Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Framing the Margins

: the social logic of postmodern culture. Harper, Phillip Brian. (1994). New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Introduction: the postmodern, the marginal, and the minor (pp. 3-29)

According to Harper, postmodernism begins with its specific ontological perspective: the individual human psyche is fundamentally incoherent, fragmented, or decentered. This decenteredness is on Harper's focus. Within this context, Harper restates the argument between Habermas and Lyotard on the topic of modernity and postmodernity and stresses that both regards the decentered experience as the postmodern condition despite their positions constitutes. Harper writes:

Habermas characterizes modernity as a motivated undertaking based in the Enlightenment impulse to provide for "the rational organization of everyday social life" This rational organization would follow from the establishment of effective communicative interaction among the three spheres of "objective science, universal morality and law, and the autonomous art," which, in the context of early modernity, had been developed as specialized realms "according to their inner logic"...Habermas identifies as postmodern the acquiescence to or embracement of the disengaged autonomy that characterizes the specialized realms of human activity in the contemporary era. This disengagement itself manifests as decenteredness in that, if there is no effective interplay among the different spheres of activity, then neither can there be any centralized "legitimating" narrative that comprises them all; but insofar as social progress for Habermas depends on just such a (modernistic) synthesizing vision, postmodernist decenteredness presents itself to him as a fundamentally conservative phenomenon to be vigorously resisted. (p. 5)

On the other hand, Harper notes that for Lyotard transparent communication as a basis of consensus consensus is both false and dangerous because of its tendency toward totalization. Harper interprets Lyotard's position:

Lyotard, in theorizing the postmodern as approximating the experience of the Kantian sublime--which is itself founded on a sort of cognitive gap, the difference between out ability to conceive of certain ideas and our inability to represent them--specifies subjective disjunction and fragmentation as key factors in the postmodern condition. (p. 8)

As to the political significance of fragmentation, Harper states that whereas for Habermas, it is a fundamentally conservative development in contemporary society, for Lyotard, it is a progressive strategy of demystification.

Harper characterizes postmodernism as the presentation of a decentered human subjectivity--here he means incoherent fragmentation of an individual psyche. He suggests that the marginalized groups' experience of decenteredness--hooks' term 'uncertainty'--is an unacknowledged factor of the general postmodern condition. Within this theoretical foundation, Harper looks into social marginality in literature. He delineates as social marginality a phenomenon reflecting political disenfranchisement due to class, gender, sexual orientation, and racial identification, and so on.

Sunday, January 24, 2010

The Postmodern Explained

Lyotard, Jean-François. (1993). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Chapter 1. Answers to the Question, What is the Postmodern? (p. 1-16)

Lyotard describes the key concept of the postmodern as "war on totality" (p. 16). In the conceptualization, he opposes in particular to Habermas on his quest of modernity through unifying experiences. Lyotard writes succinctly:

In short, Habermas demands of the arts and the experience they provide that they form a bridge over the gap separating the discourses of knowledge, ethics, and politics, thus opening the way for a unity of experience. (p. 3)

Opposing the concept of unity, Lyotard asserts that the postmodernity reexamines the thought of the Enlightenment, the idea of a uniform end of history, and the idea of the subject.

[Lyotard's idea of the postmodernity revolves primarily around aesthetic judgment.] He holds, "aesthetic judgment would only have to reach a verdict on whether a particular work conforms to the established rules of the beautiful...political academicism understands and imposes a priori criteria of the 'beautiful,' criteria that can, in one move and once and for all, select works and their public." (p. 7).

According to Lyotard, art and literary work is threatened by cultural politics coupled with a capital market order. Thus reality in such work is now to be confirmed by both science and capitalism, and we discover the lack of reality in reality. It is a condition of modernity, he argues.

Lyotard distinguishes modern/avant-guard art and postmodern/transavantguard art in terms of the representation of the "unpresentable". He states:

"[T]he avant-guardes continually expose the artifices of presentation that allow thought to be enslaved by the gaze and diverted from the unpresentable...The postmodern would be that which in the modern invokes the unpresentable in presentation itself, that which refused the consolation of correct forms, refuses the consensus of taste permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the impossible, and inquiries into new presentation--not to take pleasure in them, but to better produce the feeling that there is something unpresentable." (pp. 12-15).

For Lyotard, postmodern artists are a philosopher who constantly investigates the preestablished rules to establish new ones.

Chapter 2. Apostil on Narratives (pp. 17-21)
Defining the project of modernity as the realization of universality, Lyotard argues that the project is "liquidated". He contests that, while contemporary capitalist technoscience was instrumental to fulfilling the project, it became part of the subject that humans tried to master. As a result, contemporary technoscience profoundly "destablized" the project, as seen the populicide at Auschwitz, for instance. Within this context, Lyotard discredits the grand narratives of legitimation and calls for postmodernity, not as the end of modernity but as its anti-thesis.

Chapter 4. Memorandum on Legitimation (pp. 39-59)
In this chapter, Lyotard approaches totalitarianism from the perspective of legitimation. In the quest, he shows his political perspective. He states:

[R]ight cannot be de facto; real society draws legitimacy not from itself but from a community that is not properly nameable, merely required. One cannot deduce what a people ought to be from what it is today, nor can one deduce the concept of the universal citizen from its French or American name--only the reverse is possible. This is why, as I remarked earlier, the ferment and decomposition of the real community are inscribed in the principle of republicanism and in the history it develops. Sovereignty belongs not to the people but to the Idea of the free community. History simply marks the tension of this lack. The republic invokes freedom against security. (p. 51)

This statement implies that republicanism is based on the power of universality. Lyotard argues that totalitarianism borrows its universalizaing power from republicanism and decompose people into "masses" as its identity through authorized parties.

Chapter 7. Note on the Meaning of Post
A simple distinction Lyotard makes between modern and postmodern is that post means "a new direction from the previous one" (p. 76). On the other hand, he states as to modernity:

"The very idea of modernity is closely correlated with the principle that it is both possible and necessary to break with tradition and institute absolutely new ways of living and thinking." (p. 76).

[Lyotard, however, argues that the ideal of modernity has been destroyed for the reasons described earlier.]

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

The Location of Culture

Bhabha, Homi. (2004). London and New York: Routledge Classics. (First published in 1994)

Preface to the Routledge Classics Edition (ix-xxv)
Bhabha's interest focus on the hybrid forms of life that the marginalized produce amid the situation where their cultural integrity is negated through the ignorance of their differences. He distinguishes two discourses of globalization. In this criticism of the predominant discourse, global cosmopolitanism, he asserts that it focuses on neo-liberal forms of governance and free-market forces of competition. He states:

A global cosmopolitanism of this sort readily celebrates a world of plural cultures and peoples located at the periphery, so long as they produce healthy profit margins within metropolitan societies. States that participate in such multicultural[sic] multiculturalism affirm their commitment to 'diversity', at home and abroad, so long as the demography of diversity consists largely of educated economic migrants--computer engineers, medical technicians, and entrepreneurs, rather than refugees, political exiles, or the poor. (p. xiv)

Instead, Bhabha calls attention to globalization that deals with difference within, such as problems of diversity and redistribution at the local level and the rights and representations of minorities in the regional domain. From this view, he suggests the term vernacular cosmopolitanism, which measures global progress from minorities perspective and their claims to freedom and equality are marked by a right to difference in equality. He states:

The vernacular cosmopolitan takes the view that the commitment to a 'right to difference in equality' as a process of constituting emergent groups and affiliations has less to do with the affirmation or authentication of origins and 'identities,' and more to do with political practices and ethical choices. (p. xvii)

Bhabha sharply criticizes Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. The Article declares the rights of minority to preserve their cultural inheritance. (The current statement is as follows) "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." Bhabha contests that this statement neglects inter-cultural affiliation across minority communities. He states:

Article 27 emphasizes the need for minorities to 'preserve' their cultural identities, rather than to affiliate across emergent minority communities. For all its good intentions, such rights neglect the 'inter-cultural' political existence and ethical imperative...(p. xxii)

[The Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the sentence, "All human beings are born with equal and inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms." But it is quite intriguing that Arendt once wrote, "we are not born equal, but become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights" (The Origin of Totalitarianism, p. 297) Although the two approaches aim at the same goal of preserving human rights, Arendt emphasizes the need for struggle to achieve the goal, thus allows us to see the inveterate power differentials in our society.]


Introduction (p. 1-27)
Bhabha delineates an innovative theoretical approach as thinking beyond narratives of initial subjectivities and focus on processes produced in the articulation of cultural differences. He calls them"in-between" spaces. With respect to cultural engagement, Bhabha states:

The social articulation of difference, from minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation...The borderline engagements of cultural difference may as often be consensual as conflictual; they may confound our definition of tradition and modernity; realign the customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge normative expectations of development and progress. (p. 3)

Bhabha explains postcoloniality: (1) it focuses on the persistent 'neo-colonial' conditions within the 'new' world order and the multinational division of labor, and (2) it look at cultures 'otherwise than modern'. He describes this phrase, "Such cultures of a postcolonial contra-modernity may be contingent to modernity, discontinuous or in contention with it, resistant to its oppressive, assimilationist technologies; but they also deploy the cultural hybridity of their borderline conditions to 'translate', and therefore reinscribe, the social imaginary of both metropolis and modernity" (p. 9).

Under the postcolonial condition, Bhabha introduces the concept of unhomeliness, meaning the recess of the domestic space or simply displacement. He assert that it is inherent to inter-cultural rites and becomes historically the most intricate invasion, blurring the borders between home and world as well as private and public. [THIS REMINDS ME OF ARENDT'S ARGUMENT OF THE PRESERVATION OF PRIVATE DOMAIN]

Chapter 1. The Commitment to Theory (28-56)
Bhabha emphasizes the political commitment of a theory. Opposing to singularity, he states that hegemony requires iteration and alterity to be effectively produce politicized populations. Within this context, he argues that theoretical statements should be made through negotiation and recognition of heterogeneity, where hybrid forms of knowledge can be produced. He writes:

A knowledge can only become political through an agnostic process: dissensus, alterity and otherness are the discursive conditions for the circulation and recognition of a politicized subject and a public 'truth'. (p. 34)

He maintains that in the negotiation between politics and knowledge, theories cannot be a metanarrative claiming generality and should not lag the time and space of politics.

Bhabha notes that cultural diversity, the recognition of pre-given cultural contents and customs, gives rise to liberal notion of multiculturalism.

His perspective on the relationship between cultural meaning and language is worth to look at. [Is it similar to poststructuralism?] In his view, the act of cultural enunciation [making known] is crossed by the difference of writing. Refusing a traditional emphasis on the content of symbols and functions within different cultures, he emphasizes the structure of symbolization shaped by language. In his view, the process of language itself is crucial to creating (cultural) meanings. Thus, meaning and symbols of culture is created beyond a simple act of communication between two people and is "mobilized in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot 'in itself' be conscious " (p. 53). Therefore, this Third Space constitutes the act of cultural enunciation, which is a contradictory, ambivalent, and indeterminate space. The acknowledgment of this Third Space of cultural enunciation is critical to understanding the historical identity of culture. He states:

The intervention of the Third Space of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is customarily revealed as an integrated, open, and expanding code. Such an intervention quite properly challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homegenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People. (p. 54)

For Bhabha, the nature of culture lies not in purity, fixity, or unity but in hybridity that a Third Space produces. Bhabha describes this Third Space as an alien territory, a split-space, or inbetween space. He argues that the theoretical recognition of this space may help conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or cultural diversity in a liberal sense but on the articulation of culture's hybridity.

By emphasizing the Third Space and the hybridity of culture, he calls attention to a discontinuity of cultural identities that people bring forward in their liberatory struggle. He observes that by destroying the continuity of the nationalist tradition, people can translate and negotiate their new culture within a new context. Bhabha states:

The people are now the very principle of 'dialectical reorganization' and they construct their culture from the national text translated into modern Western forms of information technology, language, dress. The changed political and historical site of enunciation transforms the meanings of the colonial inheritance into the liberatory signs of a free people of the future. (p. 56)

Bhabha distinguishes himself from nationalists who call for the true national culture as a safeguard against colonial cultural imposition. As he notes, his perspective resonates in Fanon's. Bhabha writes, "for Fanon, the liberatory people who initiate the productive instability of revolutionary cultural change are themselves the bearers of a hybridity identity" (p. 55).

[It seems that the reason why he is called a post-colonial scholar is that his emphasis on a departure from the legacy of colonialism on the basis of the changing culture from the people.]

Chapter 7. Articulating the Archaic: Cultural difference and colonial nonsense (175-198)
Bhabha opposes to the restoration of cultural essence or authenticity. According to him, this approach is taken from the perspective of relativism for the recognition of cultural difference. Defining cultural difference as a problem caused by cultural plurality, he argues that cultural difference is not acquisition or accumulation of additional cultural knowledge, but the momentous extinction of the recognizable object of culture. Thereby he continues to emphasize a discontinuity of culture at the edge of experience. For him, culture is not a fixity, but a fluidity, disrupted by time and space.

[His discussion is not much about cultural collision within an immigrant society, rather a nation-state in a post-colonial period.]

Chapter 8. DissemiNation: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation (199-244)

Focusing on the emergence of the modern nation from the mid-nineteenth century, he defines the Western nation as an obscure and ubiquitous form of living the "locality" of culture. He argues that in the act of writing the nation, which is an apparatus of symbolic power, a continual slippage of categories, like sexuality, class affiliation, territorial paranoia or cultural difference. But Bhabha argues that by focusing on the nation-space, the narrative of nation fails to address the ambivalent and chiasmatic intersections of time and place that constitute the 'modern' experience of the Western nation. Thus his focus is placed on the temporality of the modernity.

Within this context he warns that cultural difference must not be understood from the perspective of pluralities in the "homogeneous empty" time of the national community. He states:

The question of cultural difference faces us with a disposition of knowledges or a distribution of practices that exist beside each other, abseits designating a form of social contradiction or antagonism that has to be negotiated rather than sublated...The aim of cultural difference is to rearticulate the sum of knowledge from the perspective of the signifying position of the minority that resists totalization [my emphasis]...[that] serves to disturb the calculation of power and knowledge, producing other spaces of subaltern signification. (p. 232-233)

[I seems that Bhabha regards the other spaces produced in the hybrid conditions as a site of potential subversion, but it could be and in-between culture is not powerless, however his perspective is narrated without enough evidence. The in-between culture is negotiated and can be either subversive or obedient to the totalization.]

chapter. 9 The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: the question of agency

According to Bhabha, postcolonial criticism revolves around unequal cultural representation. In order to do so, they intervene in the discourse of modernity, in particular around its rationalization, that normalizes the unequal and differential representation. Thus, they attempt to reconstitute cultural difference, social authority and political discrimination in order to reveal the oppressive function of modernity. He states that, in the discourse of cultural difference, they oppose to the continuity of an authentic 'past' and a living 'present'. Instead they see culture as a strategy of survival and focus on the transnational dimension of cultural transformation, such as migration, diaspora, displacement and relocation. Thus, he argues that the postcolonialism challenges a consensual and collusive liberal sense of cultural community. Instead, they look at culture as a disturbing practice of survival and focus on a process of alterity, which construct cultural and political identities.

Saturday, January 16, 2010

Comment to the Politics of Recognition

Walzer, Michael. 99-104

From Talyor's argument, Walzer derives two kinds of liberalism: (1) Liberalism 1 is committed to absolute individual rights and guaranteed by a state's neutrality and (2) Liberalism 2 allows state intervention to preserve a particular culture or nation within the boundaries where the basic rights of citizens are protected. Walzer delineates the first kind of liberalism as the official doctrine of immigrant societies like the United States (and federal Canada), as Rawls formulated as social unions. Under this rule, the plural unions are free to do what they need to do but without help from the state.

In reality, however, there is inequality among nationalities, social unions or cultural communities and some are more at risk than others; and the state is called upon to take responsibility for everyone's cultural survival. From this perspective, Walzer carefully proposes "Liberalism 1 chosen from within Liberalism 2" to respond to multiculturalism, that is liberalism governed by "the social condition and the actual life choices of these[sic] men and women" (p. 103). Not rejecting the idea of Liberalism 2, Walzer holds tight to the concept of Liberalism 1 in particular with respect to immigrants who made an individual choice and were prepared to take cultural risks. Thus their lives are significantly shaped by the liberal idea of individual rights. Walzer argues that this choice and their rights should not be curtailed. In addition, he contests that Liberalism 1 does not exclude support for studying otherness.

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Postcolonialism and Multiculturalism: Between Race and Ethnicity

Gunew, Sneja. (1997). The Yearbook of English Studies (The Politics of Postcolonial Criticism), 27, 22-39.

Gunew alludes that discussion of multiculturalism has become inevitable because increasing migration across borders rendered traditional national models anachronistic, but states that multiculturalism means different things in different context. For example, multiculturalism is produced out of necessity by nations and aspirants to geo-political cohesiveness despite heterogeneity within. Cultural studies focus on politics of representation in the discussion of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is also invoked within post-colonial discourses that criticize the predominance of Western culture.

Gunew calls attention to the distinction between state multiculturalism (dealing with the management of diversity) and critical multiculturalism (minorities' participation in the public sphere based on their difference). She characterizes state multiculturalism as such:

"State multiculturalism followed 'assimilation' (a term deriving from digestion and indicating 'becoming the same as') and 'integration' (separatism plus common values) and represents a kind of liberal pluralism which implies both a hidden norm from which minority groups diverge while failing to recognize prevailing power differentials." (p. 24)

Gunew notes that as seen in curriculum where ahistorical ethnic culture is celebrated, state multiculturalism holds a stance of liberal pluralism. This tendency extends to immigration deeply rooted in prejudice against minority. Gunew writes, "[i]n contrast to supposed Western tolerance the minority is often represented as primitive or uncivilized, importing its social pathologies" (p. 24)

Some implications in the discourse of state multiculturalism
Gunew points out that the emphasis on community in supporting cultural difference often leads to oppress women because, amid struggles for the maintenance of culture or tradition, women tend to be left out without agency of their interpretation or participating as a community leader.

Gunew also points out that multiculturalism's focus on culture tends to occlude or minimize political activisms and their histories: for example, literary cultural focus on black women's texts aids to depoliticize social struggles.

As observed in the public debate on political correctness and a conservative tone of multiculturalism, there has been a concern that multiculturalism carries the connotation of 'special interests' in opposition to 'general interest', or highlights oppositional minority positions.

Critical Multiculturalism
Observing pitfalls of state multiculturalism, Gunew states:

"[T]he future for critical multiculturalism lies in an alertness to the inherent 'hybridity' and diverse affiliations of all subjects which may be mobilized in varying combinations by particular
projects or events. Coalitions may be built around 'mutual and reciprocal relativization'" (p. 26-27)

Gunew refers to race, ethnicity and diaspora as three hidden reference points in the discourse of nation-building within a context of multiculturalism, in particular, in Australia). Observing that the term race is replaced by ethnicity, Gunew summarizes that while ethnicity, largely conceived as a cultural term, is structured to a concomitant desire for citizenship, race, once prevailed as irreducible differences, is structured by the desire to be human. Gunew's quote from Goldberg succinctly describes the oppositions between the two term.

"As Goldberg states, 'Race is irrelevant, but all is race' (p. 6), that is, irrelevant because while there are no non-arbitrary or absolute markers of race, debates about and struggles around race in a variety of societies are really about the meaning and nature of political consittution and community: 'Who counts as in and who out, who is central to the body politic and who peripheral, who is autonomous and who dependent?' (p. 83). Another way of putting it is to see it in this period of history as a struggle over who controls the codes and practices of nation-building." (p. 30) [Goldberg, Racist Culture]

Gunew asserts that diaspora hinges the oppositions of race and ethnicity and is seen as threats to a cohesive nation. As to the impact of diaspora, she states:

"Diasporic allegiances along the race ethnicity vector breach the homogeneity of the nation state with other affiliations, of increasing importance in the new structures of globalization. To some extent this movement of global connections is also happening amongst the indigenous peoples who are forming alliances across those nation-states imposed on them as a way of confirming solidarity for claims often grounded in land rights." (p. 30)

In spite of the emphasis of recent multiculturalism on a recognition of differences, Gunew criticizes that state multiculturalism, prevailing in the US, Canada and Australia, fails to see power differentials among competing minority groups, thus hold a profoundly conservative pluralist model.

Observing the floating meanings of whiteness, Gunew questions practices of cultural critiques and states:

"Appeals to the facts of a nation's history are not really at issue here, since we are dealing rather with metaphors and signifying systems mobilized as part of a rhetoric of the national culture concerned with identifying insiders and outsiders." (p. 36)

To her and other post-colonial scholar, alterity, being otherness, is an important concept. Gunew refers to Said's Orientalism as the founding study for the construction of alterity, while placing Homi Bhabha's work in relation to borders and hybridity (Culture's In Between, Artforum, September 1993).

Finally Gunew's emphasis of critical multiculturalism lies on the intertwined relationship between the local and the global because it introduces minority perspectives while suggesting diasporic networks. In this vein, she maintains that multiculturalism is a floating signifier that gains meaning and strategies only in a specific context. Local contextualization is essential in critical multiculturalism.

Cultural Pluralism: An Overview of the Debate since the 60s

Helly, Denise. (2002). Ethnopolitics, 2(1), 75-96.

Helly, Montreal based, notes that public controversy over the equality of minorities since the 1960s has triggered a large-scale academic debate on cultural differentiation in a modern political system. This article provides an overview of the debate and an examination of the theoretical positions.

Political liberalism and republicanism
Helly suggests political liberalism and republicanism as two extreme political stance in liberty and equality, which came to a target of criticism in the 19th century. Political liberalism, based on classical liberalism, emphasizes an autonomous individual who has unconquerable liberty and freedom. According to this view, thus, cultural diversity is a natural extension of individual diversity and the state cannot intervene to define common morality and cultural values; instead, collectivity in this model can be negotiated only through individual reasoning. Thus Helly notes that the political in this view is instrumental and administrative. This perception is parallel to political relativism, as Gutmann notes.

Republicanism, on the other hand, does not rely solely on individual reasoning to obtain common values. As Helly observes, republicanism recognizes cultural and political dissidence, but it calls attention to "the predatory effect of liberty upon equality" (p. 76), because of the passivity of citizens. Thus, central to republicanism is to place collective interests over individual desires in order to preserve equality among people. From this perspective, republicanism emphasizes a construction of citizenship to instruct an active political behavior and build a public morality. This state's active role in civil society constitutes a sharp contrast with liberalism, which adheres to the insurmountable individual right to liberty.

Critics
Helly examines critics of these perspectives (fictitious argument over liberty and freedom) from various sectors since 1940s in North America. Helly states that Black and feminist movement in the United States and francophone movement in Canada reveals the illusory character of anti-discrimination law enactment. At the center of the critique is the debate on culture: minority rights, communinatianism, and nation and ethnocentrism. (I substantiate the debate around minority rights from Kymlicka and Norman.)

[Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Kymlicka & Norman (Eds.) Intro. 1-41]
Characterizing the Culture Wars in the 1980s and early 1990s as minority rights against cultural dominance, Kymlicka and Norman inquire whether minority rights can coexist the virtue of democratic citizenship and how the rights relate to underlying principles of liberal democracy, such as individual freedom and equality. They argue that the relationship between minority rights or cultural diversity and citizenship ideals is complex and no definite answers have been found yet. In their argument, however, the author allude to the importance of citizenship education and practices to build cohesion and generate common sense and values among diverse cultural groups.

In contrast to the concept of rational individuals, predominantly supported by John Rawls's A theory of Justice (1971), communitarianism (Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1982; Taylor) emphasizes individual interaction with others and communities in the process of construction of identity. In this view, cultural inclusion and recognition are crucial to a human's well-being and this recognition has to be won. Taylor states:

"Yet inwardly derives, personal, original identity doesn't enjoy this recognition a priori. It has to win it through exchange, and the attempt can fail. What has come about with the modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail. That is why the need is now acknowledged for the first time." (The Politics of Recognition, 34-35)

Taylor contests that liberalism cannot claim complete cultural neutrality because a scheduling of rights among different cultural interests is inevitable, thus liberalism is a fighting creed. Thus Helly notes that from communitarian perspective, the cultural neutrality of the state is a myth and only reinforces cultural dominance.

Helly asserts Article 27 of the the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the optimal liberal answer to the protection of minority culture by making it an interpretive clause of individual rights:

Article 27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.

Helly locates communitarian responses, in particular from Taylor and Michale Walzer, as a liberal response to demands for multicultural diversity. According to Taylor, a recognition of cultural differences is necessary to obtain individual participation in political and collective life. For him, a politics of recognition is important in two levels: in the intimate sphere, and in the public sphere. As noted earlier, a politics of recognition is important as identity is formed in relation to significant others. This recognition comes to play a bigger role in the public sphere as this recognition refuses second-class citizenship, thus inviting a cohesion among the diversity. (FIND THE PHRASE)

As a republican response to demands for multicultural diversity, Helly notes that republican emphasizes political commonality and the unity of sovereign people reinforced by anti-discriminatory legislation and public intercultural education. Notable is Tourain. Helly summarizes his perspective: Tourain, criticizing a policy of cultural pluralism, focuses on ways in which social rules make reconcile individual sovereignty over their own life experience and diverse cultural identities. Thus for Tourain, democracy is an instrument of cultural communication and public school must be a place for the formation of respect for cultural differences, toleration, and for the intercultural.

(Touraine, Alain, 1994, Qu'est-ce que la Démocratie? Paris, Fayard.
; 1997, Pourrons-nous vivre ensemble? Égaux et différents)

Helly states that an inherent tension of the modern state lies between the cultural foundation of a specific society and its universal principles. Instead of relying on the abstract rationality of the state or universalism, the state exercises its sovereignty by intentionally integrating populations in different territories and creating a political identity in order to complement the abstract notion of the political identity.

It is interesting to note the way Helly approaches the formation of nationalism in the 19th century in Europe. Borrowing Gellner's argument, she sheds light on the ways in which capitalism played a role in forging nationalism by homogenizing culture and experiences and creating the sense of belonging to a territorial entity. In this process, she notes, citizenship and nationalism flourished and a good citizen became a patriot.

As to minority nations, Helly observes the idea that the state must become multinational (Resnick 1994; Gagnon and Rocher 1997; Bourque and Duchastel
2000). She asserts the implication of this idea in Canadian context:

"In Canada, this solution implies the sharing, amongst Quebecois and also some sixty native nations, of powers relating to the organization of collective life (Royal Commission 1996), as well as an alliance with the federal state in matters of money and international politics." (p. 87)

In response to the liberal argument that cultural rights would form closed communities and harm the unity among cultural groups, Helly argues that cultural rights concerns persons, not groups, and cultural rights do not interfere with the collectivity among the groups. For instance, Article 27 does not annul the predominance of the two official languages in Canada. She further notes that the only granted collective right in the Charter is the right to impose French as official language in Quebec. [This indicates that Quebec is a special case in Canada among many national groups. Quebec itself is not composed of the same cultural group, but the predominance of French culture is recognized as such in the federal level. Looking at Quebec at a micro level is an interesting topic to see how a cultural diversity is played out.]

As to a post-modern response to cultural plurality, Helly points out that post-modernism denies the unitary idea of living together and all controls exerted by the state codify a particular form of cultural plurality and create a illusion of commonality and social unity.

Lastly Helly states as to social cohesion:

"It affirms that 'social cohesion' grows out of cooperation between individuals and constitutes a source of social peace, equality and a sense of social belonging. It suggests that this cohesion is eroded by the decline of civic life, of political interest, of social solidarity, and an absence of any
sense of social obligations on the part of individuals." (p. 89)

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics

Gutmann, Amy. (1993). Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (3), 171-204.

Gutmann examines political controversies over social justice in multicultural contexts. She begins her argument by defining multiculturalism as "the state of a society or the world containing many cultures that interact in some significant way with each other" whereas a culture id defined as a human community associated with a set of social standards of seeing, doing and thinking.

Her aim in this essay:
(1) understanding the essential challenge of multiculturalism to social justice
(2) assessing three responses: cultural relativism, political relativism, and comprehensive universalism
(3) proposing deliberative universalism as a more defensible response

The response of Cultural Relativism
Gutmann notes that social justice, according to cultural relativism, is the distribution of social goods responding to their cultural meaning. As seen the debate on polygamy among Mormons, such meanings change over time. Thus, if there exist multiple meanings for any given good, cultural relativism will require reformulation to deal with these competing meanings to apply to social justice, Gutmann explains.

Gutmann rightly points out that because cultures are often distinguished by a set of dominant social understandings, cultural relativism can threaten to identity social justice with the dominant social norms, as seen examples of justifying slavery or women's role. She states that there has been no demonstrated general consensus to the dominant discourses. She states:
"Because social understandings are typically not shared among all members of a culture and dominant understandings do not determine justice, cultural relativism does not fulfill its promise of dissolving multicultural conflicts. It often does not even recognize moral conflicts within cultures, let alone resolve them." (p. 178)

Political Relativism
Gutmann states that social justice, according to political relativism, is achieved through institutional mechanism to adjudicate internal disagreement over social meanings and adjust distribution of social justice based on the outcome. Gutmann argues that political relativism is more adequate response to multicultural conflicts than cultural relativism because its recognition of a political community, where disagreements over social meanings are discussed and negotiated, and a provision for certain forms of procedural justice, such as forums for argument, negotiation, and so on, highlights a necessary condition of social justice; this condition, just procedures, alone, however, cannot guarantee the complete morality, she critiques.

Gutmann implies that democracy is a procedure and does not necessarily determine justice, although democratic procedures may be the best for provisionally settling many conflicts. She continues to argue, "[i]n situations of racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts within democratic societies, majoritarian procedures may deny minorities personal security, basic liberty, and decent living standards" (p. 180).

Observing cases where political procedures failed to bring just outcomes, Gutmann states:

"The strength of political relativism lies in its recognition that disagreements over social meanings should be publicly discussed, negotiated, and adjudicated. Its weakness lies in its silence regarding standards, other than social agreement, by which to judge the justice of procedures or their results." (p. 182)

The Relation Between Relativism and Personal Identity
Gutmann asserts that people, belonging to multiple cultures at a time, as well as societies are multicultural even within an orthodox religious group, for instance. This nature, however, does not lead to a cosmopolitan view about social justice, Gutmann notes. People negotiate their identities. Gutmann writes:

"Cultural and political identities are neither given like hair color nor chosen like high cuisine. People select, interpret, and evaluate stories, histories, and customs in attempts to make the best out of the various cultures given to them. They also interpret and evaluate the institutions, laws, practices, and procedures of the political community they inherit...Cultural and political relativism leave too little room for recognizing this distinctively human capacity, exercised most self-consciously by people who endure systematic social injustice." (p. 185)

The Challenge of Relativism
Gutmann argues that a fundamental challenge of relativism lies in that it fails to explain an Archimedean point outside any cultural or political community from which to justify the overriding of local understandings. Looking at Nazi Germany's dominant favor for racial discrimination yet unjust, she calls attention to certain universal values. She clarifies universalism:

"Universalism depends on the possibility of justifying actions to people who do not share the same communal attachments, and this possibility is not undermined by the idea that moral criticism comes from within particular cultures." (p. 192)

Gutmann states that universalism, in practice, better fits the force of criticisms of arbitrary arrests and systematic deception by regime.

The Response of Comprehensive Universalism
Gutmann refers to comprehensive universalism as another response to the challenge of multiculturalism. By comprehensive universalism, she means an ethical application of a set of comprehensive principles of justice to all modern culture. In comparison, she defines deliberative universalism as follows:

Deliberative universalism [sic] relies partly upon a core of universal principles and partly upon publicly accountable deliberation to address fundamental conflicts concerning social justice, conflicts that reason has yet to resolve. (p. 193)

Partly because a universalist political ethics cannot be comprehensive in practice and comprehensive univeralism overlooks moral disagreements, such as individual choice vs. abortion, concerning social justice within a specific local context, Gutmann favors for deliberative universalism, which leaves room for local negotiation.

The Response of Deliberative Universalism
Gutmann succinctly writes:

"Unlike comprehensive universalism, deliberative universalism explicitly recognize that some conflicts over social justice cannot now (or perhaps ever) be resolved by a comprehensive, universally justifiable set of substantive standards. These conflicts are best addressed and provisionally resolved by actual deliberation, the give and take of argument that is respectful of reasonable differences." (p. 197)

In this way, she convenes relativism and universalism. Gutmann's favor for deliberative universalism partly stems from the condition that the reasonable argument can create. She writes:

[T]he give and take of respectful argument can create the broadest justifianle consensus across a range of reasonable but conflicting positions because mutual respect enjoins an economy of moral disagreement, the search for substantive points of convergence between fundamentally irreconcilable positions. (p. 199)

Gutmann alludes that the difference between deliberative universalism and political relativism lies in that social justice consists of deliberation as well as substantive principles that are necessary to secure basic human well-being. (p. 200) In this respect, Gutmann stresses that there should be certain conditions for deliberation to work in society, because "deliberation not only supplements substantive principles of justice but also presupposes certain substantive principles as well as procedural requirements." (p. 200) Thus she calls for substantive and procedural principles that make deliberative universalism distinctively suitable for making decisions about social justice.

Another reason for favoring deliberative universalism that Gutmann mentions is that "multiculturalism requires deliberation on many matters of social justice" (p. 204).


[Gutmann's emphasis on deliberative universalism is comparable with Charles Taylor's 'minimal rationality', as Bhabha summarizes (the location of culture, 2004). For Taylor, a plurality of standards which stem from incommensurable cultures does not rule out judgments of superiority. Rather, it is the plurality that exist between the incommensurable that leads to such judgments. He states:

What more is involved comes out of in the different judgments we make when we compare incommensurable cultures and activities. The judgments take us beyond merely formal criteria of rationality, and point us toward the human activities of articulation which give the vale of rationality its sense. (Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p. 151)

Thus, Talyor refutes pluralism and calls attention to the rationality that is formed through our comparative judgments between incommensurable cultures. This rationality not only avoids inconsistency among cultures but also constitutes superior judgments out of our attuned and humane interests in other cultures that coexist in the same space.]