Multicultural Citizenship

: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Kymlicka, Will. (1995). New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 1. Introduction (1-9)

In his view, cultural diversity world-wide gives significant rise to clashes between majorities and minorities over languages, regional autonomy, political representation, curriculum, etc. and imposes the greatest challenge to democracies today. Taking a liberal stance of minority rights, he distances himself from the post-war liberals. He criticizes that post-war liberals framed minority rights within an extension of universal human rights as demonstrated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and at the same time defined the rights only in private spheres; post-war liberals thus neglected public recognition of minority groups and some of them focused on anti-discriminatory action as a temporary remedy.

Refuting this traditional liberal approach, Kymlicka states that minority rights are required to obtain basic human rights because minorities are more vulnerable to social injustice. He argues in addition that traditional human rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to vote, do not solve problems such as language policies, power distribution among governments, etc. which arise in diverse societies. Thus for Kymlicka, critical is to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights by giving minority groups a permanent political identity and group specific rights or 'special status' to ensure culture difference. Minority rights, however, are not unlimited to Kymlicka. He argues that minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice. (Thereby he proposes two concepts, internal restriction and external protection.)

Chapter 2. The politics of multiculturalism (10-33)

For Kymlicka, it is important to distinguish two patterns of cultural diversity: multinational and polyethnic. By nation he means "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture" (p. 11) closely related to a people or a culture. In this view, a country that consists of more than one nation is not a nation-state but a multination state. Polyethnicity, on the other hand, is an outcome of immigration. According to Kymlicka, immigrant groups neither occupy homelands nor ask to set up a parallel society; instead, they usually integrate into the dominant culture(s) and increasingly assert the rights to preserve their ethnicity. Thus he defines Canada and the United State as both multinational and polyethnic.

Kymlicka asserts that multiculturalism arise from national and ethnic differences. According to him, the confusion between the two concepts led to criticism of the Canadian government's multiculturalism policy; while French Canadians think that the policy reduces the status of Quebecers to the level of immigrants, other people fear that the policy treats immigrant groups as nations. According to Kymlicka, neither is justifiable because the multiculturalism policy supports polyethnicity within the English and French cultures. [The criticism is not all, there is an inherent problem in the official policy of multiculturalism. So isn't there any mentioning of Aboriginal rights in multicultural policy?] In this category, African-Americans, who neither form a nation nor are fully integrated into the society as immigrants, and refugees, who disassociate themselves from their own homeland and culture, are exceptional.

Kymlicka proposes three fundamental forms of group-specific rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights. In the case of Quebec, Kymlicka states:

One difficulty in a federal system is maintaining the balance between centralization and decentralization. While most Quebecers want an even more decentralized division of powers, most English Canadians favour a stronger central government. One of the challenges facing Canada, therefore, is finding an acceptable form of 'asymmetrical federalism' which grants Quebec powers not given to other provinces. Other federal states face a similar problem. (p. 28)

Chapter 3. Individual Rights and Collective Rights. (34-48)

Kymlicka forcefully argues that group-differentiated rights are consistent with liberal principles of individual freedom and equality.

Kymlicka distinguishes two forms of claims that an ethnic or national group make to protect the stability of their own communities. They are internal restriction and external protection. According to Kymlicka, while minority groups tend to suppress internal dissent ('internal restriction'), they also demand protection from external forces. For Kymlicka, not all the claims are acceptable. Within a group, individual rights take a precedence to group rights. He states:

[L]iberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices. (p. 37)

Kymlicka casts a new perspective on the debate on the primacy of individual or collective rights by proposing the concept of group-differentiated rights/citizenship. According to him, group-differentiated rights can be accorded to members of a group, to the group as a whole, or even to a province/state where the group forms the majority. For instance, the rights of French Canadians to use French in federal courts is a right accorded to individuals because language rights are one component of the national rights, which immigrant groups are not granted. The Indian rights to hunt and fish are accorded to the group, not individuals. The rights of Quebecers to promote their culture is accorded to the province of Quebec, whose citizens are predominantly Quebecers.

According to Kymlicka, the conflation of group-differentiated rights with collective rights has brought a fatal impact on the current debate over individual and group rights. In this regard, he contests that the members of different groups are to be accorded different rights which depend on their group-differentiated citizenship. For Kymlicka, justice between the members of different groups is relative to the groups to which the individuals belong.

Chapter 6. Justice and Minority Rights (107-130)

Kymlicka contests that the ideal of 'benign neglect' that states should not interfere with maintenance of of particular cultures is a myth because majority cultures and minority cultures do not have a level playing field in cultural market-place: states support the majority culture inevitably and systematically through languages, public holidays, state symbols, etc. whereas minority groups face disadvantages that the majorities do not. Thus, he calls for a political recognition of these minority groups and a provision of differential treatment to differential needs in order to sustain fairness among members of minority groups.

Kymlicka differentiates minority national rights from polyethnic rights. For Kymlicka, minority national rights are primarily to eliminate inequalities inherited to members of the minority groups and to maintain the particularities of their cultures under the theme of 'external protection', whereas polyethnic rights are rather limited to promoting equal access to the mainstream culture(s), thus enforcing common rights of citizenship among immigrants, by providing language training, for instance. [For Kymlicka, immigrants rights are very limited, just comprising a cultural mosaic and conformity to mainstream. HERE COMES THE CRITICISM.]

Kymlicka, however, does not reject entirely the idea of cultural market-place. He argues that, once national minority cultures are externally protected through language rights and territory autonomy, members of the groups should determine internally the character of the culture based on the rule of cultural market-place. [CRITICISM: what about in case there exists inherent patriarchal orders and internal unjust social issues? Are these seen problems they have internally within their own culture? Culturalization...]

With respect to minority national rights, in particular, Kymlicka stresses that the view on justice, that is, achieving fairness through differential external protections, is in fact attuned to a liberal egalitarian theory that emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities as Rawls argued. [TALK ABOUT RAWLS]

As to current argument over cultural diversity and its diffuse benefit to all, Kymlicka states that the argument itself is not sufficient to justify minority rights, arguing, "the diversity argument supplements, but cannot replace, justice arguments based on equality or historical agreement" (p. 123). The reasons include that diffuse benefit is rather by-product of national rights and promoting bilingual education for diversity does not explain special language training offered to immigrants.

Chapter 9. The Ties that Bind. (p. 173-192)

Kymlicka argues that citizenship is important to a liberal democracy because it provides a level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness to create a sense of solidarity across cultures and nations. He questions whether citizenship can be still achieved in the situation where rights are distributed on the basis of group membership.

Kymlicka argues that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by the majority, can be extended to culturally excluded minority groups such as immigrants, black, women, religious minorities, gay and lesbian, only if group-differentiated rights are granted so that they can feel accepted to the community.

Kymlick contests that polyethnic rights do not tribalize society, but instead integrate members of ethnic groups into a political community as a citizen. He explains the reasons for the public backlash against multiculturalism: first, it is because a racist fear of non-White immigrant groups. Secondly, it is because entrenched conflicts between national or racial groups are displaced onto relatively modest demands of ethnic groups.

Kymlicka notes that self-government rights among nations challenge the integrative function of citizenship more seriously than polyethnic rights. In this regard, he suggests that it is necessary to take national identities as givens to some extent. In particular observing ethnonationalist conflict around the world, he argues that imposing common citizenship on national minorities is likely to promote alienation and increase conflict in a multination state like Canada.

Kymlicka asks about the basis of social unity in a multination state. He argues that sharing principles of justice is not enough and there should be the idea of a shared identity; however, shared identity comes mostly from commonality of history, language and perhaps religion, which are not shared in a multination state. The only viable solution for him is to accommodate and nurture national identities within the larger polity.

Book Reviews: Multicultural Citizenship. By Charles Taylor. (The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), p. 408)

Taylor values highly some philosophical and political distinctions made by Kymlicka. First, the demarcation of multinational from polyethnic situations.

According to Kymlicka, a multinational state is the home of multiple nations, which claim self-determination and the ownership of a defined territory and share a distinct language or culture. A polyethnic state is, on the other hand, characterized with various immigrants who entered a society with their own distinct language and culture but without the intention of forming nations; however, they usually integrate into the dominant society while simultaneously demanding protection for their cultural preservation. (Chapter 2)

For Taylor, this distinction is important in Canada, where Quebec and aboriginal nations as national groups and voluntary immigrants as ethnic groups coexist. Taylor notes that the confusion between the two contexts has led fatal discussions by "attempting to treat Quebecois as immigrants or fearing that immigrants might demand the same things as Quebecois" (p. 408).

Taylor also points out that Kymlicka, taking a liberal stance, emphasizes that liberals neither are blind to group rights--in fact, he writes that group rights are important to supplement individual rights (chapter 1. politics of vernacular)--nor deny justice. Responding to Kymlicka concerning justice from a liberal perspective--in which the autonomy of all individuals is central, Taylor states that autonomy can be achieved in a condition where we are able to conceive what the good life is for us and this thinking can only be possible when we have a 'home' culture. Thus, he stresses that liberalism should protect and promote minority cultures that are under great pressure in the larger society if it attempts to ensure equality in autonomy.

Taylor points out internal restriction and external protection as the third crucial distinction that Kymlicka made. By internal restriction, Kymlicka means that group rights can be protected as long as they do not enforce conformity among their group members; by external protection, he means that minority culture should be protected against majority pressure.

The Politics of Recognition

Taylor, Charles. (1994). In Amy Gutmann (Ed.)., Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition (pp. 25-73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

I. (Genesis of recognition)
In this discussion of the politics of multiculturalism, Taylor calls for urgent demand for recognition because of its link to identity. He defines identity as "a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being" (p. 25). He asserts that identity is partly shaped by recognition, its absence or misrecognition, thus inflicting harm to, or oppressing, someone. Oppressed construction of identity for generations, according to Taylor, has resulted in self-depreciation, which he regards as the most potent instruments of their own oppression. He states:

[M]isrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need. (p. 26)

Taylor argues that recognition became important with the "the massive subjective turn of modern culture, a new form of inwardness" (p. 29) in the eighteenth century. He regards Rousseau as an important figure who articulated this notion, saying,"Rousseau frequently presents the issue of morality as that of our following a voice of nature within us". Thus, Taylor writes, "Our moral salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves" (p. 29). While looking for the moral ideal, we can come down to ourselves, true to ourselves, from this perspective. This leads to defining ourselves. It is the ideal of authenticity that Taylor calls.

[It appears to me that by authenticity Taylor means inward measurement with respect to morality, that constitutes modern consciousness, instead of seeking outward conformity.]

Taylor thinks that the ideal of authenticity is partly due to an offshoot of the decline of hierarchical society, where identification was primarily socially derived. Refusing socially derived identification, the ideal of authenticity regards one being inwardly generated, Taylor denotes.

However, Taylor contests that there is no inward generation. He asserts that we become full human, understanding ourselves and defining identity, by acquiring rich human languages of expression through exchanges with our significant others. He states:

"We don't just learn the languages in dialogue and then go on to use them for our own purposes. We are of course expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances toward things, and to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with important issues, like the definition of our identity. We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us." (pp. 32-33)

In this vein, Taylor emphasizes that our identity is defined and continuously redefined through dialogues with our significant others. He says that, although we cannot liberate oneself completely from the early childhood experience, we should strive to define ourselves on our own, getting certain control over our dependency. Warning against the adherence to monological ideals that shun dialogues, he writes:

"It forgets how our understanding of the good things in life can be transformed by our enjoying them in common with people we love; how some goods become accessible to us only through such common enjoyment...If some of the things I value most are accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes part of my identity." (33-34)

Thus, identity is negotiated. Taylor stressed that important to this inwardly derived, personal and original identity is that this identity is not always recognized. Taylor states:

"Yet inwardly derives, personal, original identity doesn't enjoy this recognition a priori. It has to win it through exchange, and the attempt can fail. What has come about with the modern age is not the need for recofnition but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail. That is why the need is now acknowledge for the first time." (34-35)

He states that the topic of recognition is much owed to Hegel. Taylor identifies two spheres of recognition: the intimate sphere and the public sphere. In the intimate sphere, we form our identity through continuous dialogue and struggle with our significant others. In the public sphere, a politics of equal recognition plays a bigger role in society. As suggested at the outset, Taylor put an emphasis on recognition of identity by regarding the withholding of recognition as a possible form of oppression.

II. (About the politics of equal recognition of identity)
Taylor compares two modern Western politics, politics of dignity and politics of difference. According to him, the politics of dignity, grounding in universalism, emphasizes the equal dignity of all citizens, being blind to differences among them, whereas the politics of differences stresses the recognition of unique identity of an individual or group and their distinctiveness from each other. Thus contrasting to the politics of universal dignity that is favor of forms of nondiscrimination that is blind to difference, the politics of differences sees nondiscrimination as a requirement of differential treatment for distinctions in order to preserve and cherish the distinctness 'forever'. Taylor points out that such reverse discrimination is not a temporary apparatus to level the playing field, but rather a mechanism to maintain the difference.

Taylor asserts that the politics of dignity is based on the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect. Important to this idea, he denotes, is that it is a universal human potential, a capacity that all humans share, not individual persons might have made of, that calls for respect. Taylor underpins the universal potentiality in the politics of difference as the potential for "forming and defining one's own identity, as an individual, and also as a culture" (p. 42). He continues to write, "This potentiality must be respected equally in everyone. But at least in the intercultural context, a stronger demand has recently arisen: that one accord equal respect to actually evolved cultures" (p. 42).

Thus, the two modes of politics, both based on the notion of equal respect, come into conflict, Taylor writes. While the first criticizes that the other violates the principle of nondiscrimination, the second reproaches the politics of dignity for their negation of individual identity. With this respect, Taylor states:

"The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. As it turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form. Consequently, the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory." (p. 43)

Liberalism, which assumes universal, difference-blind principles, is on attack. With this respect, Taylor himself casts doubt on the principles of liberalism. He writes:

"The charge leveled by the most radical forms of the politics of difference is that 'blind' liberalisms are themselves the reflection of particular cultures. And the worrying thought is that this bias might not just be a contingent weakness of all hitherto proposed theories, that the very idea of such a liberalism may be a kind of pragmatic contradiction, a particularism masquerading as the universal." (p. 44)

III. (the emergence of the politics of equal dignity)
Taylor finds in Rousseau (and Kant) the emergence of the politics of equal dignity in Western civilization and explains as follows: Rousseau refuted the society of honor, where people are in competition in a hierarchical society. Instead, caring about the esteem in his republican model, he insisted that all citizens are to be equally honored regardless of their differentiation or distinction with one another. Thus he spawned the age of dignity.

Taylor sharply points out that Rousseau's new politics of equal dignity is flawed not only because it failed to recognize any differentiation, but also because it required a very tight common purpose, or general will, by rigorously excluding the differentiation. This perspective, Taylor notes, has been the formula for the most terrible forms of homogenizing tyranny, extending to the totalitarian regimes of our century.

IV. (A confrontation of the two conceptions rights-liberalism in a Canadian context)
Taylor examines the confrontation of the two conceptions--one is a liberalism of equal rights or politics of universal dignity and the other is due acknowledgment to distinctness. He sees this examination as related to diversity and multicultural society, which he regards as inevitable.

Reflected on the Canadian Charter of Rights in 1982, the conflict became a real issue, he writes. According to him, it follows American precedent that ratified "equal protection" for all citizens under the laws in the Fourth Amendment.

Against Quebeckers' demand for collective goals, English Canada argues that (1) the collective goals restrict individual rights and (2) espousing collective goals on behalf of a national group can be inherently discriminatory because all under the same jurisdiction belong to the same national group.

Taylor finds in the thought of Immanuel Kant the profound philosophical assumptions underlying this view of liberalism, which is that individuals can determine a view of the good life in autonomy. Based on the view of Kantian philosophy (grounded in self-determining human agents), a liberal society is drawn that must remain neutral on the good life and only ensure that the state deals equally with all. Taylor explains that Quebec, a society with collective goals, violates this model because its policies, aimed at survival, actively seeks to create members of the community. He writes:

"It is not just a matter of having the French language available for those who might choose it. This might be seen to be the goal of some of the measures of federal bilingualism over the last twenty years. But it also involves making sure that there is a community of people here in the future that will want to avail itself of the opportunity to use the French language. Policies aimed at survival actively seek to create [sic] members of the community, for instance, in their assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers. There is no way that these policies could be seen as just providing a facility to already existing people." (pp. 58-59)

Taylor describes a Quebec version of liberal society, where the nature of the good is to be sought in common through public policy, and yet accommodating minorities who do not share the public definitions of the good. Taylor argues that a society with collective goals as such can be liberal on the two conditions: (1) it is capable of respecting diversity and (2) it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights.

V. (The politics of equal respect)
In contrast to the politics of equal rights, which he calls inhospitable to difference, Taylor calls for the politics of equal respect, which is cleared of homogenizing difference.

He critiques that "liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges", "liberalism can't and shouldn't claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a fighting creed" (p. 62). The reason for this is, he explains, that it requires a scheduling of rights. (One get a precedence over another.)

He calls attention to recognizing the equal value of different cultures in an affirmative way, that is to say, "we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth" (p. 64) He brings Frantz Fanon as an exemplary figure who called for a struggle to purge themselves of the depreciating self-images imposed by colonizers in order to begin with struggle for freedom.

Taylor writes "[T]here is perhaps after all a moral issue here" (p. 73) and seeks "something midway between inauthentic and homogenizing demand for recognition of equal worth, on one hand, and the self-immurement within ethnocentric standards, on the other" (p. 72).