Mason, Jennifer. (1996). Qualitative Researching. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage.
Generating Qualitative Data: Interviewing (35-59) [research method training for VT Summer Research Group].
Generating Qualitative Data: Observation, Documents and Visual Data (60-82)
Thursday, April 1, 2010
Reflexivity and Research
Frederick Steier. (Eds.) (1991). Reflexivity and Research. London, Newbury Park, and New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Steier, F. Introduction. (pp. 1-11)
“As inquirers and researchers, we create worlds through the questions that we ask coupled with what we and others regard as reasonable response to our questions” (p. 1).
Taking a constructivist stance, Steier defines reflexivity as “bending back on itself” (p. 2) and emphasizes that the itself is socially constructed through a loop-back or circular process mediated by language. It is the circular process, he stresses, that makes reflexivity useful in the development of constructionist research methodologies, for it allows to bring to light multiple perspectives on realities and multiple views on the same self. Steier wrote:
We are talking about a circular process, in which reflexivity is the guiding relationship allowing for the circularity. This looping back may . . . unfold as a spiraling, if we allow for multiple perspectives, and acknowledge that the ‘the same self’ may be different as a result of its own self-pointing. (p. 2)
von Foerster, Heinz. Through the Eyes of the Other. (pp. 63-75).
For von Foerster, reflexivity grounds in the concept of participatory universe as opposed to the universe that uniquely exists. The notions of Truth and Objectivity are central to this objectivist view and researchers assume that they can separate themselves from the universe as well as from others. In this paradigm, reflexivity is rejected from research practices. From the perspective of participatory universe, on the contrary, one accepts being part of the universe tied with all others.
Gergen, Kenneth, & Gergen, Mary. Toward Reflexive Methodologies. (pp. 76-95).
In responding to the constructivist view that accounts of objects are not independent of the observers, the authors draw upon social constructionism, in which accounts of the world are viewed as “an expression of relationships among persons” (p. 78) mediated by language. Thus, Gergen and Gergen argue that, while constructivists approach reflexivity as an inward subjectivity, social constructionists emphasize reflexivity as an outward and relational realm with shared language. [This is aligned with the concept of multivocality.] Taking a social constructionist stance, the authors categorize three forms of reflexivity oriented research strategies. One of them is about research based on dialogic participation to be used for exploring the range of constructions of menopause in society. In this method, the authors wrote:
Self-reflexive methods became interdependently reciprocal, and the term ‘reflexive’ applied not to one researcher, but to relations between and among investigator and research participants. (p. 93)
[Participatory research is based on this form of reflexivity. My proposition is that participatory video enhances this reflexive process, and to figure out how it happens is going to be my research question.]
The authors also compare practices of traditional scientific research and reflexive dialogic research: In traditional scientific research, subjects are only assumed to respond to variants controlled by researcher, without actively participating in meaning construction. The authors refer to feminist scholars as researchers who developed a new form of scientific work by exploring a reflexive dialogic approach.
Söderqvist, Thomas. Biography or Ethnography or Both? Embodied Reflexivity and the Deconstruction of Knowledge-Power. (143-162).
Söderqvist refers to the notions of social constructionism and reflexivity as integral parts of recent understanding of social epistemology. From the perspective of constructionism, knowledge is seen as a result of social processes mediated through linguistic interactions (Gergen and Davis, 1985). Reflexivity in this light means a researcher’s standpoint in the process of knowledge production.
Söderqvist describes a postmodern world as rejection of objective knowledge and critique of the relationship between knowledge and power. This critique is attuned to deconstructionist movement led by French post-structuralists and in particular Foucault. Here are some expressions related to criticism of objectivism (p. 147):
Feyerbend (1987, Farewell to Reason) wrote reason and objectivity made “Western expansion intellectually respectable” (p. 5) and argued for “farewell to reason”.
Gouldner (1976, The dialectic of Ideology and Technology) asserted that objectivism is a “pathology of cognition that entails silence about the speaker, about his interests and his desires, and how these are socially situated and structurally maintained”(p. 50)
Söderqvist maintains that biography is a “deconstructive enterprise” (p. 148), which could reveal the constructive side of knowledge that researchers claim. He argues that emotion can be explicit only through reflexivity because it is not a linguistic form of knowledge but bodily-based. The problem of biography, he states, arises when biographies are written according to the ‘reality principle’, which means that biographies are measured upon whether they deliver a realistic picture or not (Frye, 1973, Anatomy of Criticism, cited p. 153). In this case, knowledge-power still remains. Söderqvist argues that one way of avoiding such objective reality in biography is to enhance reflexivity, for instance, adding biographer’s autobiography into the biography, as often seen in psychoanalytic biographies.
In contrast, he calls attention to ethnobiography, meaning collective stories that are told to each other in local setting. It is characterized with reciprocity, social construction, and reflexivity. He contends ethobiography as a grounding site for resistance against knowledge-power.
[knowledge produced through PAR can be seen as ethnobiography based knowledge.]
Steier, Frederick. Reflexivity and Methodology: An Ecological Constructionism. (163-185).
For Steier, reflexivity carries the notion of circularity, “turning back onto itself” and this circularity takes place in two completely different ways: small-circuit and long circuit. In his definition, a small-circuit reflexivity means an instinctive action while a long-circuit reflexivity means a contemplative action. He asserts that both are necessary to researchers: Because a small-circuit reflexivity makes researchers act but it does not question the assumptions that drew the actions, researchers should use a long-circuit reflexivity to actively question these assumptions.
Defining reflexivity in terms of researcher’s self-interrogation, Steire stresses its reciprocal nature. Calling those who he does research with reciprocators, Steier insinuates reciprocity as a nature of reflexivity and emphasizes constructionist research mediated through language. He stated:
To call attention to what I would like to see as a more relational language of constructionist research, while still embedding such discourse in reflexive dialogue, I would like, following Orgeta y Gasset (1957), to call those who participate with me reciprocators, for it is only by their hearing me and answering me that a ‘me’ can emerge as an I who does research. (p. 165)
Here reciprocity is required between researcher and reciprocator in his term, in order to define the researcher as a researcher.
In looking into issues of reflexive methodologies, Steier finds mutualness between researcher and reciprocator--calling this mirroring--and co-constructiveness. He argues that through recognition of researcher’s role reflexively, reciprocators are given greater voice in a researcher’s stories. In saying so, he implicitly defines reflexivity as the basic nature of PAR.
Steier, F. Introduction. (pp. 1-11)
“As inquirers and researchers, we create worlds through the questions that we ask coupled with what we and others regard as reasonable response to our questions” (p. 1).
Taking a constructivist stance, Steier defines reflexivity as “bending back on itself” (p. 2) and emphasizes that the itself is socially constructed through a loop-back or circular process mediated by language. It is the circular process, he stresses, that makes reflexivity useful in the development of constructionist research methodologies, for it allows to bring to light multiple perspectives on realities and multiple views on the same self. Steier wrote:
We are talking about a circular process, in which reflexivity is the guiding relationship allowing for the circularity. This looping back may . . . unfold as a spiraling, if we allow for multiple perspectives, and acknowledge that the ‘the same self’ may be different as a result of its own self-pointing. (p. 2)
von Foerster, Heinz. Through the Eyes of the Other. (pp. 63-75).
For von Foerster, reflexivity grounds in the concept of participatory universe as opposed to the universe that uniquely exists. The notions of Truth and Objectivity are central to this objectivist view and researchers assume that they can separate themselves from the universe as well as from others. In this paradigm, reflexivity is rejected from research practices. From the perspective of participatory universe, on the contrary, one accepts being part of the universe tied with all others.
Gergen, Kenneth, & Gergen, Mary. Toward Reflexive Methodologies. (pp. 76-95).
In responding to the constructivist view that accounts of objects are not independent of the observers, the authors draw upon social constructionism, in which accounts of the world are viewed as “an expression of relationships among persons” (p. 78) mediated by language. Thus, Gergen and Gergen argue that, while constructivists approach reflexivity as an inward subjectivity, social constructionists emphasize reflexivity as an outward and relational realm with shared language. [This is aligned with the concept of multivocality.] Taking a social constructionist stance, the authors categorize three forms of reflexivity oriented research strategies. One of them is about research based on dialogic participation to be used for exploring the range of constructions of menopause in society. In this method, the authors wrote:
Self-reflexive methods became interdependently reciprocal, and the term ‘reflexive’ applied not to one researcher, but to relations between and among investigator and research participants. (p. 93)
[Participatory research is based on this form of reflexivity. My proposition is that participatory video enhances this reflexive process, and to figure out how it happens is going to be my research question.]
The authors also compare practices of traditional scientific research and reflexive dialogic research: In traditional scientific research, subjects are only assumed to respond to variants controlled by researcher, without actively participating in meaning construction. The authors refer to feminist scholars as researchers who developed a new form of scientific work by exploring a reflexive dialogic approach.
Söderqvist, Thomas. Biography or Ethnography or Both? Embodied Reflexivity and the Deconstruction of Knowledge-Power. (143-162).
Söderqvist refers to the notions of social constructionism and reflexivity as integral parts of recent understanding of social epistemology. From the perspective of constructionism, knowledge is seen as a result of social processes mediated through linguistic interactions (Gergen and Davis, 1985). Reflexivity in this light means a researcher’s standpoint in the process of knowledge production.
Söderqvist describes a postmodern world as rejection of objective knowledge and critique of the relationship between knowledge and power. This critique is attuned to deconstructionist movement led by French post-structuralists and in particular Foucault. Here are some expressions related to criticism of objectivism (p. 147):
Feyerbend (1987, Farewell to Reason) wrote reason and objectivity made “Western expansion intellectually respectable” (p. 5) and argued for “farewell to reason”.
Gouldner (1976, The dialectic of Ideology and Technology) asserted that objectivism is a “pathology of cognition that entails silence about the speaker, about his interests and his desires, and how these are socially situated and structurally maintained”(p. 50)
Söderqvist maintains that biography is a “deconstructive enterprise” (p. 148), which could reveal the constructive side of knowledge that researchers claim. He argues that emotion can be explicit only through reflexivity because it is not a linguistic form of knowledge but bodily-based. The problem of biography, he states, arises when biographies are written according to the ‘reality principle’, which means that biographies are measured upon whether they deliver a realistic picture or not (Frye, 1973, Anatomy of Criticism, cited p. 153). In this case, knowledge-power still remains. Söderqvist argues that one way of avoiding such objective reality in biography is to enhance reflexivity, for instance, adding biographer’s autobiography into the biography, as often seen in psychoanalytic biographies.
In contrast, he calls attention to ethnobiography, meaning collective stories that are told to each other in local setting. It is characterized with reciprocity, social construction, and reflexivity. He contends ethobiography as a grounding site for resistance against knowledge-power.
[knowledge produced through PAR can be seen as ethnobiography based knowledge.]
Steier, Frederick. Reflexivity and Methodology: An Ecological Constructionism. (163-185).
For Steier, reflexivity carries the notion of circularity, “turning back onto itself” and this circularity takes place in two completely different ways: small-circuit and long circuit. In his definition, a small-circuit reflexivity means an instinctive action while a long-circuit reflexivity means a contemplative action. He asserts that both are necessary to researchers: Because a small-circuit reflexivity makes researchers act but it does not question the assumptions that drew the actions, researchers should use a long-circuit reflexivity to actively question these assumptions.
Defining reflexivity in terms of researcher’s self-interrogation, Steire stresses its reciprocal nature. Calling those who he does research with reciprocators, Steier insinuates reciprocity as a nature of reflexivity and emphasizes constructionist research mediated through language. He stated:
To call attention to what I would like to see as a more relational language of constructionist research, while still embedding such discourse in reflexive dialogue, I would like, following Orgeta y Gasset (1957), to call those who participate with me reciprocators, for it is only by their hearing me and answering me that a ‘me’ can emerge as an I who does research. (p. 165)
Here reciprocity is required between researcher and reciprocator in his term, in order to define the researcher as a researcher.
In looking into issues of reflexive methodologies, Steier finds mutualness between researcher and reciprocator--calling this mirroring--and co-constructiveness. He argues that through recognition of researcher’s role reflexively, reciprocators are given greater voice in a researcher’s stories. In saying so, he implicitly defines reflexivity as the basic nature of PAR.
Reflexive Embodied Empathy
Finlay, Linda. (2009). “Reflexive Embodied Empathy”: A Phenomenology of Participant-Researcher Intersubjectivity. The Humanistic Psychologist, 33(4), 271–292.
Finlay defines as reflexive embodied empathy a researcher’s reflexive engagement in her own body, her participant’s lived body, and her embodied intersubjective relationship with the participant. [Here, I interpret the term body as ways of being present, more specifically, how to speak and listen.] Looking through the literature about empathy, Finlay notes that reflexivity and embodiment are integral to empathy and delineates three layers of reflexivity intertwined with each other as a fluid form:
• connecting-of the Other’s embodiment to our own,
• acting-into the Other’s bodily experience, and
• merging-with the Other’s bodily experience.
By embodiment, Finlay calls for being explicit about the presence and influence of researcher on a research process. Finlay also argues that empathy is a bi-directional process where both researcher and participant see each other’s place. According to Finaly, it is through mutuality that one understands oneself by recognizing from another, looking at oneself through another’s eyes, because, “[n]ormally, people experience the world in terms of egocentric space” (p. 289). Finlay empathized the importance of attending to the concept of reflexive embodied empathy in doing research, stating:
[R]esearchers’ experience of the embodied intersubjective relationship needs to be probed as part of the process of hermeneutic reflection. Explicitly and consciously engaging in the practice of reflexive embodied empathy in terms of connecting of, acting into, and merging-with offers a way of capturing something of the interpermeation of body and world.
Finlay defines as reflexive embodied empathy a researcher’s reflexive engagement in her own body, her participant’s lived body, and her embodied intersubjective relationship with the participant. [Here, I interpret the term body as ways of being present, more specifically, how to speak and listen.] Looking through the literature about empathy, Finlay notes that reflexivity and embodiment are integral to empathy and delineates three layers of reflexivity intertwined with each other as a fluid form:
• connecting-of the Other’s embodiment to our own,
• acting-into the Other’s bodily experience, and
• merging-with the Other’s bodily experience.
By embodiment, Finlay calls for being explicit about the presence and influence of researcher on a research process. Finlay also argues that empathy is a bi-directional process where both researcher and participant see each other’s place. According to Finaly, it is through mutuality that one understands oneself by recognizing from another, looking at oneself through another’s eyes, because, “[n]ormally, people experience the world in terms of egocentric space” (p. 289). Finlay empathized the importance of attending to the concept of reflexive embodied empathy in doing research, stating:
[R]esearchers’ experience of the embodied intersubjective relationship needs to be probed as part of the process of hermeneutic reflection. Explicitly and consciously engaging in the practice of reflexive embodied empathy in terms of connecting of, acting into, and merging-with offers a way of capturing something of the interpermeation of body and world.
Negotiating the swamp: the opportunity and challenge of reflexivity in research practice
Finlay, Linda. (2002). Negotiating the swamp: the opportunity and challenge of reflexivity in research practice. Qualitative Research, 2 (2), 209-230.
Interestingly, it is the notion of validity that radical relativistic scholars criticized reflexive research, according to Finlay. They saw reflexivity in the forms of ‘confessional tales’ and transparent account of research as regretful backward glances at positivist ideals. Simultaneously, as Finlay noted, growing critical inquiries on power of the researcher gave rise to feminist versions of reflexivity, interrogating power dynamics between researcher and researched or outsider and insider. Observing current practices of qualitative research, Finlay argues that reflexivity is its defining feature, for most researchers are explicit about the impact of intersubjectivity on data collection and analysis. Thus she writes, “researchers no longer question the need of reflexivity: the question is how to do it” (p. 212). Concerning perilous engagement in reflexivity, she warns, “embarking on reflexivity is akin to entering uncertain terrain where solid ground can all too easily give way to swamp and mire,” (p. 213) thus leading to excessive self-analysis at the expense of focusing on research participants and understanding problems. Reconceptualizing reflexivity, Finlay offered its five variants:(i) introspection; (ii) intersubjective reflection; (iii) mutual collaboration; (iv) social critique, and (v) discursive deconstruction.
(1) Reflexivity as Introspection: Finaly asserts that introspection on a researcher’s own engagement in research can help understanding the research problem. She, however, warns about benign introspection, using personal revelation as an end, because it can suppress the participant’s voice. Thus, she calls upon the researcher to use introspection only as a springboard for further analysis and be explicit about knowledge claims from participants and herself within a social context.
(2) Reflexivity as intersubjective reflection: For Finlay, this genre of reflexivity focuses on mutual meanings emerging from the research relationship. It explores the self-in-relation-to-others. For instance, the researcher tries to understand consequences that the relationship between her and research participants brought into the research.
(3) Reflexivity as mutual collaboration: In my opinion, this is not a particular way of defining reflexivity, but a way of using reflexivity as a research methodological concept and the topic on which researchers place. Thus it should be phrased as “reflexivity for mutual collaboration”. Here, participants become co-researchers and their reflexive dialogue also counts as a valid source for data analysis and evaluation, thus, research becomes a mutual collaborative process. Researchers who explore this genre of reflexivity argue for the need of multivocality against the dominant research practice of “biasing data toward one voice” (p. 220). Finlay argues that reflexivity as mutual collaboration and as intersubjective reflection may shift attention away from the phenomena being studied by focusing too mucho on interpersonal process. [This genre of reflexivity reflects on much thought of the process of PAR. More reading about Finlay’s discussion, however, indicate that Finlay did not explore the critical concept of PAR sufficiently. For her, mutual collaboration is, for example, to give interview transcripts to research participants to ask for their reflection.]
(4) Reflexivity as social critique: “Reflexivity for social critique”. Finlay means using reflexivity, self-interrogation or inspection, as a way of critiquing social norms and practices. An emphasis of this account is given to the social construction of power and power imbalance between them and research participants.
(5) Reflexivity as discursive deconstruction: “Reflexivity within the context of discursive deconstruction.” Finlay observes ways in which researchers engage in reflexivity within the context of discursive deconstruction. According to Finlay, researchers in discursive deconstruction generally pay attention to the ambiguity of meanings in language and its impact on presentation. Thus, some are conscious of ways in which themselves and research participants are represented to each other and a wider community, whereas others, namely post-modern researchers, draw upon reflexive writing itself to represent ambiguity and polyvocality.
[In laying out five variants of reflexivity, Finlay explores major concerns and questions related to reflexivity. Although she does not provide a clear definition of reflexivity, it appears that by reflexivity she means self-inspection. ]
Finlay remarked that the overall functions of reflexivity shifted from an account of research to the position of researcher and multivocality; from an interpretation of data to a consideration of political dimensions in presenting the data.
Finlay points out the potential of reflexivity as a valuable research tool to
● examine the impact of the position, perspective and presence of the researcher
● promote rich insight through examining personal responses and interpersonal dynamics
● open up unconscious motivations and implicit biases in the researcher’s approach
● empower others by opening up a more radical consciousness
● evaluate the research process, method and outcomes
● enable public scrutiny of the integrity of the research through offering a methodological log of research decisions. (Finlay, 2002)
Finlay argues that reflexivity has limits. These limits, however, are not inherent to reflexivity but rather an outcome of unbalanced use of reflexivity. With this respect, Finlay points the problem with its rhetorical functions. According to her, reflexivity is often used to disguise inequalities actually present in research. Finlay stated:
Her partial understanding of collaboration leads to her discussion on limitations of reflexivity. As to the problem of rhetorical functions of reflexivity, Finlay stated:
Researchers’ apparent openness and attention to multiple dynamics can, in fact, disguise the partial and emergent nature of their findings. . . . researchers who offer their participants transcripts of the interview towards collaboratively discussing findings may proceed to suggest that because they have engaged in ‘reflexivity’ and ‘participant validation’, their study is to be trusted. (p. 227)
As the second criticism on reflexivity, Finlay remarks on dangers of infinite regress and self-indulgence. [This aspect is the concern she expresses repetitively in this paper.] According to her, challenges and contradictions are inherent in the reflexive task. Reflexivity is necessary yet it needs a balance. Thus, Finlay maintains that researchers should decide how to exploit reflexivity in order to serve the aims, values and logics of research.
Interestingly, it is the notion of validity that radical relativistic scholars criticized reflexive research, according to Finlay. They saw reflexivity in the forms of ‘confessional tales’ and transparent account of research as regretful backward glances at positivist ideals. Simultaneously, as Finlay noted, growing critical inquiries on power of the researcher gave rise to feminist versions of reflexivity, interrogating power dynamics between researcher and researched or outsider and insider. Observing current practices of qualitative research, Finlay argues that reflexivity is its defining feature, for most researchers are explicit about the impact of intersubjectivity on data collection and analysis. Thus she writes, “researchers no longer question the need of reflexivity: the question is how to do it” (p. 212). Concerning perilous engagement in reflexivity, she warns, “embarking on reflexivity is akin to entering uncertain terrain where solid ground can all too easily give way to swamp and mire,” (p. 213) thus leading to excessive self-analysis at the expense of focusing on research participants and understanding problems. Reconceptualizing reflexivity, Finlay offered its five variants:(i) introspection; (ii) intersubjective reflection; (iii) mutual collaboration; (iv) social critique, and (v) discursive deconstruction.
(1) Reflexivity as Introspection: Finaly asserts that introspection on a researcher’s own engagement in research can help understanding the research problem. She, however, warns about benign introspection, using personal revelation as an end, because it can suppress the participant’s voice. Thus, she calls upon the researcher to use introspection only as a springboard for further analysis and be explicit about knowledge claims from participants and herself within a social context.
(2) Reflexivity as intersubjective reflection: For Finlay, this genre of reflexivity focuses on mutual meanings emerging from the research relationship. It explores the self-in-relation-to-others. For instance, the researcher tries to understand consequences that the relationship between her and research participants brought into the research.
(3) Reflexivity as mutual collaboration: In my opinion, this is not a particular way of defining reflexivity, but a way of using reflexivity as a research methodological concept and the topic on which researchers place. Thus it should be phrased as “reflexivity for mutual collaboration”. Here, participants become co-researchers and their reflexive dialogue also counts as a valid source for data analysis and evaluation, thus, research becomes a mutual collaborative process. Researchers who explore this genre of reflexivity argue for the need of multivocality against the dominant research practice of “biasing data toward one voice” (p. 220). Finlay argues that reflexivity as mutual collaboration and as intersubjective reflection may shift attention away from the phenomena being studied by focusing too mucho on interpersonal process. [This genre of reflexivity reflects on much thought of the process of PAR. More reading about Finlay’s discussion, however, indicate that Finlay did not explore the critical concept of PAR sufficiently. For her, mutual collaboration is, for example, to give interview transcripts to research participants to ask for their reflection.]
(4) Reflexivity as social critique: “Reflexivity for social critique”. Finlay means using reflexivity, self-interrogation or inspection, as a way of critiquing social norms and practices. An emphasis of this account is given to the social construction of power and power imbalance between them and research participants.
(5) Reflexivity as discursive deconstruction: “Reflexivity within the context of discursive deconstruction.” Finlay observes ways in which researchers engage in reflexivity within the context of discursive deconstruction. According to Finlay, researchers in discursive deconstruction generally pay attention to the ambiguity of meanings in language and its impact on presentation. Thus, some are conscious of ways in which themselves and research participants are represented to each other and a wider community, whereas others, namely post-modern researchers, draw upon reflexive writing itself to represent ambiguity and polyvocality.
[In laying out five variants of reflexivity, Finlay explores major concerns and questions related to reflexivity. Although she does not provide a clear definition of reflexivity, it appears that by reflexivity she means self-inspection. ]
Finlay remarked that the overall functions of reflexivity shifted from an account of research to the position of researcher and multivocality; from an interpretation of data to a consideration of political dimensions in presenting the data.
Finlay points out the potential of reflexivity as a valuable research tool to
● examine the impact of the position, perspective and presence of the researcher
● promote rich insight through examining personal responses and interpersonal dynamics
● open up unconscious motivations and implicit biases in the researcher’s approach
● empower others by opening up a more radical consciousness
● evaluate the research process, method and outcomes
● enable public scrutiny of the integrity of the research through offering a methodological log of research decisions. (Finlay, 2002)
Finlay argues that reflexivity has limits. These limits, however, are not inherent to reflexivity but rather an outcome of unbalanced use of reflexivity. With this respect, Finlay points the problem with its rhetorical functions. According to her, reflexivity is often used to disguise inequalities actually present in research. Finlay stated:
Her partial understanding of collaboration leads to her discussion on limitations of reflexivity. As to the problem of rhetorical functions of reflexivity, Finlay stated:
Researchers’ apparent openness and attention to multiple dynamics can, in fact, disguise the partial and emergent nature of their findings. . . . researchers who offer their participants transcripts of the interview towards collaboratively discussing findings may proceed to suggest that because they have engaged in ‘reflexivity’ and ‘participant validation’, their study is to be trusted. (p. 227)
As the second criticism on reflexivity, Finlay remarks on dangers of infinite regress and self-indulgence. [This aspect is the concern she expresses repetitively in this paper.] According to her, challenges and contradictions are inherent in the reflexive task. Reflexivity is necessary yet it needs a balance. Thus, Finlay maintains that researchers should decide how to exploit reflexivity in order to serve the aims, values and logics of research.
Reflexivity
Jupp, Victor. (2006). Reflexivity. In V. Jupp (Ed.), The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods (pp….). London: Sage.
Jupp defines as reflexivity the process of monitoring and accessing all aspects of a research project, and asserts that it requires that the researcher provide sufficient detail about the process to allow readers to validate by themselves the knowledge that the research would have produced. For Jupp, the aspect of validity is influenced by judgment of ethics (has anyone been harmed?) and politics (whose side am I on?) from the researcher’s standpoint. What is more, as Jupp notes, reflexivity reflects upon the validity of a form of research itself, asking what is truth, how it is produced and disseminated, what impact it brings in society, and so forth. This speculation leads us to think of research as a social activity concerning the social production of knowledge.
Jupp defines as reflexivity the process of monitoring and accessing all aspects of a research project, and asserts that it requires that the researcher provide sufficient detail about the process to allow readers to validate by themselves the knowledge that the research would have produced. For Jupp, the aspect of validity is influenced by judgment of ethics (has anyone been harmed?) and politics (whose side am I on?) from the researcher’s standpoint. What is more, as Jupp notes, reflexivity reflects upon the validity of a form of research itself, asking what is truth, how it is produced and disseminated, what impact it brings in society, and so forth. This speculation leads us to think of research as a social activity concerning the social production of knowledge.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Doing Qualitative Research Differently
: Free Association, Narrative and the Interview Method. Hollway, Wendy, & Jefferson, Tony. (2000). London, Thousand Oak, and New Delhi: Sage.
Introduction: the Need to do Research Differently (pp.1-6)
The authors question the veracity of accounts that a research subject tell during interview. For them, one of the reasons for believing is democratic and related to power differentials between researcher and researched. Feminists, according to the author, have been conscious of this issue of power differentials and advocated the principles of giving voice to voiceless women. However, the authors claim that researchers cannot give voice to others, quoting a statement by Reissman (1993, Narrative Analysis, p. 3):
"we cannot give voice" since we "do not have direct access to another's experience. We deal with ambiguous representations of it--talk, text, interaction and interpretation"
[This argument is not logical. Giving voice does not mean directly accessing someone's experience.]
From the standpoint of critical realism (Bunge, 1993; Watkins, 1994-5), the authors argue that researchers interpret their subject's experience only through ambiguous representations of it, yet there is a relationship between people's representations and their experiences. Here the emphasis is given to that the relationship, tracked only by the researcher, depends on the researcher's particular view.
Producing Data with defended subjects (26-54)
From their pilot studies, the authors delineate four distinct approaches to interview: traditional, feminist, narrative, and clinical case-study. While traditional approaches focus on interview technique, feminists are conscious of power balance between interviewer and interviewee. In narrative approaches, an interviewee becomes a story-teller, thus the interview agenda is open to development, depending on the interviewee's experiences. Clinical case-study emphasizes a researcher's reflexivity on their own involvement in the interview process, such as anxiety, personal experience, etc.
The authors propose biographical-interpretative method. It emulates a biographer's role to listen to someone's story and make a coherent account out of the story-telling, Gestalt, explaining, "a whole which is more than the sum of its parts, an order or hidden agenda" (p. 34). The authors propose four principles of this method: (1) the more open the better, (2) elicit stories (i.e. Tell me about a time when you feel unsafe.), (3) avoid why questions to obtain concrete meanings from the interviewee. Why questions usually induce empty, cliché-ridden discussion, the authors assert. (4) Follow up using respondents' ordering and phrasing by taking a note.
The authors emphasize free association that comes unconsciously during interview.
Introduction: the Need to do Research Differently (pp.1-6)
The authors question the veracity of accounts that a research subject tell during interview. For them, one of the reasons for believing is democratic and related to power differentials between researcher and researched. Feminists, according to the author, have been conscious of this issue of power differentials and advocated the principles of giving voice to voiceless women. However, the authors claim that researchers cannot give voice to others, quoting a statement by Reissman (1993, Narrative Analysis, p. 3):
"we cannot give voice" since we "do not have direct access to another's experience. We deal with ambiguous representations of it--talk, text, interaction and interpretation"
[This argument is not logical. Giving voice does not mean directly accessing someone's experience.]
From the standpoint of critical realism (Bunge, 1993; Watkins, 1994-5), the authors argue that researchers interpret their subject's experience only through ambiguous representations of it, yet there is a relationship between people's representations and their experiences. Here the emphasis is given to that the relationship, tracked only by the researcher, depends on the researcher's particular view.
Producing Data with defended subjects (26-54)
From their pilot studies, the authors delineate four distinct approaches to interview: traditional, feminist, narrative, and clinical case-study. While traditional approaches focus on interview technique, feminists are conscious of power balance between interviewer and interviewee. In narrative approaches, an interviewee becomes a story-teller, thus the interview agenda is open to development, depending on the interviewee's experiences. Clinical case-study emphasizes a researcher's reflexivity on their own involvement in the interview process, such as anxiety, personal experience, etc.
The authors propose biographical-interpretative method. It emulates a biographer's role to listen to someone's story and make a coherent account out of the story-telling, Gestalt, explaining, "a whole which is more than the sum of its parts, an order or hidden agenda" (p. 34). The authors propose four principles of this method: (1) the more open the better, (2) elicit stories (i.e. Tell me about a time when you feel unsafe.), (3) avoid why questions to obtain concrete meanings from the interviewee. Why questions usually induce empty, cliché-ridden discussion, the authors assert. (4) Follow up using respondents' ordering and phrasing by taking a note.
The authors emphasize free association that comes unconsciously during interview.
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Majority Norms, Multiculturalism, and Gender Equality
Song, Sarah. (2005).American Political Science Review, 99 (4), 473-489.
Attentive to debate on multiculturalism and gender inequality, emphasized by Okin in particular, Song agrees with a general assumption—either defenders or critiques of multiculturalism—that problems of gender inequality in minority groups originate partially from internal struggles within the groups, but contests that this internal view overlooks how intercultural interactions shape gender status. In this regard, she rightly points out that the debate over gender and culture within the practice and theory of multiculturalism focuses on ways in which minority norms and practices threaten gender equality within majority culture. Instead she calls attention to the reverse influence. She states:
Majority norms and practices also pose obstacles to the pursuit of gender equality within minority cultures. What is of particular concern for the debate on multiculturalism is that the mainstream legal and normative frameworks within which minority claims for accommodation are evaluated have themselves been informed by patriarchal norms, which in turn have offered support for gender hierarchies within minority cultures. (p. 474)
Thus she calls for a critical examination of both minority and majority norms and practices in claiming minority cultures.
Song insinuates that the current debate is grounded in the view that culture is well-bounded and self-integrated, as Kymlicka suggests. She argues,
Cultures and cultural identities emerge, change, and are maintained through social interactions and political struggle…To get at cultural differences, we need to examine the processes by which cultural identities get constructed. This requires attention to historical context and to collective discussions and struggles within a community, as well as to interactions between members and outsiders—–in particular, to the role of states in shaping cultural identities. (p. 474)
In responding to Kymlicka’s influential view of multiculturalism and preservation of minority cultures, Song continues to stress looking at cultural interchange between majority and minority groups and how minority cultures are shaped and continuously developed through the interchange. In this way, she calls attention to the politics of cultural construction, conflicts and identities. (She notes that cultural interactions are further fueled by global economy, transnational communication network and migrations of people across borders.) She states:
“Cultures vary in the degree of fluidity, contestation, and permeability, but even in relatively closed groups the content of cultures is not determined purely “from the inside.” Rather, cultures have developed through interactions and struggles with other cultures. This suggests the need to examine more closely the role of interactive dynamics in shaping the identities and practices of majority and minority cultural communities.” (p. 476)
Song categorizes the interconnections between majority and minority cultures: congruence effect, boomerang effect and diversionary effect.
1) Congruence effect refers to the reinforcement of (gender) inequality in minority cultures through majority norms. In reviewing the case of Santa Clara Pueblo in 1975, Song argues that gender inequality inscribed in the case—a refusal to matrilineal heritage in the Indian community—reflected the norms of gender inequality of the majority culture: the State endorsed the Pueblo’s amendment of their membership in 1939 that restricts to a patrilineal kinship system and this endorsement, in fact, reflected the current mainstream gender bias. It is only in the 1930s that women attained a right to citizenship independent to her husband. Song writes:
“[T]he gender-biased membership rule of the Santa Clara Pueblo was not “frowned upon by federal policy” in part because the Pueblo rule was congruent with the dominant culture’s own gendered understandings of membership.” (p. 479)
Song examines the congruence effect in the cases of ‘cultural defense’, where cultural evidence is taken into consideration in court decisions in the expense of equal protection to all. After examining cases of rape and wife-murder by immigrants in the 1980s in comparison with the provocation defense in the majority culture—where emotionally provoked criminal charge in intimate relationships is reduced—Song stresses:
“[T]he problem raised by the “cultural defense” cases above has not only to do with minority practices but also with mainstream norms that offer support for those practices…So long as gender-biased norms pervade legal doctrine and practice, minority defendants can continue to find support for patriarchal practices within mainstream law.” (p. 482)
2) Song defines boomerang effect as a reverse influence from minority to majority culture to reinforce patriarchal orders within the wider/mainstream society. Song calls attention to wider practices of patriarchal behaviors among immigrants and mainstream defendants influenced by a growing number of cultural defense cases. She writes:
“In some locales, juries have allowed such defenses to serve as partial excuses for patriarchal behavior among immigrants, and mainstream defendants can and may well point to these “cultural” cases in raising their own criminal defense claims. Given the increasingly diverse immigrant presence in the United States and the increasing use of cultural defenses, it is important to be attentive to boomerang effects.” (p. 483)
3) Song refers to diversionary effect as deflecting attention from unequal gender practices in the mainstream culture by emphasizing special cases of gender inequality in minority cultures. She states:
“[C]ondemnation of various practices among immigrants may help divert attention from majority practices. Focusing on cases of domestic violence or rape in immigrant communities can serve to reinforce the false dichotomy of oppressive minority cultures and egalitarian majority cultures, deflecting attention from the reality of domestic violence and other patriarchal practices within majority cultures” (p. 485)
Thus Song insist on analyzing majority norms and practices alongside those of minority because overlooking the diversionary effect can reinforce gender hierarchies across cultures and fuel the maintenance of the superiority of the mainstream culture.
In conclusion, Song contests that an internal view that regards gender inequality as an intrinsic quality of a culture as a whole fails to capture a range of interactive dynamics that shape cultural conflicts with the sustenance of the state’s role in endorsing the accommodation of minority practices that are congruent with the dominant culture’s own norms and practices. In this way, she disrupts the dilemma of multiculturalism and gender inequality, writing:
If we take a social constructivist view of cultures as not only internally contested but also interactive and mutually constitutive, then the problem for feminists is not so much “multiculturalism versus gender equality” as “patriarchy versus gender equality.” (p. 486)
In so doing, Song insinuates the necessity of looking into non-cultural factors, such as race and class, which impede struggles toward gender equality.
Attentive to debate on multiculturalism and gender inequality, emphasized by Okin in particular, Song agrees with a general assumption—either defenders or critiques of multiculturalism—that problems of gender inequality in minority groups originate partially from internal struggles within the groups, but contests that this internal view overlooks how intercultural interactions shape gender status. In this regard, she rightly points out that the debate over gender and culture within the practice and theory of multiculturalism focuses on ways in which minority norms and practices threaten gender equality within majority culture. Instead she calls attention to the reverse influence. She states:
Majority norms and practices also pose obstacles to the pursuit of gender equality within minority cultures. What is of particular concern for the debate on multiculturalism is that the mainstream legal and normative frameworks within which minority claims for accommodation are evaluated have themselves been informed by patriarchal norms, which in turn have offered support for gender hierarchies within minority cultures. (p. 474)
Thus she calls for a critical examination of both minority and majority norms and practices in claiming minority cultures.
Song insinuates that the current debate is grounded in the view that culture is well-bounded and self-integrated, as Kymlicka suggests. She argues,
Cultures and cultural identities emerge, change, and are maintained through social interactions and political struggle…To get at cultural differences, we need to examine the processes by which cultural identities get constructed. This requires attention to historical context and to collective discussions and struggles within a community, as well as to interactions between members and outsiders—–in particular, to the role of states in shaping cultural identities. (p. 474)
In responding to Kymlicka’s influential view of multiculturalism and preservation of minority cultures, Song continues to stress looking at cultural interchange between majority and minority groups and how minority cultures are shaped and continuously developed through the interchange. In this way, she calls attention to the politics of cultural construction, conflicts and identities. (She notes that cultural interactions are further fueled by global economy, transnational communication network and migrations of people across borders.) She states:
“Cultures vary in the degree of fluidity, contestation, and permeability, but even in relatively closed groups the content of cultures is not determined purely “from the inside.” Rather, cultures have developed through interactions and struggles with other cultures. This suggests the need to examine more closely the role of interactive dynamics in shaping the identities and practices of majority and minority cultural communities.” (p. 476)
Song categorizes the interconnections between majority and minority cultures: congruence effect, boomerang effect and diversionary effect.
1) Congruence effect refers to the reinforcement of (gender) inequality in minority cultures through majority norms. In reviewing the case of Santa Clara Pueblo in 1975, Song argues that gender inequality inscribed in the case—a refusal to matrilineal heritage in the Indian community—reflected the norms of gender inequality of the majority culture: the State endorsed the Pueblo’s amendment of their membership in 1939 that restricts to a patrilineal kinship system and this endorsement, in fact, reflected the current mainstream gender bias. It is only in the 1930s that women attained a right to citizenship independent to her husband. Song writes:
“[T]he gender-biased membership rule of the Santa Clara Pueblo was not “frowned upon by federal policy” in part because the Pueblo rule was congruent with the dominant culture’s own gendered understandings of membership.” (p. 479)
Song examines the congruence effect in the cases of ‘cultural defense’, where cultural evidence is taken into consideration in court decisions in the expense of equal protection to all. After examining cases of rape and wife-murder by immigrants in the 1980s in comparison with the provocation defense in the majority culture—where emotionally provoked criminal charge in intimate relationships is reduced—Song stresses:
“[T]he problem raised by the “cultural defense” cases above has not only to do with minority practices but also with mainstream norms that offer support for those practices…So long as gender-biased norms pervade legal doctrine and practice, minority defendants can continue to find support for patriarchal practices within mainstream law.” (p. 482)
2) Song defines boomerang effect as a reverse influence from minority to majority culture to reinforce patriarchal orders within the wider/mainstream society. Song calls attention to wider practices of patriarchal behaviors among immigrants and mainstream defendants influenced by a growing number of cultural defense cases. She writes:
“In some locales, juries have allowed such defenses to serve as partial excuses for patriarchal behavior among immigrants, and mainstream defendants can and may well point to these “cultural” cases in raising their own criminal defense claims. Given the increasingly diverse immigrant presence in the United States and the increasing use of cultural defenses, it is important to be attentive to boomerang effects.” (p. 483)
3) Song refers to diversionary effect as deflecting attention from unequal gender practices in the mainstream culture by emphasizing special cases of gender inequality in minority cultures. She states:
“[C]ondemnation of various practices among immigrants may help divert attention from majority practices. Focusing on cases of domestic violence or rape in immigrant communities can serve to reinforce the false dichotomy of oppressive minority cultures and egalitarian majority cultures, deflecting attention from the reality of domestic violence and other patriarchal practices within majority cultures” (p. 485)
Thus Song insist on analyzing majority norms and practices alongside those of minority because overlooking the diversionary effect can reinforce gender hierarchies across cultures and fuel the maintenance of the superiority of the mainstream culture.
In conclusion, Song contests that an internal view that regards gender inequality as an intrinsic quality of a culture as a whole fails to capture a range of interactive dynamics that shape cultural conflicts with the sustenance of the state’s role in endorsing the accommodation of minority practices that are congruent with the dominant culture’s own norms and practices. In this way, she disrupts the dilemma of multiculturalism and gender inequality, writing:
If we take a social constructivist view of cultures as not only internally contested but also interactive and mutually constitutive, then the problem for feminists is not so much “multiculturalism versus gender equality” as “patriarchy versus gender equality.” (p. 486)
In so doing, Song insinuates the necessity of looking into non-cultural factors, such as race and class, which impede struggles toward gender equality.
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