Tuesday, January 6, 2009

Twenties Century Political Theory: A Reader

Stephen Eric Bronner (Ed.). (2006). NY: Routledge

[Conservative Disposition]
What Is Liberal Education? (1959, 103-108)
(Leo Strauss: an exile from Nazi who left great influence on American political theory)
Democracy, which originally meant a universal aristocracy, is degraded to mass culture, which is lack of intellectual and moral efforts, in modern society, Strauss postulates. Thus, he stresses that this debased situation calls for liberal education so that it can establish an aristocracy within democratic mass society by connecting great minds transcended through great books. In short, "liberal education is liberation from vulgarity," he states. [Michael Oaskeshott defines conservatism as emotional resistance to change and the propensity to the familiar rather than the unknown in his essay, On Being Conservative (77-89). Strauss, in this light, shows a strong anxiety of the mass culture and nostalgic pride as the noble. From his perspective, mass culture is vulgarity and something that should be avoided.]

The Adversary Culture and the New Class (1987, 109-116)
(Norman Podhoretz: editor of Commentary, a leading conservative magazine)
In the sixties, a massive number of intellectuals formed the adversary culture and a "New Class" whose capital is education and technical expertise to the extent that they were regarded as the agents of revolution, in particular, from the perspective of neo-Marxists. Their demand of fair share of political power combined with the Black power constituted New Politics in the early 70s. As counterpart of this movement, neo-conservatism or neo-liberalism, which may be a proper label, surfaced up to advocate middle-class values and capitalism. These adversaries of the adversary culture, which ripened in the mid 70s, culminated with the election of Ragan in 1980. [This seemingly objective historical narrative is based on a strong conservative perspective in that adversary intellectual movements were still regarded as a contingent dissident event and social justice is completely ignored in the progress of the society. He wecomes back the middle-class values and counter-revolutionary movements.]

[Communitarianism and Culture]
The Search for the Great Community
(The Collected Worlds of John Dewey: Later Works, Volume 2:1925-27; Southern Illinois University Press, 1984)
Identifying democracy with the idea of the community life itself, Dewey urges people to purposefully participate in communal life with anticipation of its consequence. He embroiders some components of the community life as follows: "Interactions, transactions, occur de facto and the results of interdependence follow. But participation in activities and sharing in results are additive concerns. They demand communication as a prerequisite."

The Public and the Private Realm
(Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, 1958)
Arendt argues that pluralism, where multiple realms have distinctive functions and purposes and every human activity has its proper location in the world, has been dissolved in the modern age to the extent that the private and public realms are submerged in the sphere of the social and wealth became a public concern beyond manageable private ownership. From this perspective, she writes, "the greatest threat here, however, is not the abolition of private ownership of wealth but the abolition of private property in the sende of a tangible, worldly place of one's own." For her, the only thing that individuals own privately is his possession of a body, which Marx called "labor-power." [From the labor class perspective, the deprivation is true, but it is hardly arguable that gigantic wealth has reached beyond private ownership because wealth is accumulated in certain group of people and possessed privately, not as a public commodity.] Arendt also stresses that the destruction of private realm, where labor, bodily functions, were hidden from the public realm, caused the laborers to be segregated from the community like criminals under constant surveillance in the modern age, which is characterized as "socialization of man" by Marx. [There are certain notions parallel with Marxism in her political philosophy, but there is no single word of class in her text, and in addition, her stress on private ownership seems very vague in that what she emphasizes that should be owned privately.]

[Critical Theory]
The State of Contemporary Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research
(Max Horkheimer. in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993)
While delineating problem of contemporary social philosophy, Horkheimer reviews that whereas Kant sees individuals, spontaneous egos, as agents to derive culture, Hegel asserts that objective spirit [Geist] realizes culture and is developed by dominant spirit in each epoch. Individuals, according to Hegel, partake only in the totality, which mostly is determined by state, therefore, they can attain consciousness of their freedom only through speculative thinking, in other words, social philosophy. Horkheimer stresses that through such philosophy human beings experience "transfiguration" that makes individual existence more meaningful--"supra-personal sphere" in his term. In this regard, Horkheimer denunciates Heidegger's emphasis on the interior of indivudual beings and human existence that discard social philosophy. Horkheimer's stree on social philosophy is summarized as interdisciplinary philosophical research cooperation toward the whole on the basis of empirical materials. He writes, "the universal and the particular, the theoretical conceptualization and individual existence, permeate each other."

State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations
(Frederick Pollock, in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, Bronner. S, & Kellner, D (Eds.). NY: Routledge, 1989)

The Culture Industry Reconsidered
(Theodor W. Adorno, Translated by Anson F. Rabinbach, in New German Critique 6 (Fall 1975: pp. 12-19)
By industry Adorno means the standardization of things and the rationalization of distribution techniques. The culture industry that intentionally concentrates high and low arts, he states, makes consumers "an appendage of the machinery" through suppressing consciousness and forcing conformity. Once produced as commodoties, cultural entities are no longer commodities in his definition, because the interests the culture industry pursued are so ideologized to be free from the compulsion to sell. He further writes that the culture industry turns into public relations that manufactures "good will" and "a blissful life". To Adorno, the most destructive power of the culture industry is that it does not allow the masses to reflect its legitimation, thus stupefies the masses through "fleeting gratification" and oblige blind consensus to authority.

Liberation From the Affluent Society
(Herbert Marcuse, originally published as "Conclusion" in Counter-Revolution and Revolt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972)
His particular interest lays in liberation from the affluent, advanced industrial society, which is characterized for development and satisfaction of material and cultural needs. Regarding the educational system as "political," he urges to generate the "instinctual need for a life without fear, without brutality and without stupidity," as exemplified in Hippies in the U.S., who refuse efficient and insane reasonableness. To him, education is also "therapy" in the sense of liberating man from a society that forces them to be transformed into a brute.

[Black Heritage]
Letter from Birmingham Jail (329-340)
(Martin Luther King, Jr., 1963, assassinated in 1968.)
"Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed."
"One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws."
"South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality."
"Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability."

The Ballot or the Bullet
(Malcolm X, Malcom X Speaks, George Breitman (Ed.). Pathfinder Press, 1989; 1925-1965, a founder of Black Nationalism)
He urges Black to expand the civil rights struggle to the level of human rights and take it to the UN.

Nihilism in Black America (349-355)
(Conel West, Race Matters, Boston: Beacon Press, 2001)
He asserts that the fundamental threat in Black America is nihilism, which signifies "the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness and (most important) lovelessness. In other words, the Black community is sunken in psychological and existential depression with battered identity. This confronting historical reality has become much stronger and more rampant largely because of corporate market institutions, which targets bodily pleasure and endless consumption. He writes: "The eclipse of hope and collapse of meaning in much of black America is linked to the structural dynamics of corporate market institutions that affect all Americans. Under these circumstances black existential angst (anguish) derives from the lived exxperience of ontologial wounds and emotional scars inflicted by white supremacist beliefs and images oermeating U.S. society and culture." He stresses on a love ethic, initiated locally, at the center of a politics of conversion.

[Postmodern Perspectives]
The Postmodern Condition (399-400)
(Jean-François Lyotard. 1984. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis)
In describing the condition of knowledge in modern society as postmodern, Lyotard defines postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives" in the extreme simplification. Born as a product of progress in sciences, the incredulity threatens metanarrative (grand narrative) philosophical foundation that legitimize knowledge, he argues. He sees that the society will be governed by a pragmatics of language particles, which are denotative, prescriptive and descriptive, while grandiosity of hero, dangers, voyages and goals are being lost. While looking for legitamacy of modern society, he casts doubt on Habermas' notion of consensus obtained through discussion and writes, "Such consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And inventions is always born of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy."


[Others]
Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism
(Martha Nussbaum, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, Joshua Cohen(Ed.). Boston: Beacon, 1996)
Refuting Richard Rorty's call for patriotism and national identity (NYTimes 13 Feb 1994), Nussbaum admonishes its closeness to jingoism--bellicose chauvinism--and advocates cosmopolitan education based on the Stoics' concept of world citizen (kosmou politês), which stresses the vivid illustration of the difference in education. Nussbaum, thus, proposes education should emphasize world citizenship, rather than democratic or national citizenship, even if the realization is not so certain in every level. She is not blind to the idealistic face of this education by expressing: "Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business...[because] cosmopolitanism offers only reason and the love of humanity, which may seem at times less colorful than other sources of belongs." She urges one to get out of the cocoon of familiarity and comfort.

Democracy and Dictatorship (1910's, 177-181)
(Rosa Luxemburg)
"Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who things differently."
Against Lenin-Trotsky's dogmatic and systematic socialism movement, Luxemburg advocates adaptation in the course of realizing socialism in the mists of future. In this process, democracy becomes an important political structure. Contesting their limited democracy--dictatorship of a few, Luxemburg proposes dictatorship of the class or the mass, where the mass can participate in the most active and unlimited way, forming public opinion and public life, and criticizes the constrainted democracy of soviets by writing: "with the repression of political life in the land as a whole, life inthe soviets must also become more and more crippled."

Introduction to The Second Sex (1952, 359-368)
(Simone de Beauvoir, in The Second Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley.)
She states that the division of the sexes is a biological, not historical, fact. Throughout the history, men have been subject while women remained as Others. With regard to the inequality, Simone de Beauvoir has written: "The drama of woman lies in this conflict between the fundamental aspiration of every subject (ego)--who always regards the self as the essential--and the compulsions of a situation in which she is the inessential. The ultimate goal she wants to achieve is individual liberty--not happiness--which constitutes the base of her arguments.

Sunday, January 4, 2009

Democracy and Education

John Dewey. (1916; 1966). Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada.

The Democratic Conception in Education (81-99)

In his view of intelligence, Dewey expresses that intelligence lack of social/human factors is narrowed down only to factors concerning technical production and marketing goods to the extent that emotional life is distorted. He emphasizes enlarged physical environment and social contacts for tolerant mental life, and asserts that frequent travels and commercial tendencies contributed to the broaden contacts, thus alleviating tensions among people. [But this last view is very naive because those travels and economic flows do not necessarily bring people closer in reality. Most of all, he does not identify what he means by the closeness. He is lack of economic and political connotations in the smaller world.]

By democracy he means a "mode of associative living and of conjoint communicated experience," and writes as its characteristics increasing shared concerns and the liberation of personal capacities. As the purpose of education he writes,"a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims." [As he indicates, a common pitfall throughout the history is that social aims and its direction are hardly defined and so does his case.]

He reviews educational philosophy in three different epochs: (1) Plato believed the great truth and the society reflecting it should be stable, which is achieved by arranging individuals' roles based on what they are good for. Thus, discovering the personal aptitude and training it is the purpose of education. Dewey's criticism of Plato includes that Plato categorized individuals into three classes and did not recognize individual uniqueness. [Dewey's perspective of education is very individualistic without paying much attention to what each bring into educational environment, thus, very idealistic.] (2) With the significant studies in Nature, the eighteenth century Enlightment influenced education philosophy, namely by Rousseau. Its emphasis was given to development of individualism. Dewey, however, sees that its chief interest was in social progress toward a freer society with two distinctive aspects--cosmopolitanism and humanity. Thus in this view, individual emancipation was the agent of a progressive society, Dewey denotes. Dewey's criticism comes from the way of conducting education, which followed the natural environment--in other words, education means filling individual mind with something good and true just like seen in Nature.[This perspective is clearly shown in Emile by Rousseau.] (3) Under the German influence in the 19th century state-run public school system and nationalism spread out and the purpose of education in this paradigm was to form the citizen who can serve for the state interests and social efficiency, thus the idea of individual development receded and disciplinary training became far the most important aim of education. Even it was said that the attainment of true personality is obtained through institutions organized by the state.

Dewey poses the question of how to conduct education that preserves humanity and he answers that it should be done by the efforts of enlightened men in their private capacity. [While he criticizes Plato for his aristocratic perspective that a smart ruler will know the orderly rules and law, his idealistic individualism does not go beyond. He thinks we should rely on those few. Isn't there any systematic way of approaching the problem?]


Experience and Thinking (139-151)
Emphasizing experience, Dewey argues that even a humble experience has possibility to generate any amount of theory, but theory without an experience cannot be established. Thinking and reflection are the agent that connects experience to theory as we do not really know unless bringing certain things in relation to something else.

Thinking in Education (152-163)
For Dewey, "thinking is the method of intelligent learning" and it requires an experience. The problem in school setting is that this out-of-school ordinary experience is not reflected in pupils' learning, thus mind and activities are divorced and learning is isolated from the rest of social engagement. This separation hinders the process of thinking and creativity, which lies in putting familiar materials in an unusual context. "Only silly folk identify creative originality with the extraordinary and fanciful, " said Dewey. Therefore, his emphasis on interconnection between real life experience and school lessons becomes an core idea of curriculum development to the extent that real life materials such as 'shops' and 'gardens' integrated into class will provide opportunities for acquiring information and knowledge while carrying on progressive experience. [Although his emphasis on real life experience is agreeable in general, bringing in a model of society poses a problem because of his neglect of diversity of individual pupils' lived experience based on their cultural/social/economic/political background. Remodeling a society is not transparent as he insinuates because individuals live in different contexts. In addition, it is my ever-lasting rejection to Dewey is why we don't allow pupils to bring their own experience to class and/or dream a new society, which is totally different from the current one, for a moment.]

Intellectual and Practical Studies (262-276)

The Individual and the World (291-305)
Individualism is a modern concept. While in both Greek and medieval periods, individuals were regarded only as a channel through which a universal or divine intelligence or "reason" operated, a latent individualism smeared as a religious individualism--the salvation of individual soul-- in the medieval period, thus knowledge itself is something built up within the individual through his acts and mental states. This aspect gave birth to the 'practical individualism' that knowledge is obtained through personal experience. It, however, originates from the notion that mind is isolated from the world, which is left to be discovered, and spurred philosophic subjectivism. Dewey argues that men strive for freedom in nature and society and initiate changes in the world instead of isolating themselves from the nature. Thus self, mind and knowledge constitute a unity achieved through interactions: "The self achieves mind in the degree in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life about him; the self is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account."

Dewey maintains that every new idea different from the custom must originate from an individual, however, sprouting it is suppressed in society because of its tendency of continuity and stability. In this light, the notion of intellectual individualism guides us further as a moral and social individualism. While intellectual activities of the individual are agencies of social progress, conformity is that of social conservation. Then, the question arises: how egoistic consciousness is related to the public world? Dewey introduces three philosophic branches with regard to this question: (1) French rationalism, which emphasizes general and impersonal forms, argues that activities will be externally consistent and thus always reach a uniformity through argument and persuasion. (2) English thought is centered on individual own pleasure and pains. The main idea of this thought is that in order to maximize the pleasure, each should be considerate of others' circumstances as well and thus a harmony is achieved. (3) German philosophy lies in between in that individuals become rational only if they absorbs the rationality of the universe and social institution. Often called absolute or objective idealism, it is termed as institutional idealism by Dewey. He evaluates that while this idealism overcame isolated individualism fallen in France and England and served to arouse state-wide public education, it tended to reinstate the principle of authority and thus left political democracy foreign.

In stating educational implication of these philosophies, Dewey emphasizes learner's perspective: originality springs from unforced response of student's own individuality, which leads to their own discovery and allows them to obtain new points of view and intellectual companionship. Intellectual servility and subjection will only serve the purpose of authority, Dewey argues. His perspective of education and democracy is unfolded as following: "A progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth. Hence a democratic society must, in consistency with its ideal, allow for intellectual freedom and the play of diverse gifts and interests in its educational measures."

Vocational Aspect of Education (pp. 306-320)
By vocation Dewey means a direction of life activities in relation to others and social accomplishment that individuals play in various roles. Criticizing Plato's idea of the purpose of education, which is to discover what each person is good for and train them to master that area for social harmony, Dewey argues that he not only limits the scope of vocation but also ignores infinite capabilities that individual may possess. As seen in his note that "the vocation acts as both magnet to attract and as glue to hold," he regards vocation from a very macroscopic view to the extent to realize well-rounded personality in society. From this stand, he also writes, "the dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is living--intellectual and moral growth," thus denotes that restricting education for future occupation not only injures present development but also hinders exploring proper future right employment. In relation to the current industrial society, he asserts that increasing 'conspicuous' industrial process has brought social importance and brought to light questions of school learning to industrial life and demanded trade education. This tendency is twofold: it maintains higher education as a threshold for social status and prestige to a certain class while for the rest it turns occupation to only means for surviving, thus making education become an instrument to perpetuate the existing industrial social order--in his word, "to accomplish the feudal dogma of social predestination." Nevertheless, his pragmatic/progressive perspective is preserved in his purpose of vocational education and the way to achieve the goals: as education lies in the process of constructing a gradual transition from school materials to real life, vocational education, under the conspicuous industrial society, should integrate scientific factors that the society offers into curriculum to develop intelligence and make it more practical. [He admits that this process is not easy and emphasize the preparation to vocation should be indirect, but does not explicitly explain how to use the industrial context in such a peculiar way. Materials borrowed in class brings not only itself but also the context it is created. Without carefully conceived criticality in the adaptation, it is not an easy task.]

Saturday, December 20, 2008

Weber: a short introduction

Gianfranco Poggi. (2006). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press

Questions of Method (17-35)
One of the greatest contribution that Weber made to sociology and cultural science is his radical refusal to positivistic model that prevailed in natural science and its expansion to other fields. Thus researchers should rely on their intuition in interpreting social phenomena and persuasive communication about the given topics. The fundamental difference that divides him from the main stream seems to originate from his ontological POV: Weber sees that human beings act within the reality where they exist on the basis of the meanings [Poggi emphasized] they attribute to it. Human events are basically individual, consisting of actions and passions of individuals, and thus its scientific understanding should be based upon methodological individualism, the questions of which may include individuals' interpretation of their own circumstances and needs. His concept of ideal types plays a significant role in understanding the relation of sociology and history. While historians emphasize the uniqueness of certain facts, sociologists should provide them with ideal types, which are intrinsically at the state of fluidity, continuously corrected and replaced by others. [Ideal types does not mean optimal, rather frameworks that allows tools for interpretation of the reality, I think.] By constructing ideal types, sociology is characterized as handmaiden to history and history takes them as hypothses. Thus, Poggi puts an emphasis on Weber's perspective of contingency of social events--in that there are more than one ways of interpreting them--and necessity--in that there are not many though.

Webers' Conception of the Socio-Historical Process (36-58)
Poggi asserts that Weber would agree with Marx on the fundamental role of classes in the historical process, but he sees history as an arena where conflicts different from classes arise in the sphere of socio-cultural and political relations. One particularity in his perspectives lie in that he regards the individuals as the ultimate agents that cause conflicts and move the society. He refuses a society as an organic whole entity that sits on top of individuals. [I think this is his fundamental perspective that deduces his other ideas.]

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (59-74)
The most highly regarded Weber's essay, the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, explores the genesis of modern capitalism. Not disregarding economic components of capitalism, Weber emphasized the availability of institutional and intellectual resources, such as rationalized arrangement for political and economical activities with a weighted focus on early capitalist entrepreneurship taken by a large number of individuals, who collectively experimented new and disruptive ways of producing wealth through enterprises motivated by a very distinctive capitalist spirit. Weber finds the Calvinism, the dogma of which is predestination--God decreed for each human being its destiny in the afterlife--as the core genesis of the spirit of capitalism: accumulation of wealth was morally justified first, then the elimination of strong religious impediments became necessary. Thus, capitalism played a significant role in advancing secularization. After this developmental stage, the capitalist spirit ceased to function in the capitalist system.

Other Essays in the Sociology of Religion (75-88)
Weber's interest in religion about its general roles, Poggi defines, originates from his phylosophical anthropology--'human being as an interpretative animal, positioning itself in the world by attaching significance to selected aspects of reality'--and historically interpretaion is done chiefly through religion that imparts meaning to the cosmos.

Political Power and Legitimacy (89-104)
Weber regard organized violence as the grounding form of political power, in particular, with regard to the state (Politics as a Vocation). Political power creates legitimacy to make its order more durable, secure and effective. Weber presents three topologies about legitimacy, traditional (relying on past validity and goodness)/charismatic (obedience to the forces leader embodies)/legal-rational. Among three, legal-rational legitimacy is peculiar to modern polities and a central component of state. Unlike the others, it is grounded in the notion of commands accorded to authorized norms and obedience as dutiful observance of a whole system of norms. If the legitimacy is questioned, charismatically legitimated order "repeatedly justify itself and acquire new resources by means of new initiatives and achievements, particularly of a military and economic nature, in order to renew the followers' trust in the extraordinary qualities of the reader" (p.99). This aspect is not specifically addressed by Weber. Weber's interest in a phenomenon common to all political orders regardless of its particular form turned his attention to administrative staff structured in polity. While insecure contingency characterizes the staff in charismatically legitimate polities, the staff in legal-rational legitimacy is recruited and organized in a bureaucratic model and this model constitutes the nature of the modern state, Weber asserts.

The State and Bureaucracy (105-126)
To Weber, state is the continuously reproduced result of the convergence of innumerable lines of individual activity, not a superior entity, thus state's activities are intrinsically contingent, in other words, the set of ends they pursue is open-ended. The nature of state, which is portrayed as an ensemble of practices, facilities, rules and personnel, etc. as one entity, is defined by Weber as follows: 1) political entity, which comprises the core of the institutional identity of the state, is based on organized violence, 2) legal-rational legitimacy is determined by law, 3)individuals become citizens and they constitute a new kind of political community, a nation, 4) administration to implement the policies is bureaucratic by nature. Poggi evaluates Weber, although he acknowledged the inhumanity of the capitalism and accorded to socialists' justification, remained as a class member of bourgeoisie by adhering to the (western) modernity.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

Autobiography, Politics and Sexuality

William Pinar. (1994). NY: Peter Lang.

Working From Within (1972. pp.7-12)
Bringing Jackson Pollock's interview on his immediacy as a way of painting for greater directness as well as his emphasis on inner world, Pinar argues that the more immediate the class becomes, the more we become immersed in the moment such that students become more honest in expressing their thinking and feeling. To him, spontaneity is a key to bring about cognitive and emotional contact. [But, this requires tremendous capability of teachers themselves. In this sense, he stresses teacher's self-reflection.]

The Method of Currere (1975, pp.19-27)
Pinar delineates a process of culturing intellectuality through self-reflective biographical approach in four stages.
Regressive: Return to the past and observe as it is.
Progressive: Relax in a slightly darkened room and think of future, then bring back the attention to matters associated with one's intellectual interests and associatively.
Analytical: Describe the biographical present and respond to it freely.
Synthetical: See oneself concretely as if in a mirror.
[This meditative engagement is not so transparent to me. Nevertheless I highly regard the way he approaches for the second phase.]

The Trial (1976, pp.29-92)
His thoughtful interpretation of the Trial by Kafka is used to support his emphasis on self-reflection. Pinar explains that K, who is lack of self-reflection--attention on his own experience, on his body and on his emotion, is arrested intellectually and phycho-socially. In other words, he is dissociated from his subjective experience. On the other hand, Pinar argues that his task is to 'portray singularity, subjectivity, the process of self-knowing' and choose autobiography as a means of writing subjectively. He quotes Dewey (1960, On Experience, nature and freedom) to support his idea of self-awareness as a tool to dissolve intellectual arrest and its movement: "but that what I have learned from them ['philosophical writing'] has been technical in comparison with what I have been forced to think upon and about because of some experience in which I found myself entangled." In this light, Pinar describes the introduction of phenomenology to the social science as a significant event, that relieves theories to the 'primary experience' and the things themselves. [It is rather long, but interesting to read how he developed and support his ideas about the importance of self-reflection. It is very intellectual and persuasive.]

Notes on the Curriculum Field (1978, pp.77-99)
Pinar seeks new curriculum possibilities in emancipation based on Habermas's acknowledgment of a distinction between theory and praxis. Habermas argues, "Decisions for the political struggle, cannot at the outset be justified theoretically and thn be carried out organizationally. The sole possible jstification at this level is consensus aimed at in practical discourse, among the participants, who, in the consciousness of their common interests and their knowledge of circumstances, of the predictable consequences and secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know the risks they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations" (quoted p.93, Theory and Practice, p33). Pinar's methodology directly reaches Habermas' argument: "the methodological framework that determines the meaning of the validity of critical propositions of this category['critical social science'] is established by the concept of self-reflection. The latter releases the subject from dependence on hypothesized powers. Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest" (quoted p.87, Habermas Knowledge and Human Interest(?), 310) [It is a good historical overview on curriculum theories and Pinar carefully keeps his position regarding self-reflection and emancipatory as new curriculum possibilities and this voice gets stronger towards the end of his argument. It is well written.]

Autobiography and an Architecture of Self (1985, pp.202-222)
Pinar articulates two reasons of the loss of authentic self-acknowledgement: 1) at schools children experience clashing of their identities brought from home and 2) a capitcal economy, where everything is commodified, results in self-estrangement in its essence. From psychoanalysis theories, existential phenomenology traverse Foucault and Derria and Nietzsche, Pinar argues "the running of the course is the building of the self, the lived experience of subjectivity. Autobiography is an architecture of self, a self we create and embody as we read, write, speak and listen" (p.220). [It is amazing to see how he connects trains of thoughts through such diverse and deep analysis, but after all, I do not see the point of doing it. It is only interpretation of theories. Where is the lived experience?]

Monday, December 15, 2008

PAR and Poplular Education in Latin America

Carlos Alberto Torres. (1995). In Critical Theory and Educational Research (pp. 237-255). MaLaren, P. & Giarelli, J. (Eds.). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Torres finds the origin of PAR in Latin America largely in Freire's pedagogy of liberation. PAR is particularly prevailing in adult education, which takes a form of cultural action offered to consenting and self-motivating adults. The central objective of this action is by and large described as 'conscientization', meaning critical consciousness as forms of class knowledge and practices from a Freirian perspective. Adult education not only provides direct needs of communities where the participants belong, but also constitutes an instrument of mobilization and the development of political consciouness in the transition to socialism in Latin America, Torres argues. He asserts that although questions regarding its methodology and paradignamic position in educational research, PAR is a major contributor to emancipatory, problem-posing education throughout Latin America now.

Thursday, December 11, 2008

Gramsci (1891-1937): Prison Notebooks

Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (1971). Hoare, Q & Smith, G. (Trans & Eds.). NY: International Publishers

The Intellectuals (pp. 5-23)
To Gramsci, all men are intellectuals in that they carry on some form of intellectual activity, however, not all have in society the function of intellectuals. This discrepancy lies in elaboration of the intellectual activity. Then, what is the function of intellectuals? He quotes discussion about new intellectualism in the weekly Ordine Nuovo. In this discussion, the mode of new intellectuals consists in specialization--active participation in practical life--and politicization ('directive')--proceeding from technique-as-work to science and humanistic conception of history. This is 'organic' intellectuals, meaning that they are formed within a social group, in relation to 'traditional' intellectuals, who has no acknowledgment of class formation. The editors note that this perspective contains Gramsci's key ideas of (1) organic intellectuals of the proletariat and (2) the possibility of proletarian cultural hegemony through the work process. The relationship of intellectuals and the world is examined through the superstructures--civil society (private sector) and political society (State). Intellectuals, subordinate of dominant group, exercise the functions of social hegemony through spontaneous consent and political government through legal apparatus of state that coercive power.

On Education (pp. 26-43)
He points out that particularisation in school systems that increasing types of vocational school brought about constitutes the education crisis in his time. By its diversities and distinctions made from the traditional school, it may give the impression of democratic tendency in education, but in fact, it only deteriorated the real democratic order because individuals do not obtain "governing" stratum in a social and political context. First all children do not enter school with the same background--as Bourdieu indicates as "cultural capital"--thus those who are lack of certain assets aligned with the school system do hardly enter the system. He stresses that "child's consciousness is not something individual, it reflects the sector of civil society in which the child participates, and the social relations which are formed within his family, his neighborhood, his village, etc." Secondly, although it is implicit in this writing, the system that creates vocational school and its integration into State is philosophically far from democritization. According to him, each social group create its own types of schools , which contributes to the perpetuation of a specific traditional function, ruling and subordinate. To him, creating intellectuals from the working class is fundamental, but the task is enormous.

Here is his account of technocracy that comes to control both regimes and bureaucracies: "deliberative (having to do with policy) bodies tend to an ever-increasing extent to distinguish their activity into two organic aspects: into the deliberative activity which is their essence, and into technical-cultural activity in which the questions upon which they have to take decisions are first examines by experts and analyzed scientifically. this latter activity has already created a whole bureaucratic body with a new structure; for apart from the specialized departments of experts who prepare the technical material for the deliberative bodies, a second body of functionaries is created--more or less disinterested volunteers, selected variously from industry, from the banks, from finance houses. This is one of the mechanisms by means of which he career bureaucracy eventually came to control the democratic regimes and parliaments; now the mechanism is being organically extended, and is absorbing into its sphere the great specialists of private enterprise, which thus comes to control both regimes and bureaucracies. What is involved is a necessary, organic development which tends to integrate the personnel specialized in the technique of politics with personnel specialized in the concrete problems of administering the essential practical activities of the great an complex national societies of today."(27-28)

Mentioning the collectivism in academic culture that forces norms and particular ways of expressing, he uses the term, "Taylorise" intellectual work (more in Americanism and Fordism).

Political Struggle And Military War
Gramsci argues that political struggle, which is more complex than military war, takes three forms: 'war of movement (i.e. boycott)', 'war of position (i.e. strike)' and 'underground warfare (i.e. secret arms)'. He says while the war of position in politics, once won, is decisive, the war of manoeuvre [I think it is the same as movement] subsists when there is a question of the winning positions which are not decisive. When the balance is lost and only decisive positions are at stake, war occurs.
In opposition to iron economic determinism, Gramsci stresses civil society that "is resistant to the catastrophic incursions of the immediate economic element (crises, depressions, etc.)." Thus, the more advanced the civil society is, the more time is taken for destructive political power to be active and the less likely the civilians, defenders, lose their position or faith.

Internationalism and National Policy
Gramsci summarizes the philosophy of praxis such that "the international situation should be considered in its national aspect. In reality, the internal relations of any nations are the result of a combination which is original (in a certain sense) and unique. To be sure, the line of development is towards internationalism, ut the point of departure is national--and it is from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise." In particular, this logic supports his political idea of the solidarity of the international proletariat class under the direction of international communism. (1933). [This brief but clearly provocative essay throws an analytical groundword for my research: begin with the national but move toward the international as a directive light.]

Problem of the "Collective Man" or of "Social Conformism"
Perpetual educative and formative role of the State, according to Gramsci, is creating new higher types of civilization and turning it and morality of the popular masses to apparatus for economic production, and as a result, new types of humanity evolves. One becomes a collective man and tendency to conformism (standardisation of thoughts and actions) of society spreads. Big factories, Taylorisation, rationalisation, etc. are the economic basis of collective man, he argues. [He also talks about conformism, but it is not clear in this essay.] However, he stresses that the collective man do consent and collaborate, feeling "freedom" instead of coercion through the educative pressure of the State, and finds the apparatus in the 'Law', which includes not only legally natural activities but also the civil society. This civil society, which operates without compulsory obligation, exerts a collective pressure and develops customs, ways of thinking and acting and morality. Within the context, he mentions that the political concept of permanent revolution, which was described in the context of the epoch, where the society is still in a state of fluidity, expanded to the formular of "civil hegemony",where a State prepares a war 'minutely and technically in peacetime'. This is where the power of educative and formative role of the State arises. [A very succinct description of creeping State power that operates in civil society.]

Taylorism and the Mechanization of the Worker
The comparison Gramsci made between medieval copyist and new industrial workers highlights mechanization process of the production. He sneers at Ford's books and the work of Philip on the ground that these efforts are part of the wholesale cautionary measures and 'educative' initiatives not to leave the workers any moment to think inbetween their work times.

Tuesday, December 9, 2008

Globalization and Discontents

Joseph Stiglitz (2002). NY:W.W.Norton & Company

Stiglitz mentioned that the IMF and the U.S. Treasury, which emphasized information transparency in East Asia during the global financial crisis in 1997-98, were the least transparent he experienced with. Upon his experience, he asserts that the way international institutions such as the IMF influence the world economies is subtle such that it is a matter of a tone of voice, a meeting behind closed doors or a memo after discussions.(preface. pp. ix-xvi)

A new phenomenon in globalization, according to him, is anti-globalization wave in developed countries, which is based on the prevalent awareness that globalization in many developing countries did not bring the promised economic benefits. He supports this idea from a document of World Bank (Global Economic Prospect and the Developing Countries 2000): for the last decade, the number of people in poverty increased by almost 100 millions. The hypocrisy of the Western countries lie in that they push doors of the poor to eliminate barrier while keeping their own closed--in particular Japan and the U.S. The Uruguay Round (1986-1993 concluded by the agreements of 117 countries on trade liberalization and as a result, WTO was formed.), in particular, put the intellectual property right into fire and protected the interests of the producers, concentrated in the developed countries. He argues premature capital market liberalization caused global instability and destroyed job markets in poor countries such that a sense of job security is heightened, if not loss. Nevertheless, "capital market liberalization has been pushed despite the fact that there is no evidence showing it spurs economic growth"(p. 16). IMF, World Bank and WTo are the major international institutions who he states govern the global markets and it is interesting to how he sees these players in this context: "the application of mistaken economic theories would not be such a problem if the end of first colonialism and then communism had not given the IMF and the World Bank the opportunity to greatly expand their respective original mandate, to vastly extend their reach" (p.17) He also maintains the view that globalization can be good and reshaped as long as it is governed well, but a problem he frequently mentions is the way in which the three major players operate somewhat surreptitiously for their own financial interests--it is irony that IMF is run by taxpayers' money but its representatives are mostly directly from corporations--and there is no voice of developing countries although most activities are in the developing world.[He advocates progressive capitalism with certain governmental intervention to compensate market failure.] (pp.3-22).

Stiglitz calls it the colonial mentality or white man's burden that they know what is the best for developing countries. Furthermore, what they know about is solely based on an ideology--market fundamentalism--and they insist on playing a central role in policy making without consideration of local specifics. He presents two examples, Ethiopia and Botswana: while Ethiopia, who relied on the IMF funds, did not achieve sustainable development, let alone encountering a threat of fund cut, Botswana carefully selected advisers from various private sectors and wend through their way. Despite obvious atmosphere of discontents on the policies that the IMF pushed on Korea in 1997, the reason why government officials kept silent publicly was that they were afraid of being judged as "off track" by the IMF and losing opportunities to get funded from the IMF--also note that other access to funds contingent on IMF approval. One hot topic that the IMF imposed on Korea during the supervisory period is pushing further independence of the Central Bank from the government and having it focused on inflation. He argues that this policy reflects a groundless market fundamentalism that the IMF persists with two empirical evidence: there is a general consent that European Central Bank's independence actually exacerbated an economic downturn and also, even in the U.S., Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. central bank, refused to focus on inflation only and took into account employment and growth as well. [The U.S. doesn't have to listen to the IMF, but smaller countries often have no option, but it is a matter of balancing intellectual power to some degree. The IMF is not the only way to choose.] (pp. 23-52)

Stiglitz maintains his light that there are alternative strategies, for instance, land reform not capital market liberalization, competition policies before privatization, job creation along with trade liberalization. "The essence of freedom is the right to make a choice--and to accept the responsibility that comes with it." (pp.53-88)

Stiglitz says, "it became clear that the IMF policies not only exacerbated the ownturns but were partially responsible for the onset: excessively rapid financial and capital market liberalization was probably the single most important cause of the crisis, though mistaken policies on teh part of the countries themselves played a role as well" (pp.89-90). He recalls moments when the crisis in East Asia was about to break out: the IMF and U.S. Treasury began to criticize the countries about corruption, malfunctions, etc. although they were hardly experts. He defines that Fund aid was at the cost of accepting country's economic sovereignty. Even when the IMF calls the end of recovery, the criteria is given to stabilization of interest or exchange rate, however, he argues that there is no true recovery until workers return to their jobs and wages are restored. He continues to argue governments' role in recovering economic crisis and it is bizarre that he states that Korea is an example of the government's intervention, which not only led fast recovery but also could be more competitive in the near future. He mentions that the unemployment was up fourfold in Korea during the crisis. If the recovery was successful, the unemployment should have been reduced now. I do not have statistics, but considering skyrocket inflation, the wages are far from the restoration, I propose. (pp. 89-132).