liberal theorists' disagreement with Taylor: For Habermas, specific and traditional group cultures are not significant. Important to him is to bring about a common liberal culture through debates and discussions in the public space at the spirit of modernity and liberal democracy. That is to say that non-Westerners can be absorbed into this secular, rational and public culture.
Bannerji places Kymlicka as the primary theorist of the liberal Canadian state's multiculturalism: in theorizing official multiculturalism, he links group rights with individual rights and consider the constitution of different cultural groups in Canada within definitions of multi-nationality and poly-ethnicity. He also propose cultural sovereignty and emphasizes affirmative actions.
Chap. 5. A Question of Silence: Reflection on Violence Against Women in Communities of Colour (151-174)
Reflecting on women of color within the context of cultural nationalism or multicultural community politics, Bannerji argues that these women must claim various political movement in Canada as their own. She states:
We cannot allow ourselves to be blackmailed in the name of cultural authenticity, identity, and community, any more than we can be duped by the mythologies of social democracy proffered by a racist and imperialist bourgeois state. (p. 173)
Introduction (1-13)
Describing globalization as an economic and cultural imperialism, Bannerji is keen to cultural politics and calls attention to culture of resistance, which she calls popular multiculturalism, in opposition to official or elite multiculturalism--each is represented by Kymlicka and Taylor. She asserts that it is antiracist and feminist class politics that would prevent the popular multiculturalism from falling prey to colonial, racist discourse and ethnic nationalism.
Bannerji examines Canadian state's adoption of multiculturalism historically: multiculturalism was a response of the Canadian federal government to rapid influx of third world immigrants to Canada as well as a growing intensity of the English-French rivalry and claims of Canada's aboriginal population. Within this situation, the proclamation of multiculturalism diffused the tensions and reduced the groups' demands to cultural ones, thereby helping the nationhood of Canada centered on the hegemonic Anglo-Canadian national culture, Bannerji notes.
Observing issues around multicultualism, Bannerji argues that no critique of hegemonic relations takes place and such debate ignores an understanding of socio-economic relations that constitutes a larger national and international political economy and their manifestations in our lives. Taking a critical stance, Bannerji calls attention to class, patriarchy and gender that construct relations and ideologies for exploitation under the name of community or nation. Bannerji states:
Thus a nexus is visible between the racialized class patriarchy of the Canadian state and its creations, the multicultural ethnic communities who come from equally sexist and class societies. There is a convergence of forms of ruling and exploitation when "the community" meets the multicultural state. (p. 11)
Bannerji maintains a stance of marxist feminism in looking at multiculturalism in Canada. Refusing official or elite multiculturalism, she calls for popular multiculturalism that is safeguarded by an antiracist and feminist marxist perspective.
Chap. 1. The Paradox of Diversity: The Construction of a Multicultural Canada and "Women of Colour" (15-61)
Bannerji notes that multiculturalism is a state sanctioned, state organized ideological affair in Canada. For Bannerji, a fundamental problem in the discourse of multiculturalism lies in the notion of difference is socially abstract and wipes away its historical implication. Bannerji argues that Deflecting from historical power relations, the deployment of diversity reduces to a managerial task outside of hegemony. Through depoliticizing culture and removing hegemony from it, Bannerji contests, the discourse of multiculturalism, after all, reduces political issues into a cultural artifice and converts culture into a private matter. Bannerji defines as a dispersion effect that the discourse of diversity occludes a process of homegenization that underpins the project of liberal pluralism. Thus, for Bannerji, the discourse of diversity is an ideology.
Claiming an antiracist and marxit feminist, Bannerji ultimately calls for collective political conscientization with others inhabiting similar social conditions produced through oppressive relations such as class, race, gender and sexuality.
Chap. 3. On the Dark Side of the Nation: Politics of Multiculturalism and the State of "Canada" (87-124)
Bannerji examines the discourse of multiculturalism in the nation-making process: Canada, a capital state with the legacy of a white settler colonial economy along with aspirations of liberal democracy, needs an ideology to mediate tensions and ruptures around the historical Anglo-French rivalry. Within this context, Bennerji argues, "undesirable others" consisting non-white peoples with other kinds of cultures, are to be discursively inserted in the binary hegemonic conflict. Bennerji argues, therefore, that the discourse of multiculturalism serves as a culmination for the ideological construction of Canada. In this ideological process, difference becomes neutralized and perceived as diversity rather than racism and colonial ethnocentrism. (p. 96)
Chap. 4. Charles Taylor's Politics of Recognition: A Critique (125-150)
From the perspective of antiracist and marxist feminism, Bannerji criticizes that Taylor, who differentiates his approach from the Canadian state's official multicultural policy, demonstrates an elite multiculturalism by calling for the recognition of the incoming "their" cultures within "our" culture, the existing Anglo-European hegemony in Canada. According to Bannerji, it is condescension toward "other" people who bear witness to their complex history, culture, and value.
Bannerji notes that despite his sensitivity to alienation and individualism produced by an industrial society, Taylor does not take in account the history, social relations and politics that drive to such technological deployment; instead he slips into a metaphysics of the human conditions, thus obscuring history. (Thus, he dissociates culture from power/knowledge and politics. )
Bannerji explains Taylor's perspective on the liberal state's multiculturalism: for Taylor, the liberalism, which is based on the abstract universalism and individual rights and equality, now enters the cultural realm in the state's multiculturalism. By seeking to incorporating cultural difference into the procedural democracy of the state, the official multiculturalism inevitably encounters a dilemma because of the simultaneous demand for equality and difference and because of its reliance on a universal argument to validate the particular.
As the fundamental problem in Taylor's argument, Bannerji writes that Taylor sees difference only in culture, uninscribed with relations of power, such that Taylor quotes the attempt to connect culture with politics a half-baked neo-Nietzscheanism (in his book:70). Without consideration of class struggle, and even resisting to affirmative action (his book: 64), Bannerji criticizes, "his idea of difference invloves a combination of aesthetic resting in a sort of cultural genetics--as a phenomenon of ontology and taste" (p. 132).
For Bannerji, Taylor's use of the terms "us" and "them" reveals his hidden assumptions about his perspectives. Bannerji states:
Speaking in terms of a social dialogue, this "we" extends a gesture of communitarian hospitality--creates a space where the readers can come in if they feel themselves to be a part of this "we." But this is where a trouble arises when some readers, unable to claim an insider's status of the culture that Taylor sees as "our" culture, fall into the category of "they" about whose multiculture Taylor talks about...After all, the very need for recognition of some by others signals to relations of power and ties cultural recognition to power/knowledge. (134-136).
Bannerji states that, although Talyor turns into a philosophical role to arbitrate cultural differences, at the bottom lies his sens of cultural crisis from the influx of multicultures, as quoted on the page 63.
Another problem Bannerji points out in Taylor's theoretical horizon is that he essentializes third world culture as "traditional" and religious, which is contrasted with European post-Enlightenment. Thus, they are at most to be tolerated. After all, Taylor calls for voluntary recognition in responding to the identity needs of others, thus depoliticizing the context where parties with power differentials struggle for their rights. Therefore, For Taylor, "'they' are merely unable to know what 'they' really want, thus the politics of social justice needs to be displaced by the politics of charitable recognition" (p. 143). Bennerji contests that Taylor's elitism thus offers condescension in the name of community, where a struggle to end exploitation and injustice, not a plea for recognition, takes place. Thus, for Bannerji, what is necessary to deal with cultural contestation is not an accolade of worth or equal value but a political organization that sustains structural and legal conditions to wage such struggles.
Finally Bannerji briefs liberal theorists' disagreement with Taylor: For Habermas, specific and traditional group cultures are not significant. Important to him is to bring about a common liberal culture through debates and discussions in the public space at the spirit of modernity and liberal democracy. That is to say that non-Westerners can be absorbed into this secular, rational and public culture.
Bannerji places Kymlicka as the primary theorist of the liberal Canadian state's multiculturalism: in theorizing official multiculturalism, he links group rights with individual rights and consider the constitution of different cultural groups in Canada within definitions of multi-nationality and poly-ethnicity. He also propose cultural sovereignty and emphasizes affirmative actions.
Chap. 5. A Question of Silence: Reflection on Violence Against Women in Communities of Colour (151-174)
Reflecting on women of color within the context of cultural nationalism or multicultural community politics, Bannerji argues that these women must claim various political movement in Canada as their own. She states:
We cannot allow ourselves to be blackmailed in the name of cultural authenticity, identity, and community, any more than we can be duped by the mythologies of social democracy proffered by a racist and imperialist bourgeois state. (p. 173)
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
The Location of Culture
Bhabha, Homi. (2004). London and New York: Routledge Classics. (First published in 1994)
Preface to the Routledge Classics Edition (ix-xxv)
Bhabha's interest focus on the hybrid forms of life that the marginalized produce amid the situation where their cultural integrity is negated through the ignorance of their differences. He distinguishes two discourses of globalization. In this criticism of the predominant discourse, global cosmopolitanism, he asserts that it focuses on neo-liberal forms of governance and free-market forces of competition. He states:
A global cosmopolitanism of this sort readily celebrates a world of plural cultures and peoples located at the periphery, so long as they produce healthy profit margins within metropolitan societies. States that participate in such multicultural[sic] multiculturalism affirm their commitment to 'diversity', at home and abroad, so long as the demography of diversity consists largely of educated economic migrants--computer engineers, medical technicians, and entrepreneurs, rather than refugees, political exiles, or the poor. (p. xiv)
Instead, Bhabha calls attention to globalization that deals with difference within, such as problems of diversity and redistribution at the local level and the rights and representations of minorities in the regional domain. From this view, he suggests the term vernacular cosmopolitanism, which measures global progress from minorities perspective and their claims to freedom and equality are marked by a right to difference in equality. He states:
The vernacular cosmopolitan takes the view that the commitment to a 'right to difference in equality' as a process of constituting emergent groups and affiliations has less to do with the affirmation or authentication of origins and 'identities,' and more to do with political practices and ethical choices. (p. xvii)
Bhabha sharply criticizes Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. The Article declares the rights of minority to preserve their cultural inheritance. (The current statement is as follows) "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." Bhabha contests that this statement neglects inter-cultural affiliation across minority communities. He states:
Article 27 emphasizes the need for minorities to 'preserve' their cultural identities, rather than to affiliate across emergent minority communities. For all its good intentions, such rights neglect the 'inter-cultural' political existence and ethical imperative...(p. xxii)
[The Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the sentence, "All human beings are born with equal and inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms." But it is quite intriguing that Arendt once wrote, "we are not born equal, but become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights" (The Origin of Totalitarianism, p. 297) Although the two approaches aim at the same goal of preserving human rights, Arendt emphasizes the need for struggle to achieve the goal, thus allows us to see the inveterate power differentials in our society.]
Introduction (p. 1-27)
Bhabha delineates an innovative theoretical approach as thinking beyond narratives of initial subjectivities and focus on processes produced in the articulation of cultural differences. He calls them"in-between" spaces. With respect to cultural engagement, Bhabha states:
The social articulation of difference, from minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation...The borderline engagements of cultural difference may as often be consensual as conflictual; they may confound our definition of tradition and modernity; realign the customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge normative expectations of development and progress. (p. 3)
Bhabha explains postcoloniality: (1) it focuses on the persistent 'neo-colonial' conditions within the 'new' world order and the multinational division of labor, and (2) it look at cultures 'otherwise than modern'. He describes this phrase, "Such cultures of a postcolonial contra-modernity may be contingent to modernity, discontinuous or in contention with it, resistant to its oppressive, assimilationist technologies; but they also deploy the cultural hybridity of their borderline conditions to 'translate', and therefore reinscribe, the social imaginary of both metropolis and modernity" (p. 9).
Under the postcolonial condition, Bhabha introduces the concept of unhomeliness, meaning the recess of the domestic space or simply displacement. He assert that it is inherent to inter-cultural rites and becomes historically the most intricate invasion, blurring the borders between home and world as well as private and public. [THIS REMINDS ME OF ARENDT'S ARGUMENT OF THE PRESERVATION OF PRIVATE DOMAIN]
Chapter 1. The Commitment to Theory (28-56)
Bhabha emphasizes the political commitment of a theory. Opposing to singularity, he states that hegemony requires iteration and alterity to be effectively produce politicized populations. Within this context, he argues that theoretical statements should be made through negotiation and recognition of heterogeneity, where hybrid forms of knowledge can be produced. He writes:
A knowledge can only become political through an agnostic process: dissensus, alterity and otherness are the discursive conditions for the circulation and recognition of a politicized subject and a public 'truth'. (p. 34)
He maintains that in the negotiation between politics and knowledge, theories cannot be a metanarrative claiming generality and should not lag the time and space of politics.
Bhabha notes that cultural diversity, the recognition of pre-given cultural contents and customs, gives rise to liberal notion of multiculturalism.
His perspective on the relationship between cultural meaning and language is worth to look at. [Is it similar to poststructuralism?] In his view, the act of cultural enunciation [making known] is crossed by the difference of writing. Refusing a traditional emphasis on the content of symbols and functions within different cultures, he emphasizes the structure of symbolization shaped by language. In his view, the process of language itself is crucial to creating (cultural) meanings. Thus, meaning and symbols of culture is created beyond a simple act of communication between two people and is "mobilized in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot 'in itself' be conscious " (p. 53). Therefore, this Third Space constitutes the act of cultural enunciation, which is a contradictory, ambivalent, and indeterminate space. The acknowledgment of this Third Space of cultural enunciation is critical to understanding the historical identity of culture. He states:
The intervention of the Third Space of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, and expanding code. Such an intervention quite properly challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homegenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People. (p. 54)
For Bhabha, the nature of culture lies not in purity, fixity, or unity but in hybridity that a Third Space produces. Bhabha describes this Third Space as an alien territory, a split-space, or inbetween space. He argues that the theoretical recognition of this space may help conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or cultural diversity in a liberal sense but on the articulation of culture's hybridity.
By emphasizing the Third Space and the hybridity of culture, he calls attention to a discontinuity of cultural identities that people bring forward in their liberatory struggle. He observes that by destroying the continuity of the nationalist tradition, people can translate and negotiate their new culture within a new context. Bhabha states:
The people are now the very principle of 'dialectical reorganization' and they construct their culture from the national text translated into modern Western forms of information technology, language, dress. The changed political and historical site of enunciation transforms the meanings of the colonial inheritance into the liberatory signs of a free people of the future. (p. 56)
Bhabha distinguishes himself from nationalists who call for the true national culture as a safeguard against colonial cultural imposition. As he notes, his perspective resonates in Fanon's. Bhabha writes, "for Fanon, the liberatory people who initiate the productive instability of revolutionary cultural change are themselves the bearers of a hybridity identity" (p. 55).
[It seems that the reason why he is called a post-colonial scholar is that his emphasis on a departure from the legacy of colonialism on the basis of the changing culture from the people.]
Chapter 7. Articulating the Archaic: Cultural difference and colonial nonsense (175-198)
Bhabha opposes to the restoration of cultural essence or authenticity. According to him, this approach is taken from the perspective of relativism for the recognition of cultural difference. Defining cultural difference as a problem caused by cultural plurality, he argues that cultural difference is not acquisition or accumulation of additional cultural knowledge, but the momentous extinction of the recognizable object of culture. Thereby he continues to emphasize a discontinuity of culture at the edge of experience. For him, culture is not a fixity, but a fluidity, disrupted by time and space.
[His discussion is not much about cultural collision within an immigrant society, rather a nation-state in a post-colonial period.]
Chapter 8. DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation (199-244)
Focusing on the emergence of the modern nation from the mid-nineteenth century, he defines the Western nation as an obscure and ubiquitous form of living the "locality" of culture. He argues that in the act of writing the nation, which is an apparatus of symbolic power, a continual slippage of categories, like sexuality, class affiliation, territorial paranoia or cultural difference. But Bhabha argues that by focusing on the nation-space, the narrative of nation fails to address the ambivalent and chiasmatic intersections of time and place that constitute the 'modern' experience of the Western nation. Thus his focus is placed on the temporality of the modernity.
Within this context he warns that cultural difference must not be understood from the perspective of pluralities in the "homogeneous empty" time of the national community. He states:
The question of cultural difference faces us with a disposition of knowledges or a distribution of practices that exist beside each other, abseits designating a form of social contradiction or antagonism that has to be negotiated rather than sublated...The aim of cultural difference is to rearticulate the sum of knowledge from the perspective of the signifying position of the minority that resists totalization [my emphasis]...[that] serves to disturb the calculation of power and knowledge, producing other spaces of subaltern signification. (p. 232-233)
[I seems that Bhabha regards the other spaces produced in the hybrid conditions as a site of potential subversion, but it could be and in-between culture is not powerless, however his perspective is narrated without enough evidence. The in-between culture is negotiated and can be either subversive or obedient to the totalization.]
chapter. 9 The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: the question of agency
According to Bhabha, postcolonial criticism revolves around unequal cultural representation. In order to do so, they intervene in the discourse of modernity, in particular around its rationalization, that normalizes the unequal and differential representation. Thus, they attempt to reconstitute cultural difference, social authority and political discrimination in order to reveal the oppressive function of modernity. He states that, in the discourse of cultural difference, they oppose to the continuity of an authentic 'past' and a living 'present'. Instead they see culture as a strategy of survival and focus on the transnational dimension of cultural transformation, such as migration, diaspora, displacement and relocation. Thus, he argues that the postcolonialism challenges a consensual and collusive liberal sense of cultural community. Instead, they look at culture as a disturbing practice of survival and focus on a process of alterity, which construct cultural and political identities.
Preface to the Routledge Classics Edition (ix-xxv)
Bhabha's interest focus on the hybrid forms of life that the marginalized produce amid the situation where their cultural integrity is negated through the ignorance of their differences. He distinguishes two discourses of globalization. In this criticism of the predominant discourse, global cosmopolitanism, he asserts that it focuses on neo-liberal forms of governance and free-market forces of competition. He states:
A global cosmopolitanism of this sort readily celebrates a world of plural cultures and peoples located at the periphery, so long as they produce healthy profit margins within metropolitan societies. States that participate in such multicultural[sic] multiculturalism affirm their commitment to 'diversity', at home and abroad, so long as the demography of diversity consists largely of educated economic migrants--computer engineers, medical technicians, and entrepreneurs, rather than refugees, political exiles, or the poor. (p. xiv)
Instead, Bhabha calls attention to globalization that deals with difference within, such as problems of diversity and redistribution at the local level and the rights and representations of minorities in the regional domain. From this view, he suggests the term vernacular cosmopolitanism, which measures global progress from minorities perspective and their claims to freedom and equality are marked by a right to difference in equality. He states:
The vernacular cosmopolitan takes the view that the commitment to a 'right to difference in equality' as a process of constituting emergent groups and affiliations has less to do with the affirmation or authentication of origins and 'identities,' and more to do with political practices and ethical choices. (p. xvii)
Bhabha sharply criticizes Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. The Article declares the rights of minority to preserve their cultural inheritance. (The current statement is as follows) "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." Bhabha contests that this statement neglects inter-cultural affiliation across minority communities. He states:
Article 27 emphasizes the need for minorities to 'preserve' their cultural identities, rather than to affiliate across emergent minority communities. For all its good intentions, such rights neglect the 'inter-cultural' political existence and ethical imperative...(p. xxii)
[The Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the sentence, "All human beings are born with equal and inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms." But it is quite intriguing that Arendt once wrote, "we are not born equal, but become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights" (The Origin of Totalitarianism, p. 297) Although the two approaches aim at the same goal of preserving human rights, Arendt emphasizes the need for struggle to achieve the goal, thus allows us to see the inveterate power differentials in our society.]
Introduction (p. 1-27)
Bhabha delineates an innovative theoretical approach as thinking beyond narratives of initial subjectivities and focus on processes produced in the articulation of cultural differences. He calls them"in-between" spaces. With respect to cultural engagement, Bhabha states:
The social articulation of difference, from minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation...The borderline engagements of cultural difference may as often be consensual as conflictual; they may confound our definition of tradition and modernity; realign the customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge normative expectations of development and progress. (p. 3)
Bhabha explains postcoloniality: (1) it focuses on the persistent 'neo-colonial' conditions within the 'new' world order and the multinational division of labor, and (2) it look at cultures 'otherwise than modern'. He describes this phrase, "Such cultures of a postcolonial contra-modernity may be contingent to modernity, discontinuous or in contention with it, resistant to its oppressive, assimilationist technologies; but they also deploy the cultural hybridity of their borderline conditions to 'translate', and therefore reinscribe, the social imaginary of both metropolis and modernity" (p. 9).
Under the postcolonial condition, Bhabha introduces the concept of unhomeliness, meaning the recess of the domestic space or simply displacement. He assert that it is inherent to inter-cultural rites and becomes historically the most intricate invasion, blurring the borders between home and world as well as private and public. [THIS REMINDS ME OF ARENDT'S ARGUMENT OF THE PRESERVATION OF PRIVATE DOMAIN]
Chapter 1. The Commitment to Theory (28-56)
Bhabha emphasizes the political commitment of a theory. Opposing to singularity, he states that hegemony requires iteration and alterity to be effectively produce politicized populations. Within this context, he argues that theoretical statements should be made through negotiation and recognition of heterogeneity, where hybrid forms of knowledge can be produced. He writes:
A knowledge can only become political through an agnostic process: dissensus, alterity and otherness are the discursive conditions for the circulation and recognition of a politicized subject and a public 'truth'. (p. 34)
He maintains that in the negotiation between politics and knowledge, theories cannot be a metanarrative claiming generality and should not lag the time and space of politics.
Bhabha notes that cultural diversity, the recognition of pre-given cultural contents and customs, gives rise to liberal notion of multiculturalism.
His perspective on the relationship between cultural meaning and language is worth to look at. [Is it similar to poststructuralism?] In his view, the act of cultural enunciation [making known] is crossed by the difference of writing. Refusing a traditional emphasis on the content of symbols and functions within different cultures, he emphasizes the structure of symbolization shaped by language. In his view, the process of language itself is crucial to creating (cultural) meanings. Thus, meaning and symbols of culture is created beyond a simple act of communication between two people and is "mobilized in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot 'in itself' be conscious " (p. 53). Therefore, this Third Space constitutes the act of cultural enunciation, which is a contradictory, ambivalent, and indeterminate space. The acknowledgment of this Third Space of cultural enunciation is critical to understanding the historical identity of culture. He states:
The intervention of the Third Space of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, and expanding code. Such an intervention quite properly challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homegenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People. (p. 54)
For Bhabha, the nature of culture lies not in purity, fixity, or unity but in hybridity that a Third Space produces. Bhabha describes this Third Space as an alien territory, a split-space, or inbetween space. He argues that the theoretical recognition of this space may help conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or cultural diversity in a liberal sense but on the articulation of culture's hybridity.
By emphasizing the Third Space and the hybridity of culture, he calls attention to a discontinuity of cultural identities that people bring forward in their liberatory struggle. He observes that by destroying the continuity of the nationalist tradition, people can translate and negotiate their new culture within a new context. Bhabha states:
The people are now the very principle of 'dialectical reorganization' and they construct their culture from the national text translated into modern Western forms of information technology, language, dress. The changed political and historical site of enunciation transforms the meanings of the colonial inheritance into the liberatory signs of a free people of the future. (p. 56)
Bhabha distinguishes himself from nationalists who call for the true national culture as a safeguard against colonial cultural imposition. As he notes, his perspective resonates in Fanon's. Bhabha writes, "for Fanon, the liberatory people who initiate the productive instability of revolutionary cultural change are themselves the bearers of a hybridity identity" (p. 55).
[It seems that the reason why he is called a post-colonial scholar is that his emphasis on a departure from the legacy of colonialism on the basis of the changing culture from the people.]
Chapter 7. Articulating the Archaic: Cultural difference and colonial nonsense (175-198)
Bhabha opposes to the restoration of cultural essence or authenticity. According to him, this approach is taken from the perspective of relativism for the recognition of cultural difference. Defining cultural difference as a problem caused by cultural plurality, he argues that cultural difference is not acquisition or accumulation of additional cultural knowledge, but the momentous extinction of the recognizable object of culture. Thereby he continues to emphasize a discontinuity of culture at the edge of experience. For him, culture is not a fixity, but a fluidity, disrupted by time and space.
[His discussion is not much about cultural collision within an immigrant society, rather a nation-state in a post-colonial period.]
Chapter 8. DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation (199-244)
Focusing on the emergence of the modern nation from the mid-nineteenth century, he defines the Western nation as an obscure and ubiquitous form of living the "locality" of culture. He argues that in the act of writing the nation, which is an apparatus of symbolic power, a continual slippage of categories, like sexuality, class affiliation, territorial paranoia or cultural difference. But Bhabha argues that by focusing on the nation-space, the narrative of nation fails to address the ambivalent and chiasmatic intersections of time and place that constitute the 'modern' experience of the Western nation. Thus his focus is placed on the temporality of the modernity.
Within this context he warns that cultural difference must not be understood from the perspective of pluralities in the "homogeneous empty" time of the national community. He states:
The question of cultural difference faces us with a disposition of knowledges or a distribution of practices that exist beside each other, abseits designating a form of social contradiction or antagonism that has to be negotiated rather than sublated...The aim of cultural difference is to rearticulate the sum of knowledge from the perspective of the signifying position of the minority that resists totalization [my emphasis]...[that] serves to disturb the calculation of power and knowledge, producing other spaces of subaltern signification. (p. 232-233)
[I seems that Bhabha regards the other spaces produced in the hybrid conditions as a site of potential subversion, but it could be and in-between culture is not powerless, however his perspective is narrated without enough evidence. The in-between culture is negotiated and can be either subversive or obedient to the totalization.]
chapter. 9 The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: the question of agency
According to Bhabha, postcolonial criticism revolves around unequal cultural representation. In order to do so, they intervene in the discourse of modernity, in particular around its rationalization, that normalizes the unequal and differential representation. Thus, they attempt to reconstitute cultural difference, social authority and political discrimination in order to reveal the oppressive function of modernity. He states that, in the discourse of cultural difference, they oppose to the continuity of an authentic 'past' and a living 'present'. Instead they see culture as a strategy of survival and focus on the transnational dimension of cultural transformation, such as migration, diaspora, displacement and relocation. Thus, he argues that the postcolonialism challenges a consensual and collusive liberal sense of cultural community. Instead, they look at culture as a disturbing practice of survival and focus on a process of alterity, which construct cultural and political identities.
Saturday, January 16, 2010
Comment to the Politics of Recognition
Walzer, Michael. 99-104
From Talyor's argument, Walzer derives two kinds of liberalism: (1) Liberalism 1 is committed to absolute individual rights and guaranteed by a state's neutrality and (2) Liberalism 2 allows state intervention to preserve a particular culture or nation within the boundaries where the basic rights of citizens are protected. Walzer delineates the first kind of liberalism as the official doctrine of immigrant societies like the United States (and federal Canada), as Rawls formulated as social unions. Under this rule, the plural unions are free to do what they need to do but without help from the state.
In reality, however, there is inequality among nationalities, social unions or cultural communities and some are more at risk than others; and the state is called upon to take responsibility for everyone's cultural survival. From this perspective, Walzer carefully proposes "Liberalism 1 chosen from within Liberalism 2" to respond to multiculturalism, that is liberalism governed by "the social condition and the actual life choices of these[sic] men and women" (p. 103). Not rejecting the idea of Liberalism 2, Walzer holds tight to the concept of Liberalism 1 in particular with respect to immigrants who made an individual choice and were prepared to take cultural risks. Thus their lives are significantly shaped by the liberal idea of individual rights. Walzer argues that this choice and their rights should not be curtailed. In addition, he contests that Liberalism 1 does not exclude support for studying otherness.
From Talyor's argument, Walzer derives two kinds of liberalism: (1) Liberalism 1 is committed to absolute individual rights and guaranteed by a state's neutrality and (2) Liberalism 2 allows state intervention to preserve a particular culture or nation within the boundaries where the basic rights of citizens are protected. Walzer delineates the first kind of liberalism as the official doctrine of immigrant societies like the United States (and federal Canada), as Rawls formulated as social unions. Under this rule, the plural unions are free to do what they need to do but without help from the state.
In reality, however, there is inequality among nationalities, social unions or cultural communities and some are more at risk than others; and the state is called upon to take responsibility for everyone's cultural survival. From this perspective, Walzer carefully proposes "Liberalism 1 chosen from within Liberalism 2" to respond to multiculturalism, that is liberalism governed by "the social condition and the actual life choices of these[sic] men and women" (p. 103). Not rejecting the idea of Liberalism 2, Walzer holds tight to the concept of Liberalism 1 in particular with respect to immigrants who made an individual choice and were prepared to take cultural risks. Thus their lives are significantly shaped by the liberal idea of individual rights. Walzer argues that this choice and their rights should not be curtailed. In addition, he contests that Liberalism 1 does not exclude support for studying otherness.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Postcolonialism and Multiculturalism: Between Race and Ethnicity
Gunew, Sneja. (1997). The Yearbook of English Studies (The Politics of Postcolonial Criticism), 27, 22-39.
Gunew alludes that discussion of multiculturalism has become inevitable because increasing migration across borders rendered traditional national models anachronistic, but states that multiculturalism means different things in different context. For example, multiculturalism is produced out of necessity by nations and aspirants to geo-political cohesiveness despite heterogeneity within. Cultural studies focus on politics of representation in the discussion of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is also invoked within post-colonial discourses that criticize the predominance of Western culture.
Gunew calls attention to the distinction between state multiculturalism (dealing with the management of diversity) and critical multiculturalism (minorities' participation in the public sphere based on their difference). She characterizes state multiculturalism as such:
"State multiculturalism followed 'assimilation' (a term deriving from digestion and indicating 'becoming the same as') and 'integration' (separatism plus common values) and represents a kind of liberal pluralism which implies both a hidden norm from which minority groups diverge while failing to recognize prevailing power differentials." (p. 24)
Gunew notes that as seen in curriculum where ahistorical ethnic culture is celebrated, state multiculturalism holds a stance of liberal pluralism. This tendency extends to immigration deeply rooted in prejudice against minority. Gunew writes, "[i]n contrast to supposed Western tolerance the minority is often represented as primitive or uncivilized, importing its social pathologies" (p. 24)
Some implications in the discourse of state multiculturalism
Gunew points out that the emphasis on community in supporting cultural difference often leads to oppress women because, amid struggles for the maintenance of culture or tradition, women tend to be left out without agency of their interpretation or participating as a community leader.
Gunew also points out that multiculturalism's focus on culture tends to occlude or minimize political activisms and their histories: for example, literary cultural focus on black women's texts aids to depoliticize social struggles.
As observed in the public debate on political correctness and a conservative tone of multiculturalism, there has been a concern that multiculturalism carries the connotation of 'special interests' in opposition to 'general interest', or highlights oppositional minority positions.
Critical Multiculturalism
Observing pitfalls of state multiculturalism, Gunew states:
"[T]he future for critical multiculturalism lies in an alertness to the inherent 'hybridity' and diverse affiliations of all subjects which may be mobilized in varying combinations by particular
projects or events. Coalitions may be built around 'mutual and reciprocal relativization'" (p. 26-27)
Gunew refers to race, ethnicity and diaspora as three hidden reference points in the discourse of nation-building within a context of multiculturalism, in particular, in Australia). Observing that the term race is replaced by ethnicity, Gunew summarizes that while ethnicity, largely conceived as a cultural term, is structured to a concomitant desire for citizenship, race, once prevailed as irreducible differences, is structured by the desire to be human. Gunew's quote from Goldberg succinctly describes the oppositions between the two term.
"As Goldberg states, 'Race is irrelevant, but all is race' (p. 6), that is, irrelevant because while there are no non-arbitrary or absolute markers of race, debates about and struggles around race in a variety of societies are really about the meaning and nature of political consittution and community: 'Who counts as in and who out, who is central to the body politic and who peripheral, who is autonomous and who dependent?' (p. 83). Another way of putting it is to see it in this period of history as a struggle over who controls the codes and practices of nation-building." (p. 30) [Goldberg, Racist Culture]
Gunew asserts that diaspora hinges the oppositions of race and ethnicity and is seen as threats to a cohesive nation. As to the impact of diaspora, she states:
"Diasporic allegiances along the race ethnicity vector breach the homogeneity of the nation state with other affiliations, of increasing importance in the new structures of globalization. To some extent this movement of global connections is also happening amongst the indigenous peoples who are forming alliances across those nation-states imposed on them as a way of confirming solidarity for claims often grounded in land rights." (p. 30)
In spite of the emphasis of recent multiculturalism on a recognition of differences, Gunew criticizes that state multiculturalism, prevailing in the US, Canada and Australia, fails to see power differentials among competing minority groups, thus hold a profoundly conservative pluralist model.
Observing the floating meanings of whiteness, Gunew questions practices of cultural critiques and states:
"Appeals to the facts of a nation's history are not really at issue here, since we are dealing rather with metaphors and signifying systems mobilized as part of a rhetoric of the national culture concerned with identifying insiders and outsiders." (p. 36)
To her and other post-colonial scholar, alterity, being otherness, is an important concept. Gunew refers to Said's Orientalism as the founding study for the construction of alterity, while placing Homi Bhabha's work in relation to borders and hybridity (Culture's In Between, Artforum, September 1993).
Finally Gunew's emphasis of critical multiculturalism lies on the intertwined relationship between the local and the global because it introduces minority perspectives while suggesting diasporic networks. In this vein, she maintains that multiculturalism is a floating signifier that gains meaning and strategies only in a specific context. Local contextualization is essential in critical multiculturalism.
Gunew alludes that discussion of multiculturalism has become inevitable because increasing migration across borders rendered traditional national models anachronistic, but states that multiculturalism means different things in different context. For example, multiculturalism is produced out of necessity by nations and aspirants to geo-political cohesiveness despite heterogeneity within. Cultural studies focus on politics of representation in the discussion of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is also invoked within post-colonial discourses that criticize the predominance of Western culture.
Gunew calls attention to the distinction between state multiculturalism (dealing with the management of diversity) and critical multiculturalism (minorities' participation in the public sphere based on their difference). She characterizes state multiculturalism as such:
"State multiculturalism followed 'assimilation' (a term deriving from digestion and indicating 'becoming the same as') and 'integration' (separatism plus common values) and represents a kind of liberal pluralism which implies both a hidden norm from which minority groups diverge while failing to recognize prevailing power differentials." (p. 24)
Gunew notes that as seen in curriculum where ahistorical ethnic culture is celebrated, state multiculturalism holds a stance of liberal pluralism. This tendency extends to immigration deeply rooted in prejudice against minority. Gunew writes, "[i]n contrast to supposed Western tolerance the minority is often represented as primitive or uncivilized, importing its social pathologies" (p. 24)
Some implications in the discourse of state multiculturalism
Gunew points out that the emphasis on community in supporting cultural difference often leads to oppress women because, amid struggles for the maintenance of culture or tradition, women tend to be left out without agency of their interpretation or participating as a community leader.
Gunew also points out that multiculturalism's focus on culture tends to occlude or minimize political activisms and their histories: for example, literary cultural focus on black women's texts aids to depoliticize social struggles.
As observed in the public debate on political correctness and a conservative tone of multiculturalism, there has been a concern that multiculturalism carries the connotation of 'special interests' in opposition to 'general interest', or highlights oppositional minority positions.
Critical Multiculturalism
Observing pitfalls of state multiculturalism, Gunew states:
"[T]he future for critical multiculturalism lies in an alertness to the inherent 'hybridity' and diverse affiliations of all subjects which may be mobilized in varying combinations by particular
projects or events. Coalitions may be built around 'mutual and reciprocal relativization'" (p. 26-27)
Gunew refers to race, ethnicity and diaspora as three hidden reference points in the discourse of nation-building within a context of multiculturalism, in particular, in Australia). Observing that the term race is replaced by ethnicity, Gunew summarizes that while ethnicity, largely conceived as a cultural term, is structured to a concomitant desire for citizenship, race, once prevailed as irreducible differences, is structured by the desire to be human. Gunew's quote from Goldberg succinctly describes the oppositions between the two term.
"As Goldberg states, 'Race is irrelevant, but all is race' (p. 6), that is, irrelevant because while there are no non-arbitrary or absolute markers of race, debates about and struggles around race in a variety of societies are really about the meaning and nature of political consittution and community: 'Who counts as in and who out, who is central to the body politic and who peripheral, who is autonomous and who dependent?' (p. 83). Another way of putting it is to see it in this period of history as a struggle over who controls the codes and practices of nation-building." (p. 30) [Goldberg, Racist Culture]
Gunew asserts that diaspora hinges the oppositions of race and ethnicity and is seen as threats to a cohesive nation. As to the impact of diaspora, she states:
"Diasporic allegiances along the race ethnicity vector breach the homogeneity of the nation state with other affiliations, of increasing importance in the new structures of globalization. To some extent this movement of global connections is also happening amongst the indigenous peoples who are forming alliances across those nation-states imposed on them as a way of confirming solidarity for claims often grounded in land rights." (p. 30)
In spite of the emphasis of recent multiculturalism on a recognition of differences, Gunew criticizes that state multiculturalism, prevailing in the US, Canada and Australia, fails to see power differentials among competing minority groups, thus hold a profoundly conservative pluralist model.
Observing the floating meanings of whiteness, Gunew questions practices of cultural critiques and states:
"Appeals to the facts of a nation's history are not really at issue here, since we are dealing rather with metaphors and signifying systems mobilized as part of a rhetoric of the national culture concerned with identifying insiders and outsiders." (p. 36)
To her and other post-colonial scholar, alterity, being otherness, is an important concept. Gunew refers to Said's Orientalism as the founding study for the construction of alterity, while placing Homi Bhabha's work in relation to borders and hybridity (Culture's In Between, Artforum, September 1993).
Finally Gunew's emphasis of critical multiculturalism lies on the intertwined relationship between the local and the global because it introduces minority perspectives while suggesting diasporic networks. In this vein, she maintains that multiculturalism is a floating signifier that gains meaning and strategies only in a specific context. Local contextualization is essential in critical multiculturalism.
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics
Gutmann, Amy. (1993). Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (3), 171-204.
Gutmann examines political controversies over social justice in multicultural contexts. She begins her argument by defining multiculturalism as "the state of a society or the world containing many cultures that interact in some significant way with each other" whereas a culture id defined as a human community associated with a set of social standards of seeing, doing and thinking.
Her aim in this essay:
(1) understanding the essential challenge of multiculturalism to social justice
(2) assessing three responses: cultural relativism, political relativism, and comprehensive universalism
(3) proposing deliberative universalism as a more defensible response
The response of Cultural Relativism
Gutmann notes that social justice, according to cultural relativism, is the distribution of social goods responding to their cultural meaning. As seen the debate on polygamy among Mormons, such meanings change over time. Thus, if there exist multiple meanings for any given good, cultural relativism will require reformulation to deal with these competing meanings to apply to social justice, Gutmann explains.
Gutmann rightly points out that because cultures are often distinguished by a set of dominant social understandings, cultural relativism can threaten to identity social justice with the dominant social norms, as seen examples of justifying slavery or women's role. She states that there has been no demonstrated general consensus to the dominant discourses. She states:
"Because social understandings are typically not shared among all members of a culture and dominant understandings do not determine justice, cultural relativism does not fulfill its promise of dissolving multicultural conflicts. It often does not even recognize moral conflicts within cultures, let alone resolve them." (p. 178)
Political Relativism
Gutmann states that social justice, according to political relativism, is achieved through institutional mechanism to adjudicate internal disagreement over social meanings and adjust distribution of social justice based on the outcome. Gutmann argues that political relativism is more adequate response to multicultural conflicts than cultural relativism because its recognition of a political community, where disagreements over social meanings are discussed and negotiated, and a provision for certain forms of procedural justice, such as forums for argument, negotiation, and so on, highlights a necessary condition of social justice; this condition, just procedures, alone, however, cannot guarantee the complete morality, she critiques.
Gutmann implies that democracy is a procedure and does not necessarily determine justice, although democratic procedures may be the best for provisionally settling many conflicts. She continues to argue, "[i]n situations of racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts within democratic societies, majoritarian procedures may deny minorities personal security, basic liberty, and decent living standards" (p. 180).
Observing cases where political procedures failed to bring just outcomes, Gutmann states:
"The strength of political relativism lies in its recognition that disagreements over social meanings should be publicly discussed, negotiated, and adjudicated. Its weakness lies in its silence regarding standards, other than social agreement, by which to judge the justice of procedures or their results." (p. 182)
The Relation Between Relativism and Personal Identity
Gutmann asserts that people, belonging to multiple cultures at a time, as well as societies are multicultural even within an orthodox religious group, for instance. This nature, however, does not lead to a cosmopolitan view about social justice, Gutmann notes. People negotiate their identities. Gutmann writes:
"Cultural and political identities are neither given like hair color nor chosen like high cuisine. People select, interpret, and evaluate stories, histories, and customs in attempts to make the best out of the various cultures given to them. They also interpret and evaluate the institutions, laws, practices, and procedures of the political community they inherit...Cultural and political relativism leave too little room for recognizing this distinctively human capacity, exercised most self-consciously by people who endure systematic social injustice." (p. 185)
The Challenge of Relativism
Gutmann argues that a fundamental challenge of relativism lies in that it fails to explain an Archimedean point outside any cultural or political community from which to justify the overriding of local understandings. Looking at Nazi Germany's dominant favor for racial discrimination yet unjust, she calls attention to certain universal values. She clarifies universalism:
"Universalism depends on the possibility of justifying actions to people who do not share the same communal attachments, and this possibility is not undermined by the idea that moral criticism comes from within particular cultures." (p. 192)
Gutmann states that universalism, in practice, better fits the force of criticisms of arbitrary arrests and systematic deception by regime.
The Response of Comprehensive Universalism
Gutmann refers to comprehensive universalism as another response to the challenge of multiculturalism. By comprehensive universalism, she means an ethical application of a set of comprehensive principles of justice to all modern culture. In comparison, she defines deliberative universalism as follows:
Deliberative universalism [sic] relies partly upon a core of universal principles and partly upon publicly accountable deliberation to address fundamental conflicts concerning social justice, conflicts that reason has yet to resolve. (p. 193)
Partly because a universalist political ethics cannot be comprehensive in practice and comprehensive univeralism overlooks moral disagreements, such as individual choice vs. abortion, concerning social justice within a specific local context, Gutmann favors for deliberative universalism, which leaves room for local negotiation.
The Response of Deliberative Universalism
Gutmann succinctly writes:
"Unlike comprehensive universalism, deliberative universalism explicitly recognize that some conflicts over social justice cannot now (or perhaps ever) be resolved by a comprehensive, universally justifiable set of substantive standards. These conflicts are best addressed and provisionally resolved by actual deliberation, the give and take of argument that is respectful of reasonable differences." (p. 197)
In this way, she convenes relativism and universalism. Gutmann's favor for deliberative universalism partly stems from the condition that the reasonable argument can create. She writes:
[T]he give and take of respectful argument can create the broadest justifianle consensus across a range of reasonable but conflicting positions because mutual respect enjoins an economy of moral disagreement, the search for substantive points of convergence between fundamentally irreconcilable positions. (p. 199)
Gutmann alludes that the difference between deliberative universalism and political relativism lies in that social justice consists of deliberation as well as substantive principles that are necessary to secure basic human well-being. (p. 200) In this respect, Gutmann stresses that there should be certain conditions for deliberation to work in society, because "deliberation not only supplements substantive principles of justice but also presupposes certain substantive principles as well as procedural requirements." (p. 200) Thus she calls for substantive and procedural principles that make deliberative universalism distinctively suitable for making decisions about social justice.
Another reason for favoring deliberative universalism that Gutmann mentions is that "multiculturalism requires deliberation on many matters of social justice" (p. 204).
[Gutmann's emphasis on deliberative universalism is comparable with Charles Taylor's 'minimal rationality', as Bhabha summarizes (the location of culture, 2004). For Taylor, a plurality of standards which stem from incommensurable cultures does not rule out judgments of superiority. Rather, it is the plurality that exist between the incommensurable that leads to such judgments. He states:
What more is involved comes out of in the different judgments we make when we compare incommensurable cultures and activities. The judgments take us beyond merely formal criteria of rationality, and point us toward the human activities of articulation which give the vale of rationality its sense. (Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p. 151)
Thus, Talyor refutes pluralism and calls attention to the rationality that is formed through our comparative judgments between incommensurable cultures. This rationality not only avoids inconsistency among cultures but also constitutes superior judgments out of our attuned and humane interests in other cultures that coexist in the same space.]
Gutmann examines political controversies over social justice in multicultural contexts. She begins her argument by defining multiculturalism as "the state of a society or the world containing many cultures that interact in some significant way with each other" whereas a culture id defined as a human community associated with a set of social standards of seeing, doing and thinking.
Her aim in this essay:
(1) understanding the essential challenge of multiculturalism to social justice
(2) assessing three responses: cultural relativism, political relativism, and comprehensive universalism
(3) proposing deliberative universalism as a more defensible response
The response of Cultural Relativism
Gutmann notes that social justice, according to cultural relativism, is the distribution of social goods responding to their cultural meaning. As seen the debate on polygamy among Mormons, such meanings change over time. Thus, if there exist multiple meanings for any given good, cultural relativism will require reformulation to deal with these competing meanings to apply to social justice, Gutmann explains.
Gutmann rightly points out that because cultures are often distinguished by a set of dominant social understandings, cultural relativism can threaten to identity social justice with the dominant social norms, as seen examples of justifying slavery or women's role. She states that there has been no demonstrated general consensus to the dominant discourses. She states:
"Because social understandings are typically not shared among all members of a culture and dominant understandings do not determine justice, cultural relativism does not fulfill its promise of dissolving multicultural conflicts. It often does not even recognize moral conflicts within cultures, let alone resolve them." (p. 178)
Political Relativism
Gutmann states that social justice, according to political relativism, is achieved through institutional mechanism to adjudicate internal disagreement over social meanings and adjust distribution of social justice based on the outcome. Gutmann argues that political relativism is more adequate response to multicultural conflicts than cultural relativism because its recognition of a political community, where disagreements over social meanings are discussed and negotiated, and a provision for certain forms of procedural justice, such as forums for argument, negotiation, and so on, highlights a necessary condition of social justice; this condition, just procedures, alone, however, cannot guarantee the complete morality, she critiques.
Gutmann implies that democracy is a procedure and does not necessarily determine justice, although democratic procedures may be the best for provisionally settling many conflicts. She continues to argue, "[i]n situations of racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts within democratic societies, majoritarian procedures may deny minorities personal security, basic liberty, and decent living standards" (p. 180).
Observing cases where political procedures failed to bring just outcomes, Gutmann states:
"The strength of political relativism lies in its recognition that disagreements over social meanings should be publicly discussed, negotiated, and adjudicated. Its weakness lies in its silence regarding standards, other than social agreement, by which to judge the justice of procedures or their results." (p. 182)
The Relation Between Relativism and Personal Identity
Gutmann asserts that people, belonging to multiple cultures at a time, as well as societies are multicultural even within an orthodox religious group, for instance. This nature, however, does not lead to a cosmopolitan view about social justice, Gutmann notes. People negotiate their identities. Gutmann writes:
"Cultural and political identities are neither given like hair color nor chosen like high cuisine. People select, interpret, and evaluate stories, histories, and customs in attempts to make the best out of the various cultures given to them. They also interpret and evaluate the institutions, laws, practices, and procedures of the political community they inherit...Cultural and political relativism leave too little room for recognizing this distinctively human capacity, exercised most self-consciously by people who endure systematic social injustice." (p. 185)
The Challenge of Relativism
Gutmann argues that a fundamental challenge of relativism lies in that it fails to explain an Archimedean point outside any cultural or political community from which to justify the overriding of local understandings. Looking at Nazi Germany's dominant favor for racial discrimination yet unjust, she calls attention to certain universal values. She clarifies universalism:
"Universalism depends on the possibility of justifying actions to people who do not share the same communal attachments, and this possibility is not undermined by the idea that moral criticism comes from within particular cultures." (p. 192)
Gutmann states that universalism, in practice, better fits the force of criticisms of arbitrary arrests and systematic deception by regime.
The Response of Comprehensive Universalism
Gutmann refers to comprehensive universalism as another response to the challenge of multiculturalism. By comprehensive universalism, she means an ethical application of a set of comprehensive principles of justice to all modern culture. In comparison, she defines deliberative universalism as follows:
Deliberative universalism [sic] relies partly upon a core of universal principles and partly upon publicly accountable deliberation to address fundamental conflicts concerning social justice, conflicts that reason has yet to resolve. (p. 193)
Partly because a universalist political ethics cannot be comprehensive in practice and comprehensive univeralism overlooks moral disagreements, such as individual choice vs. abortion, concerning social justice within a specific local context, Gutmann favors for deliberative universalism, which leaves room for local negotiation.
The Response of Deliberative Universalism
Gutmann succinctly writes:
"Unlike comprehensive universalism, deliberative universalism explicitly recognize that some conflicts over social justice cannot now (or perhaps ever) be resolved by a comprehensive, universally justifiable set of substantive standards. These conflicts are best addressed and provisionally resolved by actual deliberation, the give and take of argument that is respectful of reasonable differences." (p. 197)
In this way, she convenes relativism and universalism. Gutmann's favor for deliberative universalism partly stems from the condition that the reasonable argument can create. She writes:
[T]he give and take of respectful argument can create the broadest justifianle consensus across a range of reasonable but conflicting positions because mutual respect enjoins an economy of moral disagreement, the search for substantive points of convergence between fundamentally irreconcilable positions. (p. 199)
Gutmann alludes that the difference between deliberative universalism and political relativism lies in that social justice consists of deliberation as well as substantive principles that are necessary to secure basic human well-being. (p. 200) In this respect, Gutmann stresses that there should be certain conditions for deliberation to work in society, because "deliberation not only supplements substantive principles of justice but also presupposes certain substantive principles as well as procedural requirements." (p. 200) Thus she calls for substantive and procedural principles that make deliberative universalism distinctively suitable for making decisions about social justice.
Another reason for favoring deliberative universalism that Gutmann mentions is that "multiculturalism requires deliberation on many matters of social justice" (p. 204).
[Gutmann's emphasis on deliberative universalism is comparable with Charles Taylor's 'minimal rationality', as Bhabha summarizes (the location of culture, 2004). For Taylor, a plurality of standards which stem from incommensurable cultures does not rule out judgments of superiority. Rather, it is the plurality that exist between the incommensurable that leads to such judgments. He states:
What more is involved comes out of in the different judgments we make when we compare incommensurable cultures and activities. The judgments take us beyond merely formal criteria of rationality, and point us toward the human activities of articulation which give the vale of rationality its sense. (Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p. 151)
Thus, Talyor refutes pluralism and calls attention to the rationality that is formed through our comparative judgments between incommensurable cultures. This rationality not only avoids inconsistency among cultures but also constitutes superior judgments out of our attuned and humane interests in other cultures that coexist in the same space.]
Will Kymlicka
Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State
Will Kymlicka & Keith Banting (2006). Ethics & International Affairs, 20(3), 281-304.
In spite of a increasingly prevailing public assumption of a potential trade-off between inclusive immigration policies and the maintenance of a robust welfare state, Kymlicka and Banting argue that there Besides the issues of security and terrorism that prevail in many circles about massive immigration, Kymlicka and Banting point out that there is little evidence about the impact of increasing ethnic diversity on the welfare state and the claim of an inevitable trade-off between them may be premature.
Kymlicka and Banting defines two concerns in this debate: (1) A growing heterogeneity/ethnic diversity in society will inevitably loosen national solidarity across ethnic lines, thus resulting in making more difficult achieving redistribution of resources or sustaining a robust welfare state (the heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off) (2) Multiculturalism policies that promote recognition of each culture will exacerbate weaken the politics of (economic) redistribution (the recognition/redistribution trade-off).
In the first case, the authors state that a general acceptance of the trade-off is generally drawn from case studies done in the United State, where scholars concluded that there is a universal tendency for people to resist interethnic redistribution. The authors argue that the studies are deeply rooted in the country's peculiar history of slavery and segregation, thus providing little evidence for a potential erosion of Canadian welfare state as a result of a growing ethnic diversity that new immigrants bring into the society.
Secondly, the authors observe the debate even among multiculturalism defendants over the dilemma between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution in the process of their commitment to social justice and equality. In this regard, the author state that this concern, unlike the first one, is not based on empirical studies but entirely speculative and conjectural.
Within this context, the authors conclude their research on the trade-offs as follows:
"There is no evidence here that countries with large immigrant populations have greater difficulty in sustaining and enhancing their historic welfare commitments. But large changes do seem to matter. It is the pace of social change rather than the fact of ethnic diversity per se that stands out here as politically unsettling." (p. 293)
Examining change in social spending as a proportion of GDP and change in the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers between 1980 and 2000 in twenty-one countries, the authors conclude that "the countries with the strongest immigrant multiculturalism policies did better than the other groups, providing a hint that perhaps multiculturalism policies may actually ease possible tensions between heterogeneity and redistribution." (p. 295)
They support this conclusion with a similar study conducted with indigenous peoples and national minorities: there is no evidence a politics of recognition that entails a trade-off with a politics of redistribution. Instead, the authors suggest that it is state management and politics that turns ethnic diversity into a source of erosion of the national welfare state and solidarity and trust among peoples.
The authors delineates three ways in which multiculturalism policies promote solidarity: (1) in contrast to claims made by critiques of multiculturalism, multiculturalism policies can help to combat the stereotypes and stigmatizations that currently erode feelings of solidarity across ethnic and racial lines. (2) the policies should be supplemented with nation-building policies, such as language training programs, citizenship education in the schools, the shared celebration of national heroes and holidays, citizenship ceremonies for immigrants, and so on. (3) What's more, these policies should be sustained with the national adoption of multiculturalism as a national identity. In this regards, the authors write, "Multiculturalism arguably plays this role in Canada. Affirming multiculturalism has become part of what it means to ‘‘be Canadian,’’ and, more specifically, part of what it means to be a ‘‘good Canadian" (p. 301). Thus the authors call attention to multiculturalism as an essential Canadian nationhood.
The authors' nation-centered narrative seems to stem from their perspective on nation solidarity:
"On the one hand, our findings cast doubt on pessimistic claims about the conflict between diversity and solidarity, and this should indirectly lend support to the struggles of noncitizens, making greater space for an open-minded consideration of their claims on their own merits. On the other hand, however, our findings do not cast doubt on the importance of national solidarity, and our own best guess is that those countries that have done well in combining diversity and solidarity have done so by linking immigration and multiculturalism to the promotion of national citizenship." (p. 303-304)
Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice. (2006). In Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka states, "at the heart of citizenship rights are individual liberties" (p. 128).
He regards the nation-state as the privileged locus for political participation, self-government, and solidarity. Looking at the model of citizenship developed within the liberal democratic political system in the West in the past two centuries, Kymlicka points out that this political reordering was nearly universal and embarked on "'national-building' policies aimed at the diffusion of a common national identity, culture, and language throughout the territory of the state" (p. 129)
He argues that, while this model of "liberal nationhood" succeeded in ensuring democracy, individual rights and economic prosperity, it involved injustice against immigrants, indigenous or regional minorities and neighboring nation-states.
Refuting the thought that these injustices are not intrinsic to liberal nationhood, Kymlicka contests that they are inherent risks of the pursuit of liberal nationhood and in fact responsible for many harms executed in the twenties century. In this dilemma, Kymlicka argues two options: (1) taming liberal nationhood approach, by adopting a multicultural concept for immigrants, a multination concept for indigenous and substate minorities to condone autonomy, and geopolitical agreements with neighboring nation-states. or (2) transcending liberal nation by building postnational or cosmopolitan citizenship.
In his response to Benhabib's call for cosmopolital norms instead of liberal nationhood, Kymlicka argues that the two concepts are commensurate. He states:
[O]ne concept of the nature and function of cosmopolitan norms is precisely to pomote (a tamed form of) liberal nationhood, and that this conception is conceptually coherent, politically feasible, and morally progressive. (p. 131)
Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. (2001). New York: Oxford University Press.
For Kymlicka, crucial in the theories and practices of West democracies is to see claims for minority rights as a defensive response to an assault on the basic dignity and respect in the process of state nation-building, instead of 'special status' or 'privilege'. He states that the Western democracies are a complex package of robust forms of nation-building constrained by robust forms of minority rights.
Kymlicka refutes the discourse of minority rights as the old liberalism-vs-communitarianism debate, such that communitarians supported rights of ethnocultural communities whereas liberalism opposed them in the name of individualism. He asserts that debates over minority rights within liberalism are increasingly about fair accommodations of cultural diversity within liberal institutions.
Kymlicka also argues that human rights are insufficient to ensure justice between ethnocultural groups, thus minority rights must supplement human rights.
Chapter 1.
Kymlicka summarizes that the debate over minority rights before 1989 was characterized with theoretical confrontation between liberals and communitarians. Kymlicka explains that liberals prioritize individual freedom to choose the good life, whereas communitarians dispute the concept of autonomous individuals and rather regard individuals as the product of social practices which define the good life. In this stage, minority rights were viewed as the communitarian critique of liberalism, defending communal group rights against liberal individualism.
This dichotomy, however, is an old one, according to Kymlicka. Kymlicka highlights recent debate over minority rights within a liberal perspective. Central to this debate is to distinguish 'good' minority rights to supplement individual rights.
Kymlicka observes the current tendency of nation-building efforts in modern liberal states by creating a societal culture that involves a common language and social institutions, as seen in the United States. Kymlicka questions the impact of nation-building on minority rights and justice.
Observing the recent public recognition that difference-blind rules may cause disadvantages for minority groups, Kymlicka rightly points out that multiculturalism is widely accepted although there remain profound disagreements over specific policies of multiculturalism. Along with this general disposition, he remarks another common argument that recognition of minority rights threatens to erode citizenship. With this respect, Kymlicka argues that recognizing minority rights, on the contrary, would strengthen solidarity by removing barriers that prevent minority from full participation in political institutions.
Chapter 8. The theory and Practice of Immigrant Multiculturalism (152-176)
"The first country to officially adopt such a 'multiculturalism' policy at the national level was Canada in 1971" (p. 154).
For Kymlicka, demands for multiculturalism is a response to the government's nation-building of pressuring immigrants to integrate into common educational, economical and political institutions operating in the national language. In particular about immigrant multiculturalism policy, Kymlicka disputes critiques that multiculturalism continues to ghettoize immigrants and balkanizes society. He emphasizes that the policies are clearly integrationist and promotes institutional integration through education and citizenship practices. He argues:
The idea that multiculturalism is promoting an apartheid-like system of institutional separatism is, I think, wholly misplaced. But is it promoting a kind of mental separatism, encouraging immigrants to dwell on the life they left behind, rather than the opportunities available in their new country? This is a more plausible worry. However institutional integration is likely to generate over time a sense of psychological identification. The fact that common institutions bring together the members of different ethnic groups has important ramifications both personally and politically. At the personal level, it means that people meet (and indeed often fall in love with) members of other ethnic groups, propmoting inter-ethnic friendships and marriages. These relationships are intimately tied up with one's new life here, not with the Old World. (p. 167-168)
[Criticism: his division between new world and old world, new opportunities are not that rosy in the new world, some interpersonal relations do not melt inveterate racism and other hierarchy. In fact, people do not mix as much as he imagines.]
According to Kymlicka, immigrants must engage in common institutions and contribute to democratic citizenship under the institutional multiculturalism policies. He states:
Politically, it[multiculturalism] means that people must learn how to negotiate with the members of other ethnic groups...The inevitable result is that groups must focus on how to contribute to the new life here, rather than simply dwelling on the society left behind. In short, institutional integration makes possible the kind of civic engagement that supports democratic citizenship. (p. 168)
Kymlicka calls his view of multiculturalism 'pluralizing' or 'hybridic', which "does not involve the preservation of distinct cultures (since ethnic identities weaken and incorporate aspects of the larger culture), but nor is it assimilation (since ethnic groups change the larger society as they integrate)" (p. 168-169). He asserts that immigrants common demands for language training assistance, for instance, indicate their intention of integration. Central to his argument appears to be the backlash against immigrant multiculturalism among native-born citizens. He argues:
[T]he logic of multiculturalism involves accepting the principle of state-prescribed integraion, but renegotiation the terms of integration...So immigrants accept the principle of integration into common institutions: they are simply seeking fairer terms of integration. If the state is going to pressure immigrants to integrates into common institutions operating in the national language, then immigrant groups understandably want to ensure that the terns of integration are fair. This demand is not only justified, but long overdue. (p. 169)
Will Kymlicka & Keith Banting (2006). Ethics & International Affairs, 20(3), 281-304.
In spite of a increasingly prevailing public assumption of a potential trade-off between inclusive immigration policies and the maintenance of a robust welfare state, Kymlicka and Banting argue that there Besides the issues of security and terrorism that prevail in many circles about massive immigration, Kymlicka and Banting point out that there is little evidence about the impact of increasing ethnic diversity on the welfare state and the claim of an inevitable trade-off between them may be premature.
Kymlicka and Banting defines two concerns in this debate: (1) A growing heterogeneity/ethnic diversity in society will inevitably loosen national solidarity across ethnic lines, thus resulting in making more difficult achieving redistribution of resources or sustaining a robust welfare state (the heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off) (2) Multiculturalism policies that promote recognition of each culture will exacerbate weaken the politics of (economic) redistribution (the recognition/redistribution trade-off).
In the first case, the authors state that a general acceptance of the trade-off is generally drawn from case studies done in the United State, where scholars concluded that there is a universal tendency for people to resist interethnic redistribution. The authors argue that the studies are deeply rooted in the country's peculiar history of slavery and segregation, thus providing little evidence for a potential erosion of Canadian welfare state as a result of a growing ethnic diversity that new immigrants bring into the society.
Secondly, the authors observe the debate even among multiculturalism defendants over the dilemma between the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution in the process of their commitment to social justice and equality. In this regard, the author state that this concern, unlike the first one, is not based on empirical studies but entirely speculative and conjectural.
Within this context, the authors conclude their research on the trade-offs as follows:
"There is no evidence here that countries with large immigrant populations have greater difficulty in sustaining and enhancing their historic welfare commitments. But large changes do seem to matter. It is the pace of social change rather than the fact of ethnic diversity per se that stands out here as politically unsettling." (p. 293)
Examining change in social spending as a proportion of GDP and change in the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers between 1980 and 2000 in twenty-one countries, the authors conclude that "the countries with the strongest immigrant multiculturalism policies did better than the other groups, providing a hint that perhaps multiculturalism policies may actually ease possible tensions between heterogeneity and redistribution." (p. 295)
They support this conclusion with a similar study conducted with indigenous peoples and national minorities: there is no evidence a politics of recognition that entails a trade-off with a politics of redistribution. Instead, the authors suggest that it is state management and politics that turns ethnic diversity into a source of erosion of the national welfare state and solidarity and trust among peoples.
The authors delineates three ways in which multiculturalism policies promote solidarity: (1) in contrast to claims made by critiques of multiculturalism, multiculturalism policies can help to combat the stereotypes and stigmatizations that currently erode feelings of solidarity across ethnic and racial lines. (2) the policies should be supplemented with nation-building policies, such as language training programs, citizenship education in the schools, the shared celebration of national heroes and holidays, citizenship ceremonies for immigrants, and so on. (3) What's more, these policies should be sustained with the national adoption of multiculturalism as a national identity. In this regards, the authors write, "Multiculturalism arguably plays this role in Canada. Affirming multiculturalism has become part of what it means to ‘‘be Canadian,’’ and, more specifically, part of what it means to be a ‘‘good Canadian" (p. 301). Thus the authors call attention to multiculturalism as an essential Canadian nationhood.
The authors' nation-centered narrative seems to stem from their perspective on nation solidarity:
"On the one hand, our findings cast doubt on pessimistic claims about the conflict between diversity and solidarity, and this should indirectly lend support to the struggles of noncitizens, making greater space for an open-minded consideration of their claims on their own merits. On the other hand, however, our findings do not cast doubt on the importance of national solidarity, and our own best guess is that those countries that have done well in combining diversity and solidarity have done so by linking immigration and multiculturalism to the promotion of national citizenship." (p. 303-304)
Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice. (2006). In Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka states, "at the heart of citizenship rights are individual liberties" (p. 128).
He regards the nation-state as the privileged locus for political participation, self-government, and solidarity. Looking at the model of citizenship developed within the liberal democratic political system in the West in the past two centuries, Kymlicka points out that this political reordering was nearly universal and embarked on "'national-building' policies aimed at the diffusion of a common national identity, culture, and language throughout the territory of the state" (p. 129)
He argues that, while this model of "liberal nationhood" succeeded in ensuring democracy, individual rights and economic prosperity, it involved injustice against immigrants, indigenous or regional minorities and neighboring nation-states.
Refuting the thought that these injustices are not intrinsic to liberal nationhood, Kymlicka contests that they are inherent risks of the pursuit of liberal nationhood and in fact responsible for many harms executed in the twenties century. In this dilemma, Kymlicka argues two options: (1) taming liberal nationhood approach, by adopting a multicultural concept for immigrants, a multination concept for indigenous and substate minorities to condone autonomy, and geopolitical agreements with neighboring nation-states. or (2) transcending liberal nation by building postnational or cosmopolitan citizenship.
In his response to Benhabib's call for cosmopolital norms instead of liberal nationhood, Kymlicka argues that the two concepts are commensurate. He states:
[O]ne concept of the nature and function of cosmopolitan norms is precisely to pomote (a tamed form of) liberal nationhood, and that this conception is conceptually coherent, politically feasible, and morally progressive. (p. 131)
Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. (2001). New York: Oxford University Press.
For Kymlicka, crucial in the theories and practices of West democracies is to see claims for minority rights as a defensive response to an assault on the basic dignity and respect in the process of state nation-building, instead of 'special status' or 'privilege'. He states that the Western democracies are a complex package of robust forms of nation-building constrained by robust forms of minority rights.
Kymlicka refutes the discourse of minority rights as the old liberalism-vs-communitarianism debate, such that communitarians supported rights of ethnocultural communities whereas liberalism opposed them in the name of individualism. He asserts that debates over minority rights within liberalism are increasingly about fair accommodations of cultural diversity within liberal institutions.
Kymlicka also argues that human rights are insufficient to ensure justice between ethnocultural groups, thus minority rights must supplement human rights.
Chapter 1.
Kymlicka summarizes that the debate over minority rights before 1989 was characterized with theoretical confrontation between liberals and communitarians. Kymlicka explains that liberals prioritize individual freedom to choose the good life, whereas communitarians dispute the concept of autonomous individuals and rather regard individuals as the product of social practices which define the good life. In this stage, minority rights were viewed as the communitarian critique of liberalism, defending communal group rights against liberal individualism.
This dichotomy, however, is an old one, according to Kymlicka. Kymlicka highlights recent debate over minority rights within a liberal perspective. Central to this debate is to distinguish 'good' minority rights to supplement individual rights.
Kymlicka observes the current tendency of nation-building efforts in modern liberal states by creating a societal culture that involves a common language and social institutions, as seen in the United States. Kymlicka questions the impact of nation-building on minority rights and justice.
Observing the recent public recognition that difference-blind rules may cause disadvantages for minority groups, Kymlicka rightly points out that multiculturalism is widely accepted although there remain profound disagreements over specific policies of multiculturalism. Along with this general disposition, he remarks another common argument that recognition of minority rights threatens to erode citizenship. With this respect, Kymlicka argues that recognizing minority rights, on the contrary, would strengthen solidarity by removing barriers that prevent minority from full participation in political institutions.
Chapter 8. The theory and Practice of Immigrant Multiculturalism (152-176)
"The first country to officially adopt such a 'multiculturalism' policy at the national level was Canada in 1971" (p. 154).
For Kymlicka, demands for multiculturalism is a response to the government's nation-building of pressuring immigrants to integrate into common educational, economical and political institutions operating in the national language. In particular about immigrant multiculturalism policy, Kymlicka disputes critiques that multiculturalism continues to ghettoize immigrants and balkanizes society. He emphasizes that the policies are clearly integrationist and promotes institutional integration through education and citizenship practices. He argues:
The idea that multiculturalism is promoting an apartheid-like system of institutional separatism is, I think, wholly misplaced. But is it promoting a kind of mental separatism, encouraging immigrants to dwell on the life they left behind, rather than the opportunities available in their new country? This is a more plausible worry. However institutional integration is likely to generate over time a sense of psychological identification. The fact that common institutions bring together the members of different ethnic groups has important ramifications both personally and politically. At the personal level, it means that people meet (and indeed often fall in love with) members of other ethnic groups, propmoting inter-ethnic friendships and marriages. These relationships are intimately tied up with one's new life here, not with the Old World. (p. 167-168)
[Criticism: his division between new world and old world, new opportunities are not that rosy in the new world, some interpersonal relations do not melt inveterate racism and other hierarchy. In fact, people do not mix as much as he imagines.]
According to Kymlicka, immigrants must engage in common institutions and contribute to democratic citizenship under the institutional multiculturalism policies. He states:
Politically, it[multiculturalism] means that people must learn how to negotiate with the members of other ethnic groups...The inevitable result is that groups must focus on how to contribute to the new life here, rather than simply dwelling on the society left behind. In short, institutional integration makes possible the kind of civic engagement that supports democratic citizenship. (p. 168)
Kymlicka calls his view of multiculturalism 'pluralizing' or 'hybridic', which "does not involve the preservation of distinct cultures (since ethnic identities weaken and incorporate aspects of the larger culture), but nor is it assimilation (since ethnic groups change the larger society as they integrate)" (p. 168-169). He asserts that immigrants common demands for language training assistance, for instance, indicate their intention of integration. Central to his argument appears to be the backlash against immigrant multiculturalism among native-born citizens. He argues:
[T]he logic of multiculturalism involves accepting the principle of state-prescribed integraion, but renegotiation the terms of integration...So immigrants accept the principle of integration into common institutions: they are simply seeking fairer terms of integration. If the state is going to pressure immigrants to integrates into common institutions operating in the national language, then immigrant groups understandably want to ensure that the terns of integration are fair. This demand is not only justified, but long overdue. (p. 169)
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