Thursday, December 2, 2010

Paragidmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences

Egon G. Guba & Yvonna S. Lincoln. (2008). In Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.), The landscape of qualitative research (3rd ed.) (pp. 255-286). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, and Singapore: Sage.

The authors developed their definition of the nature of paradigms proposed in 1994 by incorporating John Heron and Peter Reason's (1997) participatory/cooperative paradigm. In this chapter, they focused on issues of axiology, commensurability, action, control, foundations of truth and knowledge, validity, voice, reflexivity, and postmodern textual representation.

It is interesting to note that they changed their perspective on commensurability: in the past, they had argued commensurability between paradigms is not possible, although within each paradigm, mixed methodologies may make good sense. Yet, in this chapter is argued that it would not be impossible to blend some elements from each paradigm. For instance, positivism and postpositivism are clearly commensurable.

Concerning the call to action, the authors noted:
"The mandate for social action, especially action designed and created by and for rearch participants with the aid and cooperation of researchers, can be most sharply delineated between positivist/postpositivist and new paradigm inquirers. (p. 267)

Another controversy around paradigms is centered on control of the study: who initiates? who determines research processes? who determines what to be represented? The authors noted that the issue of control is deeply embedded in the questions of voice, reflexivity, and postmodern textual representation, which are relevant only to new paradigm inquirers. Interestingly, however, the term control is used to foster empowerment, noted the authors:

"[F]or new-paradigm researchers control is a means of fostering emancipation, democracy, and community empowerment, and of redressing power imbalances such that those who were previously marginalized now achieve voice (Mertens, 1998) or "human flourishing" (Heron & Reason, 1997). (p. 268)

Validity is the most controversial term among paradigms. Questions relevant to validity include: are the findings sufficient enough to act upon them?

Voice: In the past, the only appropriate voice was "voice from nowhere" (p. 277). While the voice of informants becomes important, the authors observed that it is critical to participatory research, having a researcher's voice in the text and simultaneously letting participants speak for themselves through various media, such as plays, forums, performance-oriented media... The authors remarked: "Performance texts, in particular, give an emotional immediacy to the voices of researchers and research participants far beyond their own sites and locale" (p. 278). For Rosanna Herz (1997, Introduction: Reflexivity and voice. In (Ed.), Reflexivity and voice), voice is a struggle for representation of the author's self as well as the respondents' selves. She wrote:

Voice has multiple dimensions: First there is the voice of the author. Second, there is the presentation of the voices of ones' respondents within the text. A third dimension appears when the self is the subject of the inquiry. (p. 278).

[Participatory video, these dimensions come into play. How do participants represent their voice when they present their respondents' interviewed voice? Is this argument really relevant ti PV in any case? I explored a bit of this issue in writing reflexivity.]

Reflexivity: The authors defined as reflexivity here reflecting critically on the self as researcher, instrumental to research.

Postmodern textual representations: postmodern and poststructural perspectives brought forth criticism around conventional texts: their reductionist representation of human reality and contribution to historical oppression. As a counter-text, new forms of texts flourish to break boundaries and moving the center to the margin. One of the examples is "messy texts" (Marcus & Fischer, 1986), which breaks the binary between science and literature. The authors noted that "Representation may be arguably the most open-ended for the controversies surrounding phenomenological research today" (p. 280).

In concluding, the authors remain as constructivists. They think it is highly unlikely and even less than useful that positivist and new paradigm forms of inquiry resolve their differences because of the assumption that there is no single truth. Thus, they wrote:

"We stand at the threshold of a history marked by multivocality, contested meanings, paradigmatic controversies, and new texual forms" (p. 281).

Competing paradigms in qualitative research

Egon G. Guba & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.). (1994). Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105-117).

An alternative paradigm dialog

Egon C. Guba (1990). In E.G. Guba (Ed.), The paradigm dialog (pp. 17-30). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

In this chapter, Guba proposed as the generic definition of paradigm "a basic set of belief that guides action" (p. 17), in particular, disciplined inquiry as the action in our concern. Such paradigms respond to three questions: ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions.

1) Ontological: What is the nature of reality?
2) Epistemological: What is the nature of the relationship between the knower (researcher) and the known (researched)?
3) Methodological: what is the process of finding out knowledge or research?

Positivism
The positivist paradigm is rooted in a realist ontology, the belief that "there exists a reality out there driven by immutable natural laws" (p. 19). The purpose of science is to discover the true nature of reality and how it truly works.

From this ground, positivists practice an objectivist epistemology, in which they put questions directly to nature and wait for its answer without altering it. Since the inquirer can be positioned far away from nature, research outcomes are value free. Within this paradigm, experimental/manipulative methodology is the most appropriate in such a way that questions and hypotheses are stated in advance and subjected to empirical tests under carefully controlled conditions.

Postpositivism
It is a modified/less naïve version of positivism. It is based on critical realism: postpositivists believe that reality exists out there, yet because of human sensory/intellectual limitations, it is impossible for humans truly to perceive it. Thus, they emphasize the need for being critical about what researchers find.
Epistemologically, postpositivists recognize the absurdity of the separation of inquirers from the inquired; thus they take on a modified objectivist epistemology in the sense that objectivity is a regulatory ideal to adhere, yet in reality, can be achieved reasonably closely (approximated) only by cleaning up one's preposition, relying on the tradition of the field to report the inquiry, and seeking judgment from peers in the disciplinary community. Guba criticized that the latter two requirements virtually make is impossible for new paradigm to assert themselves.
Methodologically, it put forth critical multiplism (modified experimentalism/manipulatism), which was also articulated as triangulation by Denzin (1978). Because of limited human sensory, it seeks as many sources as possible to draw findings. They often calls for more qualitative methods, depending more on grounded theory, and reintroducing discovery into the inquiry process.

Critical Theory
Guba proposed the label of "ideologically oriented inquiry" instead of critical theory, which encompasses feminism, neo-Marxism, Frerieism, participatory inquiry, and critical theory. The shared quality in this family is rejecting the claim of "value freedom" made by positivism (and postpositivism to an extent). They believe that values do enter into every inquiry; inquiry thereby becomes a political act.

Guba criticizes an ontological juncture that critical theorists (ideologists) adhere to:

But, for whatever reason, critical theorists (ideologists) have elected to believe in an objective reality--as the phrase commonly used by them, "false consciousness," readily demonstrates (because it implies that there is a "true consciousness" somewhere "out there," or, more likely, possessed by the inquirer or some better informed elite). The task of inquiry is, by definition, to raise people (the oppressed) to a level of "true consciousness." Once they appreciate how oppressed they are, they can act to transform the world. The close parallel between transforming the world and predicting and controlling it should not be lost. (p. 24)

Critical theorists undertake subjectivist epistemology, regarding inquiry acts as a process intimately related to the inquirer's values. Yet, Guba points out a logical disjunction a "realist ontology coupled with a subjectivist epistemology" (p. 24).

Guba asserted that critical theorists' methodology is more consistent and framed it as transformative and dialogic one. It seeks to eliminate false consciousness and to facilitate transformation.

Constructivism
Constructivist calls for a completely different paradigm. It acknowledge value-laden facts and furthermore, the interaction of inquirer and inquired into that shapes outcomes of an inquiry. Therefore, constructivists state that:

It [constructivism] renders the distinction between ontology and epistemology obsolete; what can be known and the individual who comes to know it are fused into a coherent whole. Further, it makes the findings of an inquiry not a report of what is "out there" but the residue of a process that literally creates them. Finally, it depicts knowledge as the outcome or consequence of human activity; knowledge is a human construction, never certifiable as ultimately true but problematic and ever changing. (p. 26)

From this perspective, ontologically, it takes a position of relativism in that "realities are multiple, and they exist in people's minds" (p. 26). Guba argued that relativism is "the key to openness and the continuing search for ever more informed and sophisticated constructions" (p. 26).

Epistemologically, the constructivist takes a subjectivist position, not because of the limited human conditions but because of its ontological assumptions: if realities exist only in people's minds, subjectivist interaction is the only way to accessing them.

Methodologically, the constructivist takes hermeneutics and dialectics: it attempts to depict individual constructions as accurately as possible, and simultaneously, contrast and compare dialectically to generate informed constructions on which there is substantial consensus.

A Participatory Inquiry Paradigm

John Heron and Peter Reason (1997). Qualitative inquiry, 3 (3), 274-294. doi: 10.1177/107780049700300302

Deveoloping Guba and Lincoln (1994, Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In N.
K. Denzin & Y S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research), the authors articulate a participatory paradigm by supporting Guba and Lincoln's argument that the constructivist paradigm is unclear about the relation between constructed realities and the original cosmos. In this light, the authors argued that "participative realities" are more useful.

The authors begin a paradigm building from the constructivist worldview. Further, it emphasizes human beings in relation to the living world and experiential knowledge, inquiry and reality. They argued:

"Constructivist views tend to be deficient in any acknowledgment of experiential knowing; that is, knowing by acquaintance, by meeting, and by felt participation in the presence of what is there. (p. 277)

For them, reality is a form of experience and experiential reality is both subjective and objective. For instance, holding someone's hand means that it shapes the person and simultaneously I meet the person. Thus, they stated, "To experience anything is to participate in it, and to participate is to both to mold and to encounter; hence, experiential reality is always subjective-objective" (p. 278). This participatory, subjective-objective, experiential reality constitutes the ontology of participatory worldview. Heron (1996 p, 11 ...) wrote:

It is subjective because it is only known through the form the mind gives it; and it is objective because the mind interpenetrates the given cosmos which it shapes. (p. 11)

Thus, in this paradigm, they argue that there is a primordial reality, in which the mind actively penetrates and cocreates reality through interaction with the cosmos.

Epistemology: the authors emphasize critical subjectivity as the epistemological ground. They acknowledge that knowing is from a perspective and that perspective has authentic values as well as restricting bias. Thus, what involves is critical subjectivity, such that a self-reflexive attention is given to the knower's ground. Developing the community consensus (which determines relative truth) of constructivism, the authors add shared experiential meaning to judge the relative truth. [THIS ARGUMENT IS VERY VAGUE.] In this light, they argued that critical subjectivity extends to critical intersubjectivity, for personal knowing is always set within cultural and experiential shared meaning.

Methodology: Collaborative/Cooperative forms of action inquiry.
The authors argued that cooperative inquiry rests on two participatory principles: epistemic participation and political participation:

The first means that any propositional knowledge that is the outcomes of the research is grounded by the researchers in their own experiential knowledge. The second means that research subjects have a basic human right to participate fully in designing the research that intends to gather knowledge about them. (p. 284)

The more participatory systematically the more cooperative. Thus, they distinguish this methodology from the mainstream qualitative paradigm:

Qualitative research about people is a halfway house between exclusive, controlling, quantitative, positivist research on people and fully participatory, cooperative research with people. (p. 285)

Cooperative inquiry is "a wide-ranging science about any aspect of the human condition that a group of coresearchers choose to explore through the instrumentality of their own experience" (p. 286).

Axiology: the authors contended that the omission of axiology in Guba and Lincoln's paradigm table is a critical deficit because axiology ultimately asks why we try to create reality and what it worthwhile and valuable. In this question, the authors respond that the participatory paradigm answers it is for human flourishing. It is practical knowing of "how to choose and act" (p. 287).

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

The Sage handbook of action research

: Participative inquiry and practice. Reason, Peter & Bradbury, Hilary (Eds.). (2008). London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, and Singapore: Sage.

Introduction (P. Reason & H. Bradbury, 1-13)

Reason and Bradbury traced back to the origin of action research to Lewin, liberationist perspective, exemplified by Freire, scholar-practitioners' work in education, health, and community development, and philosophical roots in critical theory, constructivism, phenomenology, etc. Epistemologically, they argue that action research has been shied away from the mainstream social sciences, which focus on objectivity and emphasize representation rather than action. Within this context, they define action research as:

a family of practices of living inquiry that aims, in a great variety of ways, to link practice and ideas in the service of human flourishing. It is not so much a methodology as an orientation to inquiry that seeks to create participative communities of inquiry in which qualities of engagement, curiosity and question posing are brought o bear on significant practical issues. (p. 1)

In their definition, action research is characterized with a participatory process. They wrote: "[A]ction research is participatory research, and all participatory research must be action research" (p. 4). Here "action" means that research responds to "people's desire to act creatively in the face of practical and often pressing issues in their lives in organization and communities" (p. 3) and it is action because the research looks into the participants' own action in their daily lives. They distinguish action research from traditional research in that action research aims at producing practical knowledge to act upon practical issues and bring about transformative experience of our daily lives. Thereby, it is contentious to some of the academic community, which aims at producing academic theories unencumbered by practical questions. In so doing, action research challenges a monopoly of knowledge production inveterate in academic practices. The authors emphasize the emancipatory dimension of action research: Without it, action research would be co-opted by the status quo instead of flourishing individual or community lives.

The authors' terms first, second, and third-person research practices as an organizing framework are useful to analyze the process of action research. First-person action research practices involve with the individual ability to inquire into his or her own life. Second-person action research practices addresses the ability to inquire into mutual issues and problem through face-to-face interpersonal dialogue and develop organizations. Third-person action research practices aims to create a wider impact. They assert that research reports can be an important form of third-person inquiry.

The authors do not bind action research with a specific set of methodologies. Instead, they draw attention to action research as a form of bringing scholarship and praxis together and a new way of knowing, and the development of new thinking about validity and quality in research. It is a paradigm. In their definition, participation is the backbone of action research. They also note that participation is political in that it allows people to have a say in decision making and producing knowledge about them. It empowers them because it allows them to see that they can construct and use their own knowledge to address pressing issue.

Living inquiry: Personal, political and philosophical groundings for action research practice (15-30, Wicks, P. G., Reason, P., & Bradbury, H. ).

The authors analyze the survey responses from action research practitioners. One of the patterns noted by the respondents is Thomas Kuhn's influence on paradigmatic shift for their epistemological understanding and research practices. Some also attributed their practices to pragmatist position that "knowledge is acquired through responding to a real need in life" (p. 19). Most respondents also seek critical social theories as their philosophical backdrop: the political dimension of theories and knowledge led them to the perspective that knowledge is value-laden and can be emancipatory. Also many come from the objection to traditional education research and embraces critical perspectives on pedagogy influenced by Freire and Hall. McTaggart and Kemmis in particular look for the transformative potential of action research. The authors conclude as the status of action researchers:

[A]ction researchers themselves could be understood to have been action as 'bricoleurs' over time, and in a very real sense, 'making the road while walking'. Indeed, the active process of integrating and making sense of various influences and perspectives and of developing one's own understanding seems to be central to many action researchers' accounts. (p. 26)

Participatory action research as practice (31-48, Swantz, Marja Liisa)
Swantz argued that the conventional scientific criteria could not validate PAR; practical success verifies the usefulness, asserted the author. Specifically, she noted Heinz Moser's (1975, as cited on page 43) three criteria: (1) transparency: are all the participants aware of the whole process of research, such as functions, aims, and methods, (2) compatibility of the aims and methods. For instance, outside researchers cannot be an independent observer, and (3) participant researcher's claim: does she claim that she knows better than does any outside observer and can she set forth all the aspects that she knows? [Criteria to evaluate PR]

Analyzing her own work, Swantz argued for the potential of participatory action research: She argued that by breaking the monopoly of privileged knowledge, people can break the monopoly of bureaucratic and technocratic power. She also asserts that knowledge should be grained in people's lives and PAR should promote such knowledge production.

Some trends in the praxis of participatory action research (Rahman, Anisur. 49-62)

Rahman finds the philosophical background of PAR in Marxist's call for the working class to create their own history, yet pointed out that Marxists have shown little interest in PAR movement. Instead, Freirians or others who focused micro-level grassroots movement and "conscientization" have promoted active PAR. Looking through regional trends throughout the world, Rahman defined PAR as a 'micro ideology' (p. 60), through which the downtrodden people can create their own history by building their own science.

[As Swantz, knowledge is tied to power in the discourse of PAR. Yet, on what basis?]
Continuing the journey: articulating dimensions of feminist participatory action research (FPAR) (Collen Reid and Wendy Frisby, 93-105)

Based on their experience, the authors articulate six dimensions of FPAR:
(1) Centering gender and women's diverse experiences in addressing power;
(2) Accounting for intersectionality across the differences in gender, class, race, culture, etc.
(3) Honoring voice and difference: by articulating personal experiences based on real life, FPAR aims at revealing hidden structural and social institutions. Cooke and Kothari (2001) warned that participatory approaches could contribute to perpetuating entrenched power relations if the heterogeneity of communities is neglected or there is lack of institutional change.

The authors noted as the current limitation of FPAR: "Yet, the feminist ideals of using participatory research techniques to give voice to people's experience and create change by focusing on action aimed at social transformation have not been fully realized" (p. 99).

(4) Exploring new forms of representation by continuing to pushing boundaries of prescribed ways of conducting research;
(5) Reflexivity: The authors define reflexivity in research as making explicit the power relations and the exercise of power in the research process. They note that feminist action researchers are attentive to self criticism and consciously write about themselves into the text. Yet, they argue that writing themselves into the text is not enough; researchers should write themselves into action and activism, meaning provoking self-discovery by using researchers' own self reflection.
(6) Honoring many forms of action: FPAR sees that actions are dependent on one's social, economic and political situation and can occur at both individual and collective levels. Yet, they argue that in some FPAR, it is not always clear what actions were taken and by whom, its effect, etc. More critically, they stated:

"Another critical consideration is whether individual and local actions eventually link up to a larger social change agenda. What this should look like and what steps could be taken to accomplish this are seldom clear." (p. 102)

* Cooke, B., & Kothari, U. (2001). The case of participation as tyranny. In B. Cooke & U. Kothari (Eds.), Participation: The new tyranny? (pp. 1-15). London: Zed.

Towards transformational liberation: Participatory and action research and praxis (M. Brington Lykes & Amelia Mallona, 106-120)

The authors discussed the liberatory and transformational potential of participatory "and" action research. They argued for a preferential option for the poor and a politically contextualized psychology to realize its radical potential. In particular, looking at PAR conceived in the majority society in the 70s and 80s, they asserted:

Participatory and action research and the broad-based social movements of the time were 'walking a long road together' and, in the best of circumstances, contributed to self- and social consciousness among social actors who constructed participatory and transformative grassroots movements towards social transformation. Participatory and action research were thus situated as a resource at the interface of radical humanism and structural transformation. (p. 109)

The authors also found the same idea in participatory and action research in the late 1960s and 70s in India and Latin America, in which personal transformation was emphasized (i.e Rahman, 1990). The authors described it as radical humanism. Reflecting on their own work around participatory and action research, they wrote:

[W]e are still 'making the road as we go', ever aware of the contradictions described above and that transformational liberation is a process to be engaged in, not an endpoint or outcome that we have achieved. (p. 117)

[Action doesn't have to me immediate, as social change is less likely to occur immediately. It is a progress. Thus I would call participatory research, instead of action research or participatory action research.]

Critical theory and participatory action research (Stephen Kemmis, 121-138)
Drawing upon critical theory--in particular the work of Habermas, Kemmis theorizes a new definition of critical participatory action research (CPAR) [WHY so many words?]

He attended to the increasing emphasis on the "social" in PAR. In particular, he drew attention to Habermas's analysis of social life in late modernity and stressed "communicative spaces" that transforms subjectivity to intersubjectivity, through which people "thematize and explore issues and crises, not from the perspective of whole system (either people or states or other social totalities as 'systems') but in terms of public discussions aimed at greater understanding and transformations of social life at the moments and places where specific crises occur" (p. 122).

But in fact, Kemmis's definition of critical PAR is not new. Rather, it insinuates a change within his perspective. His emphasis on PAR was closer to Lewin's action research. In this chapter, he came to see macro-dynamics and adjoin critical theory to his own definition of PAR.

Social construction ad research as action (159-171. Kenneth J. Gergen and Mary M. Gergen)
Gergen and Gergen explores the nexus between action research and constructionist theory. (To begin with, they clarify constructionism and constructivism: Social construction refers to a tradition of scholarship that traces the origin of knowledge, meaning or understanding to human relationships, whereas constructivist scholars views processes inherent in the individual mind and their interpretation of the world.)

As the convergence between "action oriented research" and constructionist theory, the authors explore four aspects:
(1) research as political action: As opposed to posivitists who are committed to a view of scientific neutrality and value-free facts, constructionists believe that "all research is essentially a contribution to domains of meaning" regardless of the researcher's intention. Likewise, action researchers also bring forth values in their research and do not advocate universality, treating action research as like storytelling than sermonizing.
(2) collaboration beyond individualism: As another characteristic of action research that cut away from traditional positive research practices, the authors refer to collaborative methods as opposed to individualist orientation of research. (Heron and Reason (2001) emphasizeds action research as a 'practice of co-operative inquiry,' a domain of practice that researches 'with people rather than on people'). This shift from an individualist to a collectivist orientation to research methods is in tune with constructionism. The authors noted, " constructionist theory lends itself to an ontology in which relationship precedes the individual" (p. 166) and it accounts constructionists' approach to knowledge formation.
(3) From mapping to world making: as opposed to positivist program, in which researchers attempt to bring about accurate accounts of the world, constructionists believe that language cannot map the world of human behaviors and social sciences can only bring about the meaning of the world. Likewise, action researchers reject the concept of describing "the world as it is". Rather, their focus is laid on social change and to realize versions of "what the world can become" (p. 167).
(4) From theoretical and practical priority: In the positivist tradition, the ultimate goal of research is the development of general theory and research itself is important as a case to vindicate or challenge theoretical assumptions. On the other hand, constructionists believe that experimental methods are typically remote from everyday life, thus being stripped of cultural significance; abstract theory has not of use. Within this context, the authors state that action research provides a refreshing and productive alternative by attempting to change existing conditions of life, for its ultimate goal is to generate change.

*Heron, J. & Reason, P. (2001). The practice of co-operative inquiry: research "with" rather than "on" people. In P. Reason and H. Bradbury (Eds.), Handbook of action research: participative inquiry and practice (pp. 179-99). London: Sage.

Power and knowledge (172-189, John Gaventa and Andrea Cornwall)
The authors observed that participatory action researchers have focused on their critique on structural relationships between power and monopolies of knowledge. In particular, Fals-Borda and Rahman (1991) asserted that the control of knowledge and its production was as important as material and other social relations. In this light, they saw the role of PAR is to empower themselves by participating in knowledge production through action and reflection.

The authors asserted that despite slightly different understandings of the location of power (i.e. power within, power between, power embedded in social relations, etc.), PAR practitioners share an epistemological critique about ways in which knowledge is embedded and reinforced in the dominant (or positivist) knowledge production system.
(1) positivist methods distort reality by distancing those who study reality from those who experience it;
(2) traditional research methods (surveys, i.e.) further alienate powerless groups by making them the objects of another's inquiry. And, empirical, quantitative form of knowledge may reduce the complexity of human experience;
(3) it perpetuates the legitimacy of knowledge produced by a small number of privileged experts by obscuring other forms of knowledge and the voices of other knowers.

From this perspective, PAR (1) attempts to bring forth a different forms of knowledge, the authors argued, thereby letting those who directed affected by the research participate in the research process ; PAR also recognizes the social constructedness of knowledge, thus delving into collective analysis of life experiences of power and knowledge; Lastly PAR recognizes different ways of knowing and viewing reality: research often starts with popular knowledge, yet it is deepened through a dialectical process of acting and understanding. It also stresses the importance of listening to diverse voices within the group.

The authors draw a diagram of dimensions of participatory research: participation is constituted by knowledge (as a source to affect decision-making), action (involvement in such knowledge production), and consciousness (production of knowledge as consciousness builder). They observe that one or more aspects are emphasized among PAR practitioners.

[It is interesting to note that "action" is far from the concept of Lewin's action research. Action-reflection is an important cycle of the authors' PAR, yet here action is the process of participation in knowledge production itself, not the part of verification of Lewin's concept of action research.]

Ethics and action research: Deepening our commitment to principles of social justice and redefining systems of democratic practice (199-209, Mary Brydon-Miller)

Brydon-Miller analyzes key ethical principles of research within the notion of power in research setting. For her, the shared values of action research, such as "participation in democratic processes, the improvement of human life, and engagement in morally committed action" (p. 209), are the very ethical challenge among action researchers. Yet, there is a discrepancy between the morality and institutional structural for ethics review. In this light, she rejects the tradition of ethical review centered on university-based experts. She wrote:

[S]hifts in power within the research setting away from the oversight and control of university-based experts and paternalistic oversight committees and toward ownership by members of communities themselves would better reflect the ethical principles of respect for person, beneficence, and justice. This is a critical move if the full promise of these principles is to be realized in our practice as action researchers, but at the same time such redistributions of power and control carry unique challenges and genuine risks if we do not remain vigilant to the ethical implications of our practice. (p. 208)

Monday, November 29, 2010

Handbook of emergent methods

Hesse-Biber, Sharlene Nagy & Leavy, Patricia (Eds.). (2008). New York: Guilford.

Introduction. Pushing on the methodological boundaries: The growing need for emergent methods within and across the disciplines. (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, pp. 1-16).

The authors defined paradigms as "models of knowledge building that provide templates for studying social reality" and "consist of the basic concepts and ideas by which a given discipline views the word." (p. 2).

They argued that social change promotes theoretical and technological innovations and at the same time technological innovations provide the impetus for asking new questions and revealing new realities. They noted that among the researchers who use these emergent methods, they face to negotiating their identities of both insiders and outsiders: They are insiders as they know research processes, yet outsiders because they are not familiar with methods and questions they ask. They asked:

"If I conduct mu research as an "outsider," will I be overly identifying with the other's perspective? If I conduct my research as an "insider," will I lose my ability to challenge my disciplinary perspective?" (p. 4)

The authors noted that thus the development of innovative methods has occurred congruently with increased scholarship on reflexivity. In their term, reflexivity is "the practice of actively locating oneself within the research process, including the representation stage. Reflexive practice seeks to minimize the unintentional effects of power in the research process through attention to the ways that biography, authorship, and textual representations mediate the knowledge-building process, to work within an emergent method and to successfully negotiate insider and outsider status require a highly reflexive process" (p. 4)

The authors justify emerging methods as a respond to social change and our progress in understanding the social world. While emphasizing legitimizing and revealing new methods, they do not limit to specific methods or dividing them into QUAL or QUAN. Instead they asked questions about hybridity of methods. In particular, they asked about arts-based methods:" when dealing with the visual arts and other art-driven methods, how can words be transformed into images and vice versa?" (10). They also criticize lack of training program of emerging methods. What appears to be the most challenging in the era of emerging methods is epistemological justification. The authors noted:

"More than anything else, emergent methods are about advancing our understanding of the human condition. These new approaches--often initially criticized and even feared by those who feel more comfortable with conventional ways of knowing and traditional criteria for judging the usefulness of research (traditionally referred to as validity and reliability)--challenge our very conceptions of knowledge, including who creates it, what counts as knowledge, how it is to be disseminated and to whom, and how authenticity and trustworthiness can be achieved and evaluated." (p. 12)

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

Knowing poverty

:Critical reflections on participatory research and policy. Brock, Karen & McGee, Rosemary (Eds.). (2002). London: Earthscan Publications.

Introduction (Karen Brock, 1-13)
Brock observed that PR as a poverty assessment method has been accepted in dominant institution, yet methodological credibility (validity), representation, and applicability have been in debate. Alongside, PR has been criticized within. Brock focused on the process of "decontextualizing local people's knowledge"(p. 9), which questions which voices are included and excluded as local knowledge. Pointing out Chambers's chapter, Brock also noted the dilemmas and choices a researcher faces in analyzing data. Drawing on methodological, epistemological, and ethical dilemmas, Chambers argued for the necessity of reflexivity: "the process of reflecting critically on the part one plays as a researcher in the formation, framing and construction of knowledge" (p. 9).

Brock's epistemological stance is interesting to note: Knowledge in PR is inseparable from the concept of action. She wrote:

"In participatory research, knowledge is not produced for its own sake, but is seen as being embedded in processes of social change or problem solving, inseparable from the idea of action." (p. 9)

Brock sharply noted that PR is a "process of reflection, learning, and action, producing the development of a critical consciousness" (p. 10). [This model of cycle is different from that of action research--plan, action, observe...--It is more internal and fundamental, happening at the level of consciousness. Thus, I do think that the discourse of action research is distinguished from that of participatory research. Here, action is not immediate, more about influencing policy.]

Brock introduces other topics: how policy-makers learn and change? What is a local perspective on consciousness? What are the policy implications of participatory research?

Power, knowledge and policy influence: Reflections on an experience (Robert Chambers, 133-165)

In his experience, Chambers drew attention to power and knowledge. He stated that power distorts realities and frames the realities of others. In particular, he wrote:

"Researchers had power to determine how open or closed the process was. Knowledge was formed iteratively through interactions of researchers' and participants' priorities, concepts, frames, realities and patterns of analysis and representation. Academic values and practices in part conflicted with the ethics of policy influence. (p. 136)

Because of this very reason, Chambers argued for researchers' reflexivity.