Friday, February 5, 2010

Multicultural Citizenship

: A liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Kymlicka, Will. (1995). New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 1. Introduction
(1-9)

In his view, cultural diversity world-wide gives significant rise to clashes between majorities and minorities over languages, regional autonomy, political representation, curriculum, etc. and imposes the greatest challenge to democracies today. Taking a liberal stance of minority rights, he distances himself from the post-war liberals. He criticizes that post-war liberals framed minority rights within an extension of universal human rights as demonstrated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and at the same time defined the rights only in private spheres; post-war liberals thus neglected public recognition of minority groups and some of them focused on anti-discriminatory action as a temporary remedy.

Refuting this traditional liberal approach, Kymlicka states that minority rights are required to obtain basic human rights because minorities are more vulnerable to social injustice. He argues in addition that traditional human rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to vote, do not solve problems such as language policies, power distribution among governments, etc. which arise in diverse societies. Thus for Kymlicka, critical is to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights by giving minority groups a permanent political identity and group specific rights or 'special status' to ensure culture difference. Minority rights, however, are not unlimited to Kymlicka. He argues that minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy and social justice. (Thereby he proposes two concepts, internal restriction and external protection.)

Chapter 2. The politics of multiculturalism (10-33)

For Kymlicka, it is important to distinguish two patterns of cultural diversity: multinational and polyethnic. By nation he means "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture" (p. 11) closely related to a people or a culture. In this view, a country that consists of more than one nation is not a nation-state but a multination state. Polyethnicity, on the other hand, is an outcome of immigration. According to Kymlicka, immigrant groups neither occupy homelands nor ask to set up a parallel society; instead, they usually integrate into the dominant culture(s) and increasingly assert the rights to preserve their ethnicity. Thus he defines Canada and the United State as both multinational and polyethnic.

Kymlicka asserts that multiculturalism arise from national and ethnic differences. According to him, the confusion between the two concepts led to criticism of the Canadian government's multiculturalism policy; while French Canadians think that the policy reduces the status of Quebecers to the level of immigrants, other people fear that the policy treats immigrant groups as nations. According to Kymlicka, neither is justifiable because the multiculturalism policy supports polyethnicity within the English and French cultures. [The criticism is not all, there is an inherent problem in the official policy of multiculturalism. So isn't there any mentioning of Aboriginal rights in multicultural policy?] In this category, African-Americans, who neither form a nation nor are fully integrated into the society as immigrants, and refugees, who disassociate themselves from their own homeland and culture, are exceptional.

Kymlicka proposes three fundamental forms of group-specific rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights. In the case of Quebec, Kymlicka states:

One difficulty in a federal system is maintaining the balance between centralization and decentralization. While most Quebecers want an even more decentralized division of powers, most English Canadians favour a stronger central government. One of the challenges facing Canada, therefore, is finding an acceptable form of 'asymmetrical federalism' which grants Quebec powers not given to other provinces. Other federal states face a similar problem. (p. 28)

Chapter 3. Individual Rights and Collective Rights.
(34-48)

Kymlicka forcefully argues that group-differentiated rights are consistent with liberal principles of individual freedom and equality.

Kymlicka distinguishes two forms of claims that an ethnic or national group make to protect the stability of their own communities. They are internal restriction and external protection. According to Kymlicka, while minority groups tend to suppress internal dissent ('internal restriction'), they also demand protection from external forces. For Kymlicka, not all the claims are acceptable. Within a group, individual rights take a precedence to group rights. He states:

[L]iberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices. (p. 37)

Kymlicka casts a new perspective on the debate on the primacy of individual or collective rights by proposing the concept of group-differentiated rights/citizenship. According to him, group-differentiated rights can be accorded to members of a group, to the group as a whole, or even to a province/state where the group forms the majority. For instance, the rights of French Canadians to use French in federal courts is a right accorded to individuals because language rights are one component of the national rights, which immigrant groups are not granted. The Indian rights to hunt and fish are accorded to the group, not individuals. The rights of Quebecers to promote their culture is accorded to the province of Quebec, whose citizens are predominantly Quebecers.

According to Kymlicka, the conflation of group-differentiated rights with collective rights has brought a fatal impact on the current debate over individual and group rights. In this regard, he contests that the members of different groups are to be accorded different rights which depend on their group-differentiated citizenship. For Kymlicka, justice between the members of different groups is relative to the groups to which the individuals belong.

Chapter 6. Justice and Minority Rights (107-130)

Kymlicka contests that the ideal of 'benign neglect' that states should not interfere with maintenance of of particular cultures is a myth because majority cultures and minority cultures do not have a level playing field in cultural market-place: states support the majority culture inevitably and systematically through languages, public holidays, state symbols, etc. whereas minority groups face disadvantages that the majorities do not. Thus, he calls for a political recognition of these minority groups and a provision of differential treatment to differential needs in order to sustain fairness among members of minority groups.

Kymlicka differentiates minority national rights from polyethnic rights. For Kymlicka, minority national rights are primarily to eliminate inequalities inherited to members of the minority groups and to maintain the particularities of their cultures under the theme of 'external protection', whereas polyethnic rights are rather limited to promoting equal access to the mainstream culture(s), thus enforcing common rights of citizenship among immigrants, by providing language training, for instance. [For Kymlicka, immigrants rights are very limited, just comprising a cultural mosaic and conformity to mainstream. HERE COMES THE CRITICISM.]

Kymlicka, however, does not reject entirely the idea of cultural market-place. He argues that, once national minority cultures are externally protected through language rights and territory autonomy, members of the groups should determine internally the character of the culture based on the rule of cultural market-place. [CRITICISM: what about in case there exists inherent patriarchal orders and internal unjust social issues? Are these seen problems they have internally within their own culture? Culturalization...]

With respect to minority national rights, in particular, Kymlicka stresses that the view on justice, that is, achieving fairness through differential external protections, is in fact attuned to a liberal egalitarian theory that emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities as Rawls argued. [TALK ABOUT RAWLS]

As to current argument over cultural diversity and its diffuse benefit to all, Kymlicka states that the argument itself is not sufficient to justify minority rights, arguing, "the diversity argument supplements, but cannot replace, justice arguments based on equality or historical agreement" (p. 123). The reasons include that diffuse benefit is rather by-product of national rights and promoting bilingual education for diversity does not explain special language training offered to immigrants.

Chapter 9. The Ties that Bind. (p. 173-192)

Kymlicka argues that citizenship is important to a liberal democracy because it provides a level of civic virtue and public-spiritedness to create a sense of solidarity across cultures and nations. He questions whether citizenship can be still achieved in the situation where rights are distributed on the basis of group membership.

Kymlicka argues that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by the majority, can be extended to culturally excluded minority groups such as immigrants, black, women, religious minorities, gay and lesbian, only if group-differentiated rights are granted so that they can feel accepted to the community.

Kymlick contests that polyethnic rights do not tribalize society, but instead integrate members of ethnic groups into a political community as a citizen. He explains the reasons for the public backlash against multiculturalism: first, it is because a racist fear of non-White immigrant groups. Secondly, it is because entrenched conflicts between national or racial groups are displaced onto relatively modest demands of ethnic groups.

Kymlicka notes that self-government rights among nations challenge the integrative function of citizenship more seriously than polyethnic rights. In this regard, he suggests that it is necessary to take national identities as givens to some extent. In particular observing ethnonationalist conflict around the world, he argues that imposing common citizenship on national minorities is likely to promote alienation and increase conflict in a multination state like Canada.

Kymlicka asks about the basis of social unity in a multination state. He argues that sharing principles of justice is not enough and there should be the idea of a shared identity; however, shared identity comes mostly from commonality of history, language and perhaps religion, which are not shared in a multination state. The only viable solution for him is to accommodate and nurture national identities within the larger polity.

Book Reviews: Multicultural Citizenship. By Charles Taylor. (The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), p. 408)

Taylor values highly some philosophical and political distinctions made by Kymlicka. First, the demarcation of multinational from polyethnic situations.

According to Kymlicka, a multinational state is the home of multiple nations, which claim self-determination and the ownership of a defined territory and share a distinct language or culture. A polyethnic state is, on the other hand, characterized with various immigrants who entered a society with their own distinct language and culture but without the intention of forming nations; however, they usually integrate into the dominant society while simultaneously demanding protection for their cultural preservation. (Chapter 2)

For Taylor, this distinction is important in Canada, where Quebec and aboriginal nations as national groups and voluntary immigrants as ethnic groups coexist. Taylor notes that the confusion between the two contexts has led fatal discussions by "attempting to treat Quebecois as immigrants or fearing that immigrants might demand the same things as Quebecois" (p. 408).

Taylor also points out that Kymlicka, taking a liberal stance, emphasizes that liberals neither are blind to group rights--in fact, he writes that group rights are important to supplement individual rights (chapter 1. politics of vernacular)--nor deny justice. Responding to Kymlicka concerning justice from a liberal perspective--in which the autonomy of all individuals is central, Taylor states that autonomy can be achieved in a condition where we are able to conceive what the good life is for us and this thinking can only be possible when we have a 'home' culture. Thus, he stresses that liberalism should protect and promote minority cultures that are under great pressure in the larger society if it attempts to ensure equality in autonomy.

Taylor points out internal restriction and external protection as the third crucial distinction that Kymlicka made. By internal restriction, Kymlicka means that group rights can be protected as long as they do not enforce conformity among their group members; by external protection, he means that minority culture should be protected against majority pressure.